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Editorial on the Research Topic
Lacanian Psychoanalysis
The tricky thing about knowing is that one not just wishes to know, it is that one wishes to know,
so to speak, for real. No kidding, the real-real, not the fake-real, that is what science, and yes, also
psychoanalysis, are after. Certainly, the modern sciences were driven by the Greek ideal of being
proven right in name of the truth—and not just, like the sophist, by the simple fact of wanting to
be right. And the sciences of today are just on the same track, no matter how much relativity they
are willing to take on board.
All this is a matter of speaking, of course, and psychoanalysis, and certainly Lacan’s return
to Freud, time and again confront us exactly with that: from the moment we speak, we, human
subjects, are into the issue of truth, that is, into the issue of truth-seeking, inevitably and often quite
desperately so. But then, psychoanalysis can reveal, perhaps more than any other discourse today,
the decoys at play in this truth-seeking business, as well as the eagerness with which we are all
inclined to forget about them, as if truth must be there, somewhere, somehow, even if only a little
bit, just a little bit, . . .
In psychoanalysis, it is Lacan who most insistently stresses that the drive to know is what pulls
us into subjectivity. And the fact that he is known to be most difficult of access, is perhaps related to
that: the question for him is not to tell how things really are—how could he, after all?—it is to have
us, all of us, one by one, circle around the structural impossibility that marks us as speaking beings,
and to have us, all of us, one by one, address the question of what it means for us to have wanted and
to continue to want to know. To attempt to overcome this structural impossibility is what makes us
suffer, as it is what makes up our pleasure and enjoyment. In this structural impossibility lies our
whole possibility.
This small introductory note is meant to invite the readers of this special issue on Lacanian
Psychoanalysis to look upon the contributions from this methodological angle: the point is not
to approach them against the background of a possible “real-real” truth, it is to consider them,
each in their own way, clinically, theoretically, philosophically, as potential small eye openers...
Clinically, for the occasions where the overall “wanting to cure”—a scandal, as Artonin Artaud
reminds us—risks to overrule the very singular way speaking beings have of traveling in subjectivity,
of inhabiting it by finding their very own and proper way of dying, as Freud so poignantly states in
“Beyond the pleasure principle.” Theoretically, for the occasions where the sciences—in this regard
it are most of the time the neurosciences—are invoked to bring on the “objective” authority, the
“real” truth, and where not much room is left, except in the defensive mode, for a diverging voice,
or a voice at all. Philosophically, for the occasions where the truth risks to pass only under the cover
of an objectivity that speaks for itself, leading to an objectivism that can only side with a subjectivism
that is as homeless and voiceless as it is itself.
This special issue contains 12 contributions.
Within the “Hypothesis and Theory” section, we have 5 contributions:
The contribution of Feyaerts and Vanheule, “The Logic of Appearance: Dennett,
Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis,” deals with Daniel Dennett’s take on the neurosciences,
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psychoanalysis, and contemporary phenomenology. It is the logic
of appearance, stemming from Lacanian psychoanalysis, that
serves here as a wager to confront and assess ideas about the first
person perspective, consciousness, and issues of naturalization.
Potier and Putois start in “A Lacanian Approach to Medical
Demand, With a Focus on Pediatric Genetics: A Plea for
Subjectivization” from clinical experience in pediatric genetics.
They take Lacan’s remarks on the unconscious demand as a
source of inspiration, and address the question in what sense
medical demand, with healing and curing as its objects, can be
viewed as a special instance of it—medical demand as an instance
of transference, i.e., as an instance of seeking knowledge on the
cause of one’s desire. The notion of implicit demand is especially
highlighted here, in line with the work of Raimbault, in turn
inspired by Lacan, and this allows the authors to suggest that it
might be interesting to supplement the medical perspective of
curing and healing by what the “family myth” presents in relation
to guilt and disease.
From a more historical angle, Razon et al. then give, in “The
Lacanian Concept of Cut in Light of Lacan’s Interactions with
MaudMannoni,” a detailed explanation on howMaudMannoni’s
clinical experiences fed Lacan’s theorizing of the concept of the
cut and the symbolic operation through which the object a
is produced.
In “TheMark, the Thing, and the Object: On what Commands
Repetition in Freud and Lacan” Van de Vijver et al.’s “Beyond
the pleasure principle,” the compulsion to repeat and Lacan’s
commentary on it. For Lacan the compulsion to repeat
articulated in terms of jouissance, is a genuine break with the
pleasure principle. Over and again Lacan stresses that repetition
is the basis of subjectivity, not intentionality. Man is driven to
repeat what was structurally missed and not be guided by what
brings satisfaction to his needs.
Westphal and Lamote discuss in “The Clinic of Identifications
in the Different Processes of Metamorphosis Into Woman” the
function of identification of the unconscious subject in relation
to the body, the body image, and the other. Clinical examples
and examples out of the literature bring the authors to sustain
that transsexualism, and metamorphosis into woman, can be
considered as a way to problematize the relation to the body and
to the other—a new opportunity and a new challenge in light of
the changed legal context.
In the “Conceptual Analysis” sectionwe have 4 contributions:
The relation between psychoanalysis and neuroscience is the
subject of Aguiar’s “The ‘Real Without Law’ in Psychoanalysis
and Neurosciences.” Lacan’s adage “The real of psychoanalysis
is without law” apparently contrasts sharply with what the real
is for science, i.e., according to Lacan, entirely governed by
laws. Neither Lacan nor Freud defended an incompatibility
between psychoanalysis and science, and the latest discoveries
in neuroscience seem to bring them closer, in as far namely
that contingency (“the real without law”) plays an ever more
important role in the sciences.
Dimitriadis explores in “The Psychoanalytic Concept of
Jouissance and the Kindling Hypothesis” the relation between
Lacan’s effort to articulate the concept of jouissance, current
researches in the neurosciences, and clinical phenomena that
witness to the fact that jouissance becomes “kindled,” i.e., escapes
the control of the symbolic process. He suggests that the process
of kindling can have a destructive effect, also in the brain, that he
proposes to coin as a “psychosomatic disease of the brain.”
In “The Individual and the Collective: Sociological Influences
on Lacan’s Concept of the Relation Subject—Other,” Schrans
gives a large exposition of the development of the family in
Western and other societies elaborated by thinkers as Durkheim,
Mauss, and Lévi-Strauss. It is shown how Lacan was influenced
by these sociologists, how he changed his standpoint from a
principle of an imaginary identification in the family to a concept
in which the subject is structured in a symbolic system.
Vulnerability is the main concept under study in “Language
and Vulnerability—A Lacanian Analysis of Respect” by Laufer
and Santos. The article discusses the way in which Lacanian
psychoanalysis allows to take into account the vulnerability of the
subject, without reducing it thereby to a victim. Underlying here
is the issue of the identity of the subject.
In the “Perspective article” section we have 2 contributions:
Lepoutre et al. give in “The Lacanian Concept of Paranoia: An
Historical Perspective” an outline of Lacan’s concept of paranoia
that he considered as the “resistant nucleus” of psychosis in
contrast with schizophrenia. Opposite to the neo-Kraepelinian
approach in the DSM-enterprise where paranoia as a concept
loses of its importance, Lacan puts it in the center of his theory on
psychosis. The authors plea for a reinvestment of Lacan’s concept
of paranoia because of its subtleties and theoretical potentiality.
Ouvry informs us in “Lacan and Adolescence: The
Contemporary Clinic of the ‘Sexual Non-rapport’ and
Pornography” on the “Sexual Non-rapport” and pornography
among adolescent boys. He explores two clinical phenomena and
their risk of pathological fixation: pornography and conspiring
thinking. Two aspects of the same principle are at stake: “seeing
it” [ça voir] and “knowledge” [savoir] applied to sexuality
(pornography) and to truth (conspiracy theories). In both cases
there is a denial of the recognition of the “other jouissance.”
In the “Opinion Article” section, we have 1 contribution:
De Battista deals in on “Lacanian Concept of Desire in
Analytic Clinic of Psychosis” with Lacan’s concept of desire in
psychosis. She discusses the relative absence of references to the
concept of psychotic desire in Lacan scholarship, and takes up
the challenge of attempting to reconsider it in ways other than
departing from the concept of the Name-of-the-Father.
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INTRODUCTION
The conceptof desire is central to Lacan’s theory and practice, even if it is not among the four
fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis—unconscious, Trieb, repetition, transference, it can be
understood that it underlies all of them. The concept of desire is inherent to the ethics of
psychoanalysis that Lacan formulated, therefore it is especially concerned with a practice whose
operation is defined by the function of analyst’s desire. However, this central thesis of Lacan has
been called into question with regard to psychosis. Some Lacanian scholars have derived from the
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father a lack of desire in psychosis.
This paper aims to discuss the relative absence of references to the concept of psychotic desire
in Lacanian schools. The debate is relevant because Lacan did exclude neither desire nor psychosis
from his conception of analytic treatment.
It is frequent that in the transmission of the approach of this type of cases into the Lacanian
schools, the concept of desire is not used, but rather the consequences of its absence are emphasized
(De Battista, 2012). For example, in two of the latest publications compiled by Miller, where there
are more than 20 clinical cases of psychosis treated by Lacanian analysts, the concept of desire is
not evoked to think about the changes caused by the cure. In the clinical cases where this concept is
mentioned, the authors highlight that desire has not operated (cf. Borie, 2011; Dewambrechies-La
Sagna, 2011; Di Ciaccia, 2011; Zerghem, 2011; Klotz, 2012; Magnin et al., 2012).
In the argumentation of these authors, this non-operational desire would go hand in hand with
intrusive and invasive phenomena that would account for a delocalized jouissance, whose restraint
would depend on its fixation through identifications, delusional metaphors or writing practices,
introducing a limitation of jouissance (Maleval, 2000; Soria Dafunchio, 2008; Miller, 2011, 2012).
Other authors claim that desire would not be absent in psychosis (Lombardi, 1992; Soler, 2004),
nonetheless it is restricted to paranoia, declaring its abolition in schizophrenia (Quinet, 2006).
However, even in those cases where psychotic desire is considered, the affirmation of its existence
does not go hand in hand with a clarification of its operation in the cure. The authors again resort
to the idea of an invasion of jouissance, which should be limited (Soler, 1987; Quinet, 2006; Soria
Dafunchio, 2008; Miller, 2011, 2012; Redmond, 2013).The notion of limitation of jouissance is that
which is most frequently used to account for the analytical treatment of psychosis (Maleval, 2000).
In view of the current state of affairs with regard to the subject treated, the following questions
deserve—in my view—an investigation.
Firstly, Is desire the exclusive patrimony of those clinical types derived from the père-version
(neurosis/perversion)? What would be the Lacanian arguments to sustain the absence of desire in
psychosis? Secondly and according to my hypothesis of the importance of psychotic desire, which
kind of desire would operate in psychosis?
LACANIAN CONCEPT OF DESIRE
On his return to Freud, the Lacanian perspective reintroduces the question of desire as the
basis of analytic experience. Desire and unconscious go hand in hand for Freud. The Freudian
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notion of desire is early linked to the effort toward motility
and the difference between what is found and what is sought:
negativity and lack that drive the indestructible pursuit of
desire.Unconscious desire is then the core of our being. Desire
irrigates us, innervates us and includes that vital and sexual
dimension. It seems to be the way by which Trieb, thanks to the
institution of a fault, works in the unconscious, thus becoming a
kind of Trieb destiny, a treatment of the real of the body.
Lacan (1966a) pointed out that the question of desire
remained veiled in the conceptualizations of analytic experience.
He proposed to reintroduce it in terms of an ethic that is not that
of Aristotle—which exiles the desire to be beyond the domain of
reason—but it is rather in harmony with the purposes of Spinoza,
who conceives desire as the essence of human kind. A journey
through references, brief and metonymic as our object seems to
demand, reminds us that for Lacan desire is also linked to the vital
impulse and to libido (Lacan, 1986, 1971–1972). Desire cannot
be said, it is manifested in the interval, in the interstices and
defined for Lacan as the metonymy of being in the subject, or the
metonymy of the lack in being (Lacan, 2013).This definition is
maintained throughout the entirety of his teaching. Even in 1975,
Lacan argues that the unconscious determines the subject as
being, being that disappears in the metonymy in which the desire
is supported, impossible to say as such (Lacan, 1974–1975).The
desire can be articulated but it is not articulable, it is irreducible to
the demand and the necessity, cannot be named, cannot be sifted,
it is of the order of the unconscious fault (Lacan, 1976–1977).
However, desire can be clinically verified (Lacan, 2005).
For Lacan, desire is established in the dialectic of the fault.
The Other gives the subject an experience of his desire which is
the basis of the position in the structure. This implies a certain
dependence on the desire of the subject with respect to the
desire of the Other, whereby the desire for desire is the essential
dimension (Lacan, 1986). The subject is born into language and
is already determined in his unconscious by the desire of the
Other, it is born of a desire (Lacan, 1971–1972, 1974–1975).
The point is to have been desired, that is what we found in the
analytic experience, even for those to whom that experience was
perturbed in their constitution.
NEUROTIC POSITION AND PSYCHOTIC
POSITION WITH RESPECT TO DESIRE
The relation of the subject’s desire to the Other’s desire is not
a structure reserved solely for neurosis. Lacan (2013) is explicit
in this respect, when he says that “it is an essential structure,
not only of neurosis, but of every analytically defined structure”
(p. 502). He does not renounce to situate the position of desire
in different structures; there would then be different forms of
desire and different subjective structures. The relations of desire
become the field where analytic experience is articulated and
this implies an ethic of desire characteristic of psychoanalysis, an
ethics that sets the question of the analyst’s desire. Analysts are
intermediaries, they preside over the advent of desire, they are a
kind of midwives of desire (Lacan, 2013).
If we return to the different subjective structures and the
different forms of desire, we find that for the neurotic, whose
position in desire is the fantasy, the metaphorical reference to the
Name-of-the-Father knots the registers and establishes an oedipal
psychic reality, therefore religious. The object a, cause of desire,
is trapped in the center of the knot. The desire is mediated by the
phallic reference that gives it a common measure and symbolizes
the X of the mother’s desire. The function of the father knots
desire to a law, that of the interdiction of incest: here is the père-
version (Lacan, 1974–1975). The X of desire is fixed on the fantasy
that brings an interpretation. The neurotic subject has a relation
to desire by the way of fantasy, due to the fact that fantasy has the
function of sustaining desire.
Notably, the situation is different for the psychotic subject,
because his condition implies the rejection of the father’s
metaphorical reference, that is, the foreclosure of the Name-of-
the-Father, a circumstance of the subjective position for Lacan
(1966b). But the absence of the father’s metaphor does not
condition the presence of desire, whose support is not metaphor
but metonymy. Consequently, if the Name-of-the-Father has
been rejected, the metaphorical effect in this point does not
occur and the X of the maternal desire is not symbolized by the
signifier of the phallus: which is why the desire of the Other is not
symbolized (Lacan, 1998).
According to Lacan (1986), the desire of the mother is the
founding desire of the whole structure, and in the psychotic
subject it is outside of the symbolization introduced by the
paternal metaphor, therefore the knotting of records does not
occur in an Oedipal way. This argument is not enough to say
that there is no desire in the psychotic, but rather that it is a
not symbolized desire, without the reference that introduces the
phallus as a signifier of the lack.
Evidently, Lacan’s intention has not been to exile desire from
the field of psychosis. What is in question is the reference that
desire can find in the signifier of lack, the phallus, but not the
existence of desire itself. Then, the question would not be that of
the absence of desire in psychosis, but that of a desire which is not
symbolized by the Name-of-the-Father. That is, a desire that is
not knotted to the law of the father, dimension that characterizes
the position of the psychotic as one of rejection of the paternal
imposture. The desire of the psychotic would not be sealed by the
consent of the father.
A close bond between desire and the law of the father has
veiled that for Lacan desire is an absolute condition. That is to
say, desire is not relative to another thing, it is detached from
the dependence to something else. Desire makes the law and not
the law which introduces the desire. Desire is autonomous with
regard to the mediation of the law, the law itself originates from
desire and not vice versa (Lacan, 1966c). A certain transmission
effect has reversed this assertion, by concluding that the law
of the Father is the one that introduces the desire, and then it
follows that the psychotic’s rejection of the Name-of-the Father
implies an exclusion from desire. But Lacan did not make the
Name-of-Father or the law the absolute condition, but desire.
In this way, the question of desire remains in Lacan beyond the
father, it concerns the condition of the speaking being in language
and does not necessarily entail the operation of a metaphorical
reference. The desire offers a key to read what could knot real,
symbolic, and imaginary without reference to the Name-of-the-
Father and without this being constituted in a deficient condition,
but simply different.
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Desire is an absolute condition, not relative to something
else, desire is the essence of the human being. This thesis is
maintained throughout the teaching of Lacan: from the 50s to
the late 80s, the desire is at the heart of the analytic experience as
a possible Triebschicksale (Lacan, 1980). In 1962, Lacan affirms
that the specificity of psychosis with respect to desire is that,
in its structuring, the psychotic does not know the phallus and
the Other, therefore the body acquires all the importance. One
example of this thesis could be found in Cotard’s syndrome where
Lacan (1978) recognized a desire of death. However, this one
is not the only form of psychotic desire that Lacan places, in
1974–1975 he also speaks of frozen desire in paranoia (Lacan,
1974–1975).
CONCLUSION
However, the position on the desire differs in neuroses, psychosis,
and perversion. In the case of psychotic desire, Lacan has
affirmed a fundamental relationship with the body (Lacan,
1961–1962). The references worked allow us to propose that
the problem is not a lack of desire in psychosis, but rather
its support. We can determine delusional supports of desire,
as in Schreber’s case, or symptomatic supports of desire as
in Joyce’s solution “desire to be an artist who will keep the
critics busy for three hundred years” (Lacan, 2005: 88). Both
of them have a common term: the asymptotic character. One
possible clinical application of these references is to question
the position of the psychotic in desire. From this perspective,
the analyst’s position is relevant because of its specificity:
become the cause of the analysand’s desire, a sort of “tailored
partenaire” for the psychotic, who finds it difficult to sustain his
desire.
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In the present essay, we aim to develop and contrast three different positions toward
Sellars’ distinction between the manifest and scientific images of man: Dennett’s
philosophical reconstruction of neurocognitive science, contemporary phenomenology
and psychoanalysis. We will suggest that these respective traditions and the substantial
differences between them can be understood in terms of a ‘logic of appearance.’
Related to this are differing ideas about the rights and limits of the first-person
perspective, the relation between conscious experience and belief, and the issue of
naturalization. In the final part, we will try to specify, on the basis of a detailed reading
of the disagreement between Dennett and phenomenology, in what way psychoanalytic
theory could respond to these different issues.
Keywords: Dennett, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, subjectivity, experience, belief
INTRODUCTION
In his Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, Wilfrid Sellars offered a condensed diagnosis
that seems to retain a certain validity with respect to our current philosophical, scientific and
social predicament. Sellars (1991) famously talked about a discord fueled by the conflict between
two apparently opposing “images” of man-in-the-world (1991, p.5): on the one hand, a manifest
image which represents the tentative and provisional collection of ideas and assumptions we
spontaneously adopt to characterize ourselves and the world we live in. Chief among these are ideas
closely related to our immediate self-understanding as subjects endowed with self-consciousness,
a certain extent of freedom of choice, gifted with reason but also desires, and so on. On the other
hand, a relatively recent, but continually expanding scientific image of man as a “complex physical
system” (1991, p. 25) – that is, an image conspicuously unlike its manifest double, but one which
can be progressively distilled from various burgeoning scientific disciplines, such as neurology,
physics, evolutionary biology and cognitive science.
In a more recent past, Sellars’ distinction has found a renowned application in the work of
the well-known philosopher of cognitive neuroscience, Daniel Dennett. For the past few decades,
Dennett has been vehemently advocating against “the fantasy of first-person science” (Dennett,
2001), arguing, amongst other things, that there is no such thing as a ‘Cartesian theater’ where
private things happen that are spontaneously revealed before a ‘mental I/eye’, one that, moreover,
would form an unsurpassable source for self-knowledge from a first-person perspective. Why
indeed, Dennett asks, should we give up our scientific abstinence when, compared to some
other notorious fictive entities such as the phlogiston or élan vital, it comes to seemingly less
exotic matters such as the ‘I’, ‘experience’ and ‘consciousness’? According to Dennett’s well-known
proposal, we should treat these manifest testimonies in the same way we treat testimonies in
court, that is, as provisional fictions (Dennett, 1991, p. 79), where after we can safely let cognitive
neuroscience do its job in deciding if, and to what extent, there might be “truth in fiction.”
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Given the central importance of the first-person perspective –
in one way or another, and to be specified throughout our article –
in both contemporary phenomenology and psychoanalytic
theory, the questions we want to pose in this article are therefore
the following ones: where do these disciplines, respectively, stand
with regard to such proposals? And in what way would these two
disciplines respond to Dennett’s proposal to consider subjective
beliefs about ourselves as provisional fictions and, to be sure, in
all likelihood, future illusions?
In the first part, we will give a detailed reading of what
is understood by such terms as ‘first-person experience’ and
‘subjective appearance’ in both phenomenology and Dennett’s
account and, on the basis of that reading, press some arguments
that can be advanced against Dennett’s fictionalization of
subjectivity in favor of phenomenology. In the second part, we
will offer a similar exercise in the case of psychoanalysis. We
will argue that Sellars’ distinction, exemplified by the discussion
between Dennett and phenomenology, touches upon a classic
ambiguity in psychoanalytic theory. Finally, a possible way out
of this ambiguity will be sought through a close examination of
the psychoanalytic concept of ‘belief ’.
DENNETT AND PHENOMENOLOGY: THE
SEEMING OF SEEMING
Let us take as a point of entry in the already quite extensive
debate between phenomenology and Dennett1 one of the latter’s
most cherished examples which he uses in his Consciousness
Explained in order to fortify his Multiple Drafts Model of
consciousness, a model which, Dennett warns us, “is initially
deeply counterintuitive” (1991, p. 45). Dennett refers to a certain
perceptual effect, better known in the literature as the phi
phenomenon or phi movement, first so called by the Gestalt
psychologist Max Wertheimer, which was the object of repeated
study in a series of experiments conducted by Kolers and von
Grünau (1976). In the simplest case of the experiment, subjects
were shown a single flash of a red spot, followed quickly by a
displaced green spot, followed by another flash of the original
red (each flash lasting about 150 ms, with a gap of about 50 ms
in between). Perhaps not that surprising given our everyday
smooth television-experience, the subjects reported seeing not
two discrete spots, but one spot rapidly moving over and back
again. However, one might ask, what about the change of color
from red to green? Interestingly, the subjects reported the spot
changing color about halfway through its trajectory from the
initial flash to the second. As Dennett (1991) recounts the
result: “the first spot seemed to begin moving and then change
color abruptly in the middle of its illusory passage toward the
second location” (p. 114). Given this surprising result, one of
the collaborators to the experiments, the philosopher Nelson
Goodman, asked the following question: “how are we able to fill
in the spot at the intervening place-times along a path running
from the first to the second flash before that second flash occurs”
1For a representative sample of the different discussions running through this
debate, see the collection of essays in Dreyfus and Kelly (2007).
(Goodman, 1978, p. 73)? A pressing question indeed in so far as
we want to avoid positing strange ontological scenarios wherein
effects precede their causes and time starts running backward.
So how then are we to proceed in answering Goodman’s
question? We will first begin by teasing out some basic principles
in the way phenomenology would handle this issue, in order to
articulate more clearly the dividing line which separates Dennett’s
account from the former.
The Principle of Appearance Qua
Appearance
From a phenomenological perspective, when confronted with
such an ambiguous situation, it would be wise to make use
of Husserl’s notorious maxim of phenomenological inquiry and
“to go back to the things themselves” (Husserl, 2001, p. 168).
Indeed, one of the guiding motifs and enabling assumptions
of phenomenology is that in principle, and through availing
ourselves of phenomenology’s methodological procedures of
‘epoché’ and ‘reduction’, we would be able to put these
explanatory questions aside for a moment and to focus instead
on the experienced object (in this case the moving spot) precisely
in the way it is experienced from the subjective or first person
point of view. Rather than the hasty conjuring up of various
theoretical explanations (e.g., Goodman’s “how are we able to fill
in the gaps?”), phenomenology’s traditional first move is to get
a clear descriptive picture of what is to be explained in the first
place – the quod erat explicatum for a science of consciousness -,
precisely by letting, to use Heidegger’s inimitable phrasing, “that
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which
it shows itself from itself ” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 34). Despite the
different ways in which contemporary phenomenology aims to
fulfill its role in the debate around the nature of consciousness,
there is indeed at least one unifying principle amongst the
various phenomenological commentators. Let us call this the
phenomenological principle of appearance qua appearance. In
order to get a clear view of the sort of claims at stake in
such a principle, let us begin by considering a few remarks by
Husserl. In the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, Husserl (1970) writes:
The first thing we must do, and first of all in immediate
reflective self-experience, is to take conscious life, completely
without prejudice, just as what it quite immediately gives itself,
as itself, to be (p. 233).
Here we have the first point: if anything, phenomenology, as a
transcendental investigation of the first-person perspective, takes
its point of departure “in immediate self-experience”, that is, it
tries to offer a descriptive analysis of the way the world in general
(Wertheimian spotlights included), but also other subjects and
we ourselves, appear to us in ordinary experience. Crucially,
in offering such a description of our everyday intentional
involvement with the world, this appearance should be accepted
“just as what it quite immediately gives itself, as itself, to be”
(Husserl, 1970, p. 233). In short: on a phenomenological account,
appearance should be taken as appearance as such, rather than as
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something else. Let us take one of Husserl’s examples to clarify
and develop the ramifications of such an idea a little bit further.
Suppose we walk through a garden and become struck
by a blossoming tree. How do we go about analyzing our
immediate experience of the appearing of this blossoming
tree? It is here that Husserl’s methodological tool of ‘epoché’
comes into play; a notion, however, particularly fraught with
all kinds of misunderstandings we need to clear up before
furthering our analysis (see Overgaard, 2015). According to a
common misunderstanding, for example, the method of epoché
or ‘bracketing’ would lead us to a consideration of the immanent
contents of perception as they show up ‘in’ consciousness,
severed and disconnected from any possible relation to the
transcendent, real world which, conversely, is considered to
be ‘outside’ consciousness (e.g., Burge, 2010). Accordingly,
phenomenological bracketing would be first of all the bracketing
of the realist presumption inherent in the natural attitude of
our everyday experience. That is, the elimination of our pre-
philosophical belief in the real world in favor of the appearance
of Husserl’s blossoming tree as some kind of second blossoming
tree, this time considered as an immaterial entity (i.e., image,
datum, perceptum, . . .) somehow hovering before or within
consciousness as in a Dennettian Cartesian theater. Yet closer
inspection of some of Husserl’s own remarks on what the
epoché is supposed to accomplish makes it clear that such an
introspective reading is simply mistaken. Remarking on how that
blossoming tree appears to consciousness after the epoché has
been performed, Husserl (1983) writes
[. . .] everything remains as of old. Even the
phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process
is a perceiving of “this blossoming apple tree, in this garden,”
etc., and, likewise, the reduced liking is a liking of this same
thing. The tree has not lost the least nuance of all these
moments, qualities, characteristics with which it was appearing
in this perception, <with which > it < was appearing
as > “lovely,” “attractive,” and so forth “in” this liking (p. 216).
Hence, the practice of phenomenological bracketing as
originally intended by Husserl does not consist in a reflexive
retreat from reality the better to focus on contents or
‘qualia’ that are found within the self-enclosed terrain of
pure consciousness. Nevertheless, although everything after
the epoché “remains as of old” (Husserl, 1983, p. 216),
there is of course a sense in which the epoché, in Husserl’s
understanding, does reveal something that might have gone
unnoticed before we put it to use. Again, Husserl (1970)
remarks:
[...] through the epoché a new way of experiencing, of thinking,
of theorizing, is opened to the philosopher; here, situated
above his own natural being and above the natural world, he
loses nothing of their being and objective truths and likewise
nothing at all of the spiritual acquisitions of his world-life (...);
he simply forbids himself – as a philosopher [...] – to continue
the whole natural performance of his world-life (p. 152).
Two points are important in this rendition of the epoché.
The first thing to emphasize is that this new way of
experiencing is not a matter of acquiring additional empirical
information through further forms of experience, for example,
by turning my introspective gaze from the world to my
consciousness. This means that, with regard to the earlier
example of Husserl’s blossoming tree, the epoché is intended
to enable a faithful attending and description of the original
experience of the blossoming tree precisely as it appeared in
that very experience, that is, without changing anything about
all the moments and elements that were already implicit in
that experience. So if in our straightforward experience of the
blossoming tree, it appeared as ‘actually existing’ or ‘real’, mind
independent in whatever sense, but also ‘lovely’, ‘attractive’, ‘in this
garden’ and so forth, then these presuppositions, and basically
all positions with regard to that tree, should be retained in our
description.
Yet, secondly, in this reflexive elucidation of conscious
experience through the epoché, not only does the focus shift from
world to world-as-experienced, but so does the criterion for truth
and error with regard to phenomenological statements that try to
express descriptively what was going on according to experience.
That is, by abstaining from taking any positions toward the
conscious experience of, for example, spotlights changing color
at a certain moment, we seem to be moving to what is at least
a different sort of epistemological terrain when compared to
the epistemic situation of empirical claims about the world (see
Rosenberg, 2002). Yet, we should be careful as to the precise
nature of the epistemic shift that, according to phenomenology,
is at stake here.
Does such a claim, for example, imply some sort of “papal
infallibility” (Dennett, 2007, p. 6) or incorrigibility with regard to
phenomenological beliefs relative to the first-person perspective?
Here is how Koch (1997) formulates such an idea:
We shall take the cogito only as a means of suspending
objectivity claims and of thereby inducing infallibility in what
remains of the objectivity claim after suspension. This last
point is important. For every objective truth claim, in which
I am invariably fallible, there is a corresponding trivial truth
claim, in which I am infallible, a truth claim which is fulfilled by
the sheer fact that I seriously and honestly claim so. For every
objective, thick truth claim, that p, there is a corresponding
trivial, thin truth claim, that I think that p (or that it seems
to me that p) (p. 73).
Hence, on Koch’s reading (but also Dennett’s, cf. infra), the
epoché entails a movement from objectivity claims in which I am
invariably fallible, e.g., the explicit judgment ‘the spot changes
color about halfway its trajectory’, to a suspension of the same
objectivity claim for which in that case I become infallible,
‘it seems to me that the spot changes color about halfway its
trajectory’. Moreover, the reason why such a transition from
judgment to suspension implies infallibility is because in this case,
according to Koch, the cogito “falls within its own scope” (1999,
p. 72). What this means is that the cogito, represented by the
expression ‘I think that p’ or ‘it seems to me that p’, cannot be
iterated without becoming trivial since an additional deployment
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of the epoché would add no further relevant information beyond
what can already be found after the first suspension: ‘I think that
p’ is logically equivalent to ‘I think that I think that p’ or ‘it seems
to me that it seems to me that p’.
However, it is highly questionable whether Husserl and
other major figures in the phenomenological tradition would
apprehend the outcome of the epoché and the suggested
first-person incorrigibility in such an intellectualistic and
Cartesian way. Here, the question is: should we understand
the phenomenological transition from world to world-
as-experienced as a suspension from objectivity claims to
subjectivity claims in terms of a regression to the ‘I think’ of
the Cartesian cogito? Husserl (1970), for one, does not seem to
endorse this reading:
It is naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common
misunderstanding, to seek to attack transcendental
phenomenology as “Cartesianism”, as if its ego cogito
were a premise or set of premises from which the rest of
knowledge (. . .) was to be deduced, absolutely “secured.” The
point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it (p. 193).
What is behind Husserl’s quite explicit rejection
of understanding phenomenology as another form of
“Cartesianism”? Although much can (and has been) said
about this (see e.g., MacDonald, 2000; Staiti, 2015), in the
present context, the most important point to stress is that
Husserl’s and Descartes’ projects are driven by fundamentally
different questions. The relevant difference for our purposes
is to be found in the opposition Husserl draws in the passage
above between the Cartesian project of ‘securing’ and that of
phenomenological ‘understanding’. For Descartes, as is well
known, given the rather unlikely but still imaginable possibility
of my being deceived by a vicious demon, the crucial question
becomes that of securing some ‘fundamentum inconcussum’
(involving the two figures of the cogito and a benevolent God)
in order to ward off the skeptical threat of perpetual illusion. On
a more formal level, Cartesian hyperbolic skepticism represents
a passage from uncertainty regarding the truth of most of our
convictions regarding the world and ourselves, to certainty with
regard to the truth of believing itself (i.e., Koch’s thesis above).
How then is this different from Husserl’s description of the task
of phenomenology not to secure, but to understand objectivity?
And how is this related to the issue of first-person incorrigibility
and truth? Here is how Husserl (1989) specifies this task:
Its sole task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this
world, precisely the sense in which everyone accepts it – and
rightly so – as actually existing. That the world exists – that
it is given as an existing universe in uninterrupted experience
which is constantly fusing into universal concordance – is
entirely beyond doubt. But it is quite another matter to
understand this indubitability, which sustains life and positive
science, and to clarify the ground of its legitimacy (p. 420).
So, on the one hand, Husserl would basically subscribe to
Peirce’s (1992) sobering advice not to “pretend to doubt in
philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts” (1992, pp. 28–
29), thereby denying that such a radical pretense is genuinely
possible to begin with. Doubting, according to Husserl, is not
a matter of simple decision or sheer will. In order to doubt
something and to go beyond a philosophical play of mere
make-believe, I need a relevant motivation to doubt and such
motivation seems entirely lacking in the case of my experience of
reality. The world, Husserl (1995) writes, stands before our eyes
as existing “without question” (1995, p. 17); or, in Heidegger’s
(1985) words, it is there “before all belief” and never “experienced
as something which is believed any more than it is guaranteed
by knowledge” (1985, p. 216). Basically all phenomenological
authors would concur on this basic point: rather than being the
effect of what I believe it to be, my experience of reality, in its own
characteristic way of appearing, determines and makes possible
any beliefs I might form about it in turn (see also Merleau-Ponty,
2002, p. 44 et passim).
Yet this, according to Husserl, still somehow constitutes
a problem. Again, however, one should avoid precipitously
identifying this ‘problem’ with the Cartesian effort of trying
to secure the world or any of its objects through some kind
of miraculous deduction starting from the immanent sphere
of consciousness. The main reason for Husserl’s misgivings
with regard to such an effort is not so much that it is a
hopeless endeavor (although it is), but that it already betrays
one’s lack of a proper understanding of consciousness and
world-experience. That is, within this Cartesian setup, conscious
experience is already pre-understood as a matter of having
‘subjective representations’ or ‘images’ that may or may not
correspond to the object as it is in-itself standing behind the
veil of appearances, thereby opening up the skeptical challenge
of knowing whether and how knowledge can extend beyond the
prison-house of subjective-relative appearances. This conception
of consciousness as some kind of ‘bag’ or ‘container’ where
representational contents, to use Dennett’s expression, “swim
along” (1991, p. 44) is, in Husserl’s (1999) view, a “fatal mistake”
(1999, p. 35).
To give just one example of the ‘mistake’ Husserl is aiming
at: when I visually perceive, say, a chair, almost no one
(except, perhaps, some philosophers) makes the mistake of
claiming that what we are actually conscious of is some sort
of image, sense-datum or another mental representative of
the chair. According to Husserl, being conscious of the chair
through the presentational consciousness of some other chair-
like simulacrum precisely does not count as a perception of
a chair, even if this representative image somehow resembles
the original chair. This is (but one limited way) how our
ordinary experience of everyday objects immediately strikes us,
as somehow presenting us with the chair itself. Yet most of us,
Husserl included, would agree that objects don’t appear before
consciousness magically, as – in Sellars’ idiom – “a seal on melted
wax” (Sellars, 1981, p. 12): at least some sort of process is involved
that makes the presence of the object – in the way that it is
present – possible. It is precisely this possibility which Husserl,
under the heading of his transcendental-constitutive analysis,
wants to understand: not if conscious experience is involved with
the world itself rather than its ghostly double, but how it is so.
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Now the ‘fatal mistake’ – of which Descartes was in Husserl’s
eyes a paradigmatic offender – occurs when we substitute some
part of this process, i.e., that in virtue of which we are conscious
of objects in the way that we do, for our consciousness of the
object itself. In contemporary terms: when we confuse properties
of what is represented with properties of the representing. To
stick with the chair-example: as I visually perceive the chair, my
experiences change in various detectable ways. What I perceive
of the chair will, amongst other things, depend on my position
relative to it. Yet, the chair itself does not appear to get bigger
or smaller whenever I get nearer or back away from it, nor does
it appear to turn black when I switch off the light. I perceive
the chair as having one uniform color, size and shape, while the
sensations in virtue of which I perceive those qualities can, and
often must, vary with changes in my environment and condition.
However, in straightforward perception I do not attend to these
sensations, and they are not among the perceptual experience’s
object. As Husserl (2001) writes: “I do not see color-sensations,
but colored things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer’s
song” (p. 99).
Although we won’t go further in Husserl’s detailed analyses
of perceptual experience, Husserl’s notorious quarrel with
Descartes’ theory of ideas on what it is like to perceive a world
already reveals that there is nothing specifically ‘incorrigible’
about the phenomenological epoché and its turn to world-
as-experienced. So unlike Koch’s reading of Descartes, the
phenomenological version of the epoché does not entail any sort
of insularity thesis according to which first-person beliefs are
immune to error as long as they are restricted to the principle of
appearance qua appearance. Put yet another way: not how I think
the world appears, but how it actually appears is the principal
focus of phenomenological inquiry. And this is precisely what the
phenomenological epoché, on Husserl’s understanding, should
enable us to do: no more and no less than to clarify the implicit
sense of what is always already familiar and taken for granted in
straightforward experience.
Dennett’s Heterophenomenology:
Cartesianism without a Theater
We seemed to have wandered needlessly into the historical
vagaries of philosophical dispute between Husserl and Descartes
in order to shed a light on an apparently trivial example like that
of the phi-phenomenon discussed by Dennett. But, as pointed
out endlessly by Dennett himself, seeming is not always being,
and the triviality of the example stands in sharp contrast with the
wider philosophical ramifications Dennett develops on a certain
reading of the phenomenon for the very idea of consciousness
and the first-person perspective. So what about this reading?
There is indeed a much simpler and parsimonious approach
to the topic of subjective experience compared to the one we
have been offering on our reading of Husserlian phenomenology.
Dennett is a firm defender of the methodological principle that
scientific theories, especially when it comes to such a contested
field as consciousness, should avoid multiplying entities beyond
necessity (1991, p. 134). By this he means primarily that if a
certain gap should arise between how things stand in reality and
how they ‘seem’ from the first-person perspective, one should
avoid postulating what he famously calls ‘the Cartesian theater’:
i.e., some kind of inner screen where shadowy representatives of
an absent reality are henceforth really present before the inner
eye of an equally shadowy observer. Yet, as Dennett points out,
the idea dies hard and in order to dispel its seductive lure, it is not
enough to avoid explicit reference to outdated forms of dualistic
metaphysics by, for example, quickly replacing mind-talk with
brain-talk. That is, even within the now dominant terms of
neurocognitive materialism, the Cartesian specter tends to make
its unholy reappearance – under the bastard idea of ‘Cartesian
materialism’ – whenever a central point is presupposed where
everything “comes together” and various brain processes present
their final product to consciousness (Dennett and Kinsbourne,
1992, p. 185). Such an idea is pernicious in a variety of ways: on
the one hand, it usually makes for a sloppy functional analysis
of how the brain is able to perform its various capacities because
such an abstract center tends to clean up all our functional loose
ends. On the other hand, wherever there is talk of something
being finally presented to consciousness, we can be sure that the
idea of a central observer appreciating and observing this product
is never too far away. As Dennett (2007) points out with regard
to the example visual consciousness:
We are making steady progress on this subpersonal story [. . .]
and we can be confident that there will be a subpersonal story
that gets all the way from eyeballs to reports and in that
story there will not be a second presentation process with an
inner witness observing an inner screen and then composing a
report. As I never tire of saying, the work done by the imagined
homunculus has to be broken up and distributed around (in
space and time) to lesser agencies in the brain (p. 11).
This is the crux of Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model,
specifically devised as an antidote to the crippling but tenacious
legacy of the Cartesian Theater. However, what exactly does
it mean to deny the existence of this central ‘Oval Office’
and to replace it it with “various events of content fixation
occurring in various places at various times in the brain”
(Dennett, 1991, p. 365) for our overall discussion on first-
person appearance? Did we, for example, not already see how
Husserlian phenomenology left behind such a theater-conception
of consciousness quite some time ago for an externalist
understanding of consciousness as essentially world-involving?
To appreciate in what way Dennett’s proposal specifically diverges
from the phenomenological tradition, let us see how this
model works in vivo with the empirical example of the phi-
phenomenon.
In response to Goodman’s question (cf. supra) for a possible
explanation of the avowed experience of seeing the moving
spot change color before it actually occurred, Dennett considers
two possible hypotheses: an Orwellian and Stalinesque version,
respectively. That is, either we concoct false memories of having
seen the spot change color, though in fact we had no prior
immediate experience of the change (this is the post-experiential
‘Orwellian’ revision, suggesting a kind of ex post facto rewriting
of history); or else we really do have a genuine, albeit delayed,
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consciousness of the light moving continuously and changing
color, due to a kind of unconscious rapid editing process that “fills
in” the missing data and presents the finished product to the eye
of the beholder (this is the pre-experiential ‘Stalinesque’ revision,
reminiscent of the cooked-up evidence presented in communist
show trials, which does in fact make a genuine appearance in
court, despite its fraudulence). Common to both versions is the
subject’s belief in the conscious experience of the moving spot,
although they seem to differ substantially in how that belief
came about: due to false memories of a veridical experience in
the Orwellian case, and accurate memories of a non-veridical
experience in the case of the Stalinesque show trial.
Yet, in glossing over these two accounts of the phi-
phenomenon, Dennett’s ‘counterintuitive’ proposal finally reveals
its true color: according to Dennett, the intuition that one of
the explanations must be correct to the exclusion of the other
is, once again, a clear indication of our persistent captivity in
the Cartesian Theater. Postulating a difference between a real
experience above and beyond or, more properly, before or after
what subjects believe they experienced is, in Dennett’s functionalist
idiom, “a difference that makes no difference” (1991, p. 132).
Hence, in clear opposition to the phenomenological account,
the conclusion Dennett wants us to draw from the numerous
experiments discussed in his Consciousness Explained is that there
is no difference between how things seem to us and how we think
they seem. Bringing this all together, Dennett consequently dubs
his Multiple Drafts Model as a first-person operationalism “for
it brusquely denies the possibility in principle of consciousness
of a stimulus in the absence of the subject’s belief in that
consciousness” (1991, p. 132).
Needless to say, such a conception of the first-person
perspective as entirely constituted by subjective beliefs
immediately carries some remarkable consequences for the
scientific effort to devise a proper naturalistic account for
this dimension. These become most salient in Dennett’s own
methodology of choice for approaching the scientific study of
human consciousness, his heterophenomenology, advertised as
an explicitly third-person approach to the issue of subjectivity
(Dennett, 2003). On the face of it, this seems like a remarkable
thing to do: subjectivity is traditionally regarded as occupying
something rather like another dimension – the private,
‘first-person’, more or less self-consciousness sort of being –
in comparison with the privileged objects of ‘third-person’
methodologies like meteors, sound waves or bone density. This
ostensible difference between meteors and minds has led some
phenomenological authors, like e.g., Evan Thompson, to claim
that phenomenology, as an explicitly first-person investigation,
is in fact an inescapable prerogative for any naturalistic account
because “any attempt to gain a comprehensive understanding
of the human mind must at some point confront consciousness
and subjectivity – how thinking, perceiving, acting and feeling
are experienced in one’s own case” (Thompson, 2007, p. 16, our
italics; see also Gallagher, 2007). The reasoning behind such a
claim is relatively straightforward and is meant particularly as
a warning sign for Dennett’s – but also others’ – overambitious
naturalistic inclinations: any explanatory scheme which departs
so completely from first-person experience that it calls into doubt
the very existence of such experiences can no longer claim to be
elucidating that explanandum, since it has effectively ‘eliminated’
the very object it purports to be an account of. Yet Dennett is
not impressed. In an essay addressing some misunderstandings
concerning his apologia for his heterophenomenology with the
little concealing title “Who’s On First?”, Dennett asks:
Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as
to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness?
Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary
alternative science? I have defended the hypothesis that there is
a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science
that handsomely covers the ground – all the ground – of
human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without
ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the
experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of
science (2003, p. 19).
Heterophenomenology is the method of choice whenever
one wishes to take the first person point of view seriously –
that is, as seriously as it can be taken – while keeping the
methodologically scrupulous requirements undergirding the
same objective perspective that reigns in those sciences that
aspire to explain different, but from a methodological point of
view, no more daunting phenomena such as continental drift,
biodiversity or the digestive tract. So what then, exactly, does
Dennett’s heterophenomenology commit us to? What precisely
does it mean to take subjects seriously, but not too seriously?
Return of the Cogito: Serious, All Too
Serious
Given that we have to adopt a strict third-person perspective,
since as Dennett is keen to say, “all science is constructed
from that perspective” (1991, p. 68), the only access to
the phenomenological realm will be via the observation and
interpretation of publicly observable data, including utterances
and other behavioral manifestations. Furthermore, we will have
to find a neutral way of describing these data – that is, a way
that doesn’t prejudge the issue – by adopting a special form
of heterophenomenological abstinence. Such an abstinence –
likened by Dennett to a third-person version of Husserl’s epoché
(Dennett, 2003, p. 22) – brackets the issue about whether the
subject is in fact a computer, a mere zombie, a dressed up
parrot or a real conscious being. The only thing such a third-
person epoché does commit us to is adopting what Dennett
calls the intentional stance: we should interpret the vocal sounds
emanating from the subjects’ mouths as speech acts that express
the subject’s beliefs in order to compose a text of what that subject
wants to say about his or her own conscious experiences. As
Dennett (1991) explains:
People undoubtedly do believe they have mental images, pain,
perceptual experiences and all the rest, and these facts –
the facts about what people believe, and report when they
express their beliefs – are phenomena any scientific theory of
mind must account for. We organize our data regarding these
phenomena into theorists’ fictions, “intentional objects” in
heterophenomenological worlds. Then the question of whether
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items thus portrayed exist as real objects, events, and states in
the brain – or in the soul, for that matter – is an empirical
matter to investigate (p. 98).
Again, this merely seems like a fairly trivial rehearsal of the
principle of scientific neutrality: from the fact that people believe
all kinds of things, even when these things happen to refer to
their own experience, we shouldn’t immediately conclude that
these things actually exist. As a case in point, take the example of
visual experience. People often seem to believe that their visual
experience represents the world in sharp focus, uniform detail
and high resolution from the center out to the periphery, as a
kind of snap-shot like picture of the world (Noë, 2004). Yet as
Dennett points out, convincingly, such a view of visual experience
as gap-free and wholly continuous is mistaken. Take the example
of looking at a wall: while staring at it, it looks to you as if there is
unbroken expanse of wall. However, this is not to say that it seems
to you as if, in a single saccadic fixation, the whole of the wall’s
surface is presented in equally rich detail from the center out to
the periphery, as if every part of the wall’s surface is immediately
presented to consciousness at once. Rather, as Husserl would
say, the wall is “transcendent” to my experience insofar as it
has more to it than what is revealed to me in any single phase
of experience and, moreover, is precisely given or experienced
(as opposed to inferred or deduced) as having more to it. So,
as the example illustrates, we would do well to follow Dennett’s
advice by not taking everything a subject believes about his or her
own experience at face value. On this account, taking subjects’
reports and beliefs serious means that we take into account that
they can be mistaken; if not, that is, if doubt with regard to
conscious experience would be strictly speaking senseless, then –
as Wittgenstein (1958) famously said – so too would any assertion
of knowledge (1958, p. 211).
However, despite Dennett’s repeated insistence on our
pervasive fallibility with regard to first-person experience as a
central argument for the adoption of his heterophenomenological
stance, the question is how this methodological modesty squares
with his aforementioned first-person operationalism. How to
reconcile the by all parties acknowledged fact that we can be
wrong about first-order experience with Dennett’s thoroughgoing
fictionalization of subjectivity up to the point where we have
“total, dictatorial authority over the account of how it seems to
you, about what it is like to be you” (Dennett, 1991, p 96)? To
put it in the language of Dennett’s own cherished functionalism:
is fallibility a difference that can make a difference for the
defense of heterophenomenology when there is no possibility
of consciousness in the absence of a subject’s belief in that
consciousness? It must be clear by now that it cannot, and
furthermore, that this inability to make room for a distinction
between appearance and reality within the field of conscious
appearance is itself a remarkable and, as per the defense of
heterophenomenology, undesirable consequence of what we
would call Dennett’s own doxastic Cartesianism. For if my
subjective experience is entirely constituted by what I believe to
be the case, or what I believe that seems to be the case, then there
is of course – and as we made clear in our reading of Descartes –
no ‘case’ about which I can be wrong either. Consequently,
Dennett is confronted with the following paradox:
(1) Either make room for the distinction between experience and
judgment in which case the plea for heterophenomenology can
be saved but at the cost of first-person operationalism;
(2) Or retain the latter, but at the cost of being unable
to countenance fallibility and hence of introducing an
unavoidable return to the philosophical core of Cartesianism,
although this time without a theater.
Yet secondly, apart from this general philosophical tension, a
further problem for Dennett’s doxastic account arises when we
raise the further question about how it construes the relation
between belief and experience. As we have seen, the central
strategy of Dennett’s heterophenomenology is to attribute a
belief to the subject whenever he or she reports an experience,
rather than the other way around. And indeed, it has been a
traditional argument ever since Descartes and Kant that an ‘I
think’ or ‘I believe’ accompanies, or at least in principle must
be able to accompany, any experience I might claim to be
having, for otherwise, as the famous quote from Kant (1996)
continues, “something would be represented in me that could
not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the
representation would either be impossible or else at least would
be nothing to me” (1996, B131–132). Importantly, Dennett trades
on this ineliminable occurrence of the ‘I think’ within reflective
consciousness to advance his first-person operationalism and
thus to deny the possibility that there could be any difference
between beliefs and experience. Since, as Dennett’s argument
goes, if you have conscious experiences you don’t believe you
have – those experiences would be just as inaccessible to you as to
the heterophenomenological observer. Conversely, if you believe
you have conscious experiences you don’t in fact have, it is your
beliefs that need to be explained, not the non-existent experiences
(Dennett, 2003, p. 21). Hence, the crucial question becomes: is
it really necessary for a subject while enjoying or undergoing
an experience, to immediately believe that he is enjoying or
undergoing that experience?
It is safe to say that one of the grounding motives in the
phenomenological works of most notably Sartre, Merleau-Ponty
and Heidegger is a forceful critique of this intellectualistic
idea. The claim has been that there are indeed conscious
intentional experiences that a subject could have without
immediately believing that he is having them. Even more,
those experiences precisely depend on the subject’s not having
a belief about them: if the subject were to believe he was
having the experience, instead of merely living it through, the
experience would become impossible (see also Dreyfus and Kelly,
2007). Differently put: a necessary condition for those types of
experience is precisely the absence of the Cartesian spectator.
A famous example is of course the following one by Sartre
(2004):
When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I
am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There
is consciousness of the streetcar-needing-to-be-overtaken, etc.,
and non-positional consciousness of consciousness. I am then
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 August 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 143715
fpsyg-08-01437 August 21, 2017 Time: 18:37 # 8
Feyaerts and Vanheule The Logic of Appearance
plunged into the world of objects; they constitute the unity of
my consciousness, they present themselves with values, with
attractive and repellant qualities – but me, I have disappeared
(2004, p. 32).
Central to such examples is that the subject, to put it in
Lacanian terms, is ‘internally excluded’ from the experience while
living them through: in keeping an appropriate distance while
talking to people, in reaching automatically for the proffered
handshake, laughing while listening to some amusing story,
rapidly walking down the stairs or backing away from a painting
to get a better view, there is a certain solicitation from the world
to engage in various activities without us having to decide to
do so. Moreover, reflexively deciding, contemplating or believing
in such activities is the best way to lose all grips on what the
situation calls for. Such an experience of spontaneous immersion
or absorption “into the world of objects” only arises precisely
when we are not looking for them; conversely, they would vanish
immediately insofar I would try to think or believe them. Yet,
pace Dennett, this does not mean that in those instances I
momentarily become a zombie or unconscious machine; there
still is something ‘it is like’ to be absorbed in these activities which
set them apart from, say, a comatose condition, and the absence
of belief is one example of its constitutive features. It is precisely
this ‘internally excluded’ character of belief and experience in
such phenomena which Dennett’s doxastic Cartesianism cannot
countenance.
DENNETT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE
CURIOUS CASE OF THE “OBJECTIVELY
SUBJECTIVE”
Before we can begin to specify in what way psychoanalytic theory
could bear on this debate between Dennett and phenomenology,
some precursory remarks are in order. Because, first of all, it
might not be entirely clear where, if at all, we should situate
psychoanalysis, whether in its original Freudian formulation or
in its Lacanian version, along Sellars’ somewhat contrived, but
perhaps still hermeneutically useful dichotomy. For in contrast to
phenomenology’s straightforward and programmatic insistence
on first-person experience as an indispensable datum for any sort
of naturalism, the claims and subject matter of psychoanalytic
theory are in this regard, to put it mildly, somewhat more
ambiguous. Of course, it might be argued that psychoanalysis
is not really that interested in, nor in itself capable of, pursuing
or resisting the naturalistic agenda of bridging the gap between
neurocognitive and phenomenological accounts of blind sight
or the rubber-hand illusion. And indeed, one could say, what
would be further removed from psychoanalysis’ basic insight into
man’s constitutive disadapted relation to its ‘natural’ environment
than Dennett’s talk of the design stance? Yet such a first and
perhaps heartening impression is easily discarded when we shift
the terrain to those phenomena, however, ill designed, that
are considered to be at least more amenable to psychoanalytic
elucidation, such as the nature of psychopathology, sexuality,
language or desire. With regard to those, the question emerges
whether or not psychoanalysis would simply join in with
Dennett’s deflationary tactics of reducing the several issues
that may arise in the effort of articulating the intertwinement
of subjectivity and language – for example, the relation a
subject entertains with its own speech – or subjectivity and
desire – for example, what it means to desire the desire of
the other – to the austere categories of ‘seeming’ or ‘fiction’?
Presumably, the pre-reflexive answer would consist in a quick and
resounding ‘no’.
However, on the other hand, given Freud’s departure from
Brentano’s views on intentionality and self-consciousness (see
Seron, 2015, pp. 15–30; Bernet, 2002) or Lacan’s critique of
both Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis (Lacan, 2006, p. 80)
and Merleau-Ponty’s bodily unconscious (Lacan, 1982−1983,
p. 75), it is equally clear that the intellectual relation between
phenomenology and psychoanalysis is complicated enough
to avoid any easy wedding of psychoanalysis with manifest
experience. Given this ambiguous position, a clarification of how
psychoanalysis relates to the ongoing ‘scientific disenchantment’
along the terms set by Dennett’s ingenious codification of the
claims and methods of cognitive science, and conversely, to the
phenomenological arguments that are being advanced against
Dennett’s proposal, indeed becomes a reasonable task.
Freud and Lacan between
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
To begin with some sweeping examples: what exactly is left of
the once so seductive Freudian image of the three successive
humiliations of man-in-the-world (Copernicus-Darwin-Freud)
now that we can safely add a fourth one, -Dennett? As noted
by several commentators (Gardner, 2000; Zizek, 2006), it seems
that Freudian psychoanalysis, steeped as it is in the intentional
language of repression, desires and negation – now finds itself
amongst those traditional ‘manifest’ philosophies threatened by
the more recent neurocognitive humiliations. And the reason for
this clear: though, in the felicitous wordings of Freud, “psyche is
extended; knows nothing about it” (Freud, 1938b, p. 300), there
has never been a lack of critics pointing out that what it does not
know is still suspiciously close to the philosophical problematic
of intentional consciousness. And it is indeed striking and ironic,
given psychoanalysis’ original declaration of independence from
any philosophy issuing from the cogito (see Freud, 1923, p. 13;
Lacan, 2006, p. 75), that one of the standard ways of defending
the unconscious today is precisely by referring to the properties of
consciousness, of which intentionality is held to be pre-eminent.
As Freud (1915) himself indeed pointed out:
All the categories which we employ to describe conscious
mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so on,
can be applied [to unconscious mental acts]. Indeed, we are
obliged to say of some of these latent states that the only respect
in which they differ from conscious ones is precisely in the
absence of consciousness (p. 168).
Turning to Lacan, we can discern the same manifest motives
despite the latter’s proto-cognitivist, structuralistic inclinations:
even on the most cursory reading of the Ecrits, it would
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be difficult to avoid the perennial ‘philosophemes’ of subject,
alienation, desire, Other and so on. But Lacan, of course,
would try to avoid any quick philosophical (mis)recognition by
reminding his readers to this subject is split, barred and divided
by the signifier, therefore not the phenomenological subject of
Jemeinigkeit, always already conscious of itself in its intentional
involvement with the world. Nevertheless, however, split or
deferred this subject might be, this failed or misfired cogito is still
close enough to its Cartesian predecessor so as not to completely
break with it. On the contrary, Lacan only ever wanted to think
the unconscious, not as antithetical to consciousness, not as “a
species that defines a circle in psychical reality of what does not
have the attribute of consciousness” (Lacan, 2006, p. 830), but
precisely as the implicit truth already contained in the Cartesian
cogito me cogitare (see Dolar, 1998; Lacan, 2006). But this also
means that this truth, whatever else it may be, is the truth of
that same old Cogito, gained through a certain radicalization of
that traditional aporia, confronted differently by Husserl, Fichte
or Sartre, of conceiving subjectivity from and within its own
terms. Therefore, in so far as phenomenology is susceptible to
Dennett’s heterophenomenological recasting of subjectivity in
terms of a ‘theorist’s fiction’, the same holds for Lacan’s particular
defense of the subject. And is it indeed not quite imaginable,
for example, that Dennett’s response to Lacan’s notorious anti-
humanistic formula in Science and Truth according to which
“science’s man does not exist, only it’s subject does” (2006, p. 730)
would be the sobering “nor does it’s subject, although it might
seem to”?
On the other hand, however, it could be pointed out that we
might have proceeded a little bit too quickly and carelessly in
lumping together psychoanalysis with the manifest philosophies
of intentional experience. And in fact, as is well known, both
Freud and Lacan have been taken to task for neglecting and
underestimating the accomplishments of phenomenology in a
way that is, although not strictly equivalent, remarkably close to
the contemporary phenomenological arguments raised against
Dennett (see Schafer, 1976; Chalmers, 1995). Suffice to recall,
in Freud’s case, the succinct phenomenological critique of the
psychoanalytic unconscious by Eugen Fink in the appendix to
Husserl’s Crisis:
This objection, which is raised in many variations against
the so-called ‘consciousness-idealism of phenomenology,’ is
based on a fundamental philosophical naïveté. [. . .] The
naïveté we refer to consists, before all theory-construction
about the unconscious, in an omission. One thinks one is
already acquainted with what the ‘conscious’, or consciousness’,
is and dismisses the task of first making into a prior
subject matter the concept against which any science of the
unconscious must demarcate its subject matter, i.e., precisely
that of consciousness. But because one does not know what
consciousness is, one misses in principle the point of departure
of a science of the ‘unconscious’ (Husserl, 1970, p. 386).
Despite the shifting terminology, it’s not too difficult to
recognize in this depiction of psychoanalysis’ ‘naïveté’ the
same point of contention we already encountered in Dennett’s
case. That is, Freud is held to have tried to develop a
naturalistic third-personal theory of mental functioning, couched
in broadly functionalistic-energetic terms (the dynamic trinity
of ‘ego’, ‘id’ and ‘superego’; the energetic metaphors of cathexis,
displacement, condensation, and so on), destined to explain
various pathological phenomena, without, however, offering any
explicit and sustained consideration of ‘consciousness’. As noted
by Tugendhat (1986, pp. 131–132) and Ricoeur (1977, p. 420
et passim.), Freud indeed never seems to talk about phenomenal
consciousness and self-consciousness directly, but only and
rather loosely in terms of the ‘ego’ which is portrayed as yet
another homuncular-functional entity amongst others. A similar
story can be told with regard to the notion of repression and
other ‘mechanisms’ of defense of which Freud gives an extended
account in terms of word- and thing-presentations, cathexes and
so on, again strongly suggesting that these concepts designate
sub-personal operations of some kind. Accordingly, repression,
displacement, condensation and other similar notions, should
not be conceived as first-personal actions, whether conscious
or unconscious, operating within a normative framework of
beliefs and desires, but as functionally specifiable processes
requiring no agents, experiencers or observers whatsoever. In
short: on this reading, psychoanalytic theory turns out to share
roughly the same agenda as cognitive neuroscience in trying to
offer a homuncular-functionalist top-down analysis of mental
functioning in terms of various subsystems until we reach the
level of non-intelligent functionaries that can be replaced by a
machine (see Freud, 1938a, p. 144).
As for Lacan, although one of the remarkable features of his
self-proclaimed return to Freudian orthodoxy is precisely the
explicit avoidance of all those orthodox-naturalistic elements, this
didn’t necessarily seem to imply a return to a consideration of
l’expérience vécue at the expense of Freud’s naturalism. On the
contrary, Lacan’s structuralist-materialist reworking of Freudian
metapsychology in terms of his ‘logic of the signifier’ appears
to have been driven by an even more fierce ambition to finally
establish psychoanalysis as a rigorous, because aspiring to the
Koyréan ideal of mathematical formalization, scientific endeavor
(see Milner, 1995; Johnston, 2012; Tomšic,, 2012). And indeed,
after some years of flirting with phenomenological accounts, the
famous 1953 Discourse of Rome can be seen as a veritable trumpet
blast fiercely announcing the new footings on which to resurrect
the psychoanalytic edifice as a “science of subjectivity” (Lacan,
2006, p. 235):
The form of mathematicization in which the discovery of the
phoneme is inscribed, as a function of pairs of oppositions
formed by the smallest graspable discriminative semantic
elements, leads us to the very foundations that Freud’s final
doctrine designates as the subjective sources of the symbolic
function in a vocalic connotation of presence and absence. And
the reduction of any language (langue) to a group comprised
of a very small number of such phonemic oppositions,
initiating an equally rigorous formalization of its highest-level
morphemes, puts within our reach a strict approach to our own
field (Lacan, 2006, pp. 235–236).
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This is indeed a far cry from Lacan’s earlier phenomenological
declaration that “language, prior to signifying something,
signifies to someone” (2006, p. 66). Here we are incited to the
view that language, loosely defined in terms of the symbolic order
as somehow pertaining to both the regulatory principles of social
exchange and the material-phonetic level of ‘pure signifiers’ (on
this equivocation, see Descombes, 2009), is “a form in which
the subject is inserted at the level of his being” (Lacan, 1993,
p. 179). In the Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” and The
Instance of the Letter, gloomy images are being invoked to convey
the radical nature of this ‘insertion’. Lacan (2006, p. 21)) talks
about “machines-that-think-like-men, subjects “more docile than
sheep”, lined up before the gripping effect of the signifying chain
as “ostriches”, determined by the signifier’s displacement in their
“acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate.” How all
of this is supposed to be an effect of ‘symbolic determination’ is
never really convincingly spelled out (Dennett’s anti-mysterian
concept of “wonder tissue” might be put to good use here;
see Dennett, 2013, pp. 198–205), nor is it clear if and in what
way Lacan’s structuralistic remolding of Freudian concepts (e.g.,
metaphor/metonymy for condensation/displacement, repetition
of the signifying chain for Wiederholungszwang, . . .) is really an
advance compared to the latter. Yet, for our present purposes, at
least it is clear that on this reading Lacan’s intent was to purify the
Freudian unconscious even further from any remaining residues
of metaphysical humanism and its associated anthropomorphic
terminology. Hence, as we have noted in the case of Freud,
Lacan’s structuralistic rearticulation of the unconscious could
therefore equally well be seen as a forerunner to the sort of
materialist program better known today under the heading of
cognitive science (see also Dupuy, 2000).
Psychoanalysis’ “Abominable Mess”
Now this Janus-faced character of psychoanalysis has of course
never slipped the attention of its various commentators,
provoking blame and rejection from its critics; praise, confusion
or silent endorsement from its defenders. On Sartre’s diagnosis,
for example, psychoanalysis is precisely founded on a systematic
confusion of the personal and sub-personal levels and this
constitutes its unavoidable yet inadmissible paradox: “I
both am and am not the psychic facts hypothesized by
psychoanalysis” (Sartre, 1958, pp. 50–51). In roughly the
same way, Wittgenstein famously spoke of psychoanalysis’
“abominable mess” (Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 316), premised as it is
on a confusion between first-personal reasons and third-personal
causes, imposing the former even if the patient doesn’t accept
them, resorting to the latter and being content with the patient’s
acceptance for their justification (Cioffi, 1998).
Similar accusations apply to Lacan’s ‘materialism of the
signifier’, as representing yet another confused effort to straddle
both sides of this fence at once: the signifier being regarded
as both amenable to a ‘materialist’ description in terms of its
meaningless phonemic properties and an ‘idealist’ description in
terms of its meaningful semantic properties. By cutting the cord
between signifier and signified, and in the same move declaring
the primacy of the former over the latter, Lacan thought to be able
to transmute these ‘pure signifiers’ into causal forces operating
in a mechanical way, yet responsible for the different meaning
effects encountered in psychoanalytic practice. This is, for some,
the very formula of magic (see Descombes, 2001, p. 93–101).
So what then are we to make of this confusion? There
are of course some well-tried reconciliatory attempts which
basically consist in either translating psychoanalysis into
phenomenological terms2, or, embracing it precisely as a form
of sub-personal psychology3 (see Gardner, 2000 for a detailed
discussion), yet perhaps the more interesting thing to notice is the
recurrent image from which such solutions spontaneously spring.
By this we mean, as regards the present discussion, the very form
in which the difference between Dennett and phenomenology is
formulated: that is, in terms of ‘fictional beliefs’ (Dennett) and
‘manifest experience’ (phenomenology). In the following section,
we will therefore try to explicate in what way psychoanalytic
theory could distinguish itself from both these readings.
Decentering Appearance: Belief in Belief
Let us begin this section by recapitulating in a condensed
form the core disagreement which stands behind the discussion
between Dennett and phenomenology. Whether it is the topic
of perceptual consciousness, imagination, sense of agency, the
painfulness of pain or the problem of other minds, is not really
that essential here: the crucial divergence already appears at the
level of “the organization of the data” (Dennett, 2003, p. 9), that
is, the way in which researchers should proceed whenever they set
out to explain those phenomena of consciousness.
In his Who’s on First? (2003), Dennett offers a clear summary
of his position that can put the problem in sharper focus.
“What”, Dennett asks, are the “primary data” from which we
ought to depart in order to arrive at “a science of consciousness”
(p. 21), i.e.: (a) conscious experiences themselves; (b) beliefs
about these experiences; (c) verbal judgments expressing those
beliefs; or (d) utterances of one sort or another? Whereas, as
we have seen, phenomenology vigorously opts for (a); Dennett’s
heterophenomenology is premised on the elimination of (a) in
favor of (b) and (c). From this disagreement, it necessarily follows
that the philosophical concepts of ‘appearance’ and ‘seeming’
function as a kind of shibboleth in the ensuing debate: designating
‘immediate experience’ in the case of phenomenology, ‘beliefs
about experience’ in Dennett’s account. Furthermore, it becomes
obvious why the way in which arguments are being pressed for
one position or the other, take on the form in which we have
argued for some of the claims found in phenomenology: i.e.,
those cases that point toward a disjunction between belief and
experience – that is, on the one hand, ‘beliefs without experience’
as in the discussion about the level of detail found in visual
consciousness; on the other hand, ‘experience without belief ’ as
in Sartre’s example of ‘pre-reflexive immersion’.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, however, what should
immediately strike us is not so much this manifest level
2This is indeed the proposal we can read in the works of Sartre and – even
earlier – Politzer: to release psychoanalysis from its “mechanistic cramp” (Sartre,
1979, p. 32) or “abstract” and “realist” exigencies (Politzer, 1994) – for an excellent
overview of Politzer’s somewhat forgotten critique, see Bianco (2016).
3For a defense of this reading, see, e.g., Moore (1988); Kitcher (1992) and
Livingstone-Smith (1999).
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of disagreement in terms of the difference between ‘belief ’
and ‘experience’, but rather the implicit Cartesian agreement
between Dennett and phenomenology on the concept of
belief itself. To put it in Spinozistic terms, there is still,
however, slightly, something sticking out as ‘a kingdom within
a kingdom’ throughout this whole discussion, something
which becomes most explicit in Dennett’s response to some
of his critics – Schwitzgebel (2007) and Noë (2007) – in
his Heterophenomenology Reconsidered (2007). As before, the
critique involves Dennett’s seemingly incompatible insistence on
both the essential fallibility of first-person accounts and some
kind of Rortian incorrigibility with regard to “how it seems
to them” (p. 263). In the same volume, Noë (2007) evokes
the familiar Wittgensteinian theme on the logical limits of
justification of first-person accounts which comes to an end
rather sooner than we might think:
It [Wittgenstein’s view on justification] applies to the special
case where what is in question is how I take my own experience
to be, what I take it to be like. I can be mistaken about the
nature of my experience – about how I, in experience, take
things to be. [. . .] But it would be a different kind of mistake
for me also to be mistaken about how I take my experience to
be. I can be wrong then about how things seem but not wrong
about how I take things to seem (p. 244).
Dennett (2007) wholeheartedly agrees:
If somebody says her visual field seems detailed all the way
out to the periphery, which lacks a perceptible boundary, there
is no gainsaying her claim, but if she goes on to theorize
about “the background” [. . .], she becomes an entirely fallible
theorist, no longer to be taken at her word (p. 263).
So, at least when it comes to this notion of ‘taking’, of what
I believe my experience ‘is like’, phenomenology and Dennett
prove themselves to be something like an “epistemological pair”
(Bachelard, 1949, p. 5). In short: whereas we can be wrong
about ‘seeming’ understood in terms of experience, we cannot,
however, be wrong about ‘seeming’ in terms of belief. Now the
proper psychoanalytic questions that should arise in this context
are the following ones: whence this sudden confidence? Which
arguments are being advanced here to uphold this last inviolable
sanctum of minimal infallibility with regard to this Cartesian
theme of ‘belief in belief ’? Why is it so obvious that ‘immunity
to error’ immediately ensues whenever we shift the terrain to the
topic of belief itself? Is it because, in this case, the well-known
phenomenological figure of the ‘unbeteiligte Zuschauer’ suddenly
reappears on the scene? If so, why would that be? And why
precisely at this point? Surprisingly, precious little can be found
on these questions when we consult these various commentators.
Nevertheless, here, as everywhere else, it could be wise to
stick to Althusser’s famous “golden rule of materialism” to
“not judge a being by its self-consciousness (Althusser, 1996,
p. 115). Particularly interesting in this context are the analyses
we can find in the works of Zizek (1998, 2006, 2014) and
Pfaller (2014, 2015) on the psychoanalytic concept of ‘belief ’.
Elaborating on and extending Octave Mannoni’s perspicuous
theory of fetishism (see Mannoni, 2003, pp. 68–92), both these
authors have drawn attention to a series of entirely common
phenomena which nevertheless share some striking features that
are directly relevant for our overall discussion. To start with some
of these examples:
Imagine you’re sitting in a bar reading a newspaper, waiting for
a friend. The friend arrives. He says hello, and then continues:
‘Excuse me, can I have a quick look at your newspaper? I know
it’s silly, but I just have to know the score from yesterday’s game’
(Pfaller, 2014, p. 1).
For reasons that are no doubt suspect, but hidden, I sometimes
read the rather rudimentary horoscopes published in certain
papers. It seems to me that I do not take much of an interest
in them. I wonder how people can believe in them. [. . .]
Once, last year, my horoscope said that “tomorrow will be an
extremely favorable day for tidying up the house.” This was not
a spectacular prediction, except that I had long been planning
to move on the day in question. I burst out laughing at so funny
a coincidence. [. . .] I could say that I am not superstitious
because I pay no mind to such things. But, to be precise, I
should rather say: I know quite well that coincidences of this
kind are meaningless, but I take a certain amount of pleasure
in them all the same (Mannoni, 2003, p. 78).
What is common to these examples – and numerous others
(see Zizek (1998); Pfaller (2014), for an extensive collection) –
is the paradoxical relation a subject seems to entertain with
its belief (i.e., the importance of sports; the significance of
horoscope predictions). In a way that is difficult to render
conceptually transparent, these sorts of beliefs are never really
believed in (“I know it’s silly” – “I know quite well that these
coincidences are meaningless”), yet in one way or another, they
nonetheless exert a particular influence on their subjects (the
compulsion to look at the paper – the pleasurable laughter).
Moreover, as Pfaller argues, it is not so much their content
that is primarily of interest here, but rather the form in
which people refer to these beliefs. That is, as was already
apparent from Mannoni’s formula for these types of beliefs (“I
know quite well . . . but still”), its form is characterized by
a complex coexistence of ‘better knowledge’ and ‘belief ’. The
fidget sports fanatic knows quite well that yesterday’s results
are not important, but still he has to see them. Despite the
better knowledge, and despite the gap this places between him
and his silly practice, he nevertheless acts as if sports are
of utmost importance. Similarly, horoscope predictions seem
rather ridiculous to Mannoni, nonetheless, as he admits: “if
the horoscope had said that “tomorrow will be an extremely
unfavorable day for moving”, “it would have made me laugh
differently” (2003, p. 78.).
So in an initial approximation of the formal structure of
this phenomenon, one should say that, on the one hand, these
are beliefs that are never really one’s own beliefs in the sense
that one would claim ownership over them (à la “I believe in
horoscopes, I really do”). The “better knowledge” is immediately
invoked to signal such a subjective position of transcendence
toward the belief. Yet, different from, for example, the Sartrean
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formula for transcendence – i.e., “To believe is to know that one
believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe”
(Sartre, 1958, p. 114) – such a better knowledge seems to be of
little avail with respect to the efficacy of the belief in question.
On the contrary, as Mannoni points out, one should even
wonder if this position of knowledgeable transcendence does
not somehow contribute to the maintenance of the disavowed
belief? Such a claim would immediately contradict the seemingly
incontestable principle according to which the dialectical relation
between ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief ’ is grounded in exclusion: on
such an account, we (erroneously) believe (in the importance
of sports, in the predictive validity of horoscopes, . . .) precisely
because we do not know (that sports are not important, that
horoscopes do not possess predictive value, . . .); conversely,
better knowledge cancels out what we previously believed. Here,
on the contrary, the dialectical relation between knowledge and
belief would be based on the principle of necessary conjunction:
only on the condition of better knowledge are we susceptible
to those beliefs; conversely, in the absence of better knowledge,
believing becomes impossible – as Mannoni succinctly puts it:
“Evidently, the sole reason for the “but all the same” is the “I
know well”” (2003, p. 71). If this principle is somehow sustainable
(cf. infra for further argumentation), we can now proceed to
advance a more precise formulation of this dialectic in terms
of our general discussion: on a psychoanalytic account, the way
things appear to me, that is, of what I “objectively believe”
(cf. Zizek, 1989, p. 35) – as evidenced, despite myself, in my
nonsensical behavior, spontaneous reactions and utterances (e.g.,
encouraging my car by means of little compliments when it won’t
start, wearing my ‘lucky shirt’ for an important interview which I
did prepare for in a ‘professional’ way, . . . ) – as opposed to what
I believe to believe, is structurally dependent on the self-reflexive
movement of intellectual distancing through ‘knowing that one
knows’.
Belief in the Uncanny or Uncanny Belief?
Now, in order to substantiate this rather strong claim, what we
seem to need is a methodological procedure closely resembling
the phenomenological tool of “eidetic variation” (see Husserl,
1977, sec. 9a) in and through which, formally speaking, the
necessary conditions of a certain phenomenon are established by
‘varying’ those conditions up to the point where the phenomenon
itself would become (in)conceivable. Now it happens that a
procedure of this kind is to be found implicitly in Freud’s 1919
treatise on The Uncanny, a phenomenon which, moreover, bears
some striking resemblances to the examples discussed above
(see Dolar, 1991; Zupancic, 2005; Pfaller, 2006). Regardless of
the wealth of literary examples and psychoanalytic concepts
Freud employs throughout the article, this dense and, to a
certain extent, inconclusive text, essentially revolves around one
central effort: to circumscribe the “common core” which would
allow us “to distinguish as ‘uncanny’ certain things which lie
within the field of what is frightening” (Freud, 1919, p. 219).
Freud’s question is: how should one proceed in defining the
common denominator in such a variety of examples as the
mechanical doll Olympia, the obscene figure of the Sand-
Man, the recurrent theme of the “double”, the “repetition
factor” or the Rat Man’s “omnipotence of thoughts” – all taken
as typical instances of the uncanny (Freud, 1919)? Why are
they not simple examples of garden variety phobias such as
the fear of heights or crowded places? What is it that sets
them apart from the more epistemologically innocent logic of
cognitive surprise or unfulfilled anticipation? And, finally, why
should they even produce this peculiar affective response rather
than none at all? As an instructive introduction for a further
demarcation of the problem, Freud offers the following, general
formula:
[. . .] an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the
distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when
something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears
before us in reality [. . .] (1919, p. 242).
Accordingly, we seem to have three relevant conditions –
(1) the uncanny affect; (2) imagination; (3) appearance. First,
the feeling of uncanniness should be distinguished from more
common affective responses such as surprise, fear or mere
indifference. Nor is it merely the univocal opposite of what
is familiar, in the sense of ‘homely’, ‘cozy’ or ‘intimate’, since
not everything which entails a negation of the familiar in this
sense will provoke the feeling of the uncanny. As Freud argues,
“something has to be added to what is novel and unfamiliar in
order to make it uncanny” (1919, p. 221). Secondly, what it is
that should be added seems to be contained in the two other
conditions: appearance and imagination. Freud illustrates this
point with an example taken from his case study of the Rat Man:
In the case history of an obsessional neurotic, I have described
how the patient once stayed in a hydropathic establishment
and benefited greatly by it. He had the good sense, however, to
attribute his improvement not to the therapeutic properties of
the water, but to the situation of his room, which immediately
adjoined that of a very accommodating nurse. So on his second
visit to the establishment he asked for the same room, but
was told that it was already occupied by an old gentleman,
whereupon he gave vent to his annoyance in the words: ‘I
wish he may be struck dead for it’. A fortnight later the old
gentleman really did have a stroke. My patient thought this an
‘uncanny’ experience (1919, p. 239).
Here we have all the conditions combined: (1) the uncanny
fearful experience, (2) the imagination pertaining to the obsessive
wish and (3) reality appearing as if it immediately responded
to what was “hitherto regarded as imaginary” (Freud, 1919,
p. 242). At this point we can also introduce our previous
dialectic between ‘better knowledge’ and ‘belief ’. Freud’s first
decisive move is to exclude Jentsch’s hypothesis of intellectual
uncertainty as an essential factor for the production of the Rat
Man’s uncanny experience and seemingly absurd guilt feelings.
On such a cognitive account, the Rat Man would be struck
by the uncanny precisely because he was, for a brief moment,
a spontaneous theoretician of the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’,
intellectually unable to rid himself from the illusion that ‘wishes
can truly kill’. And the reason for this is precisely because
reality appears to correspond with was held to be impossible:
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better knowledge is suspended because of the qualities of the
appearance. Conversely, lifting the veil of appearances would
mean to break the spell of the uncanny. However, not only
would this idea square rather badly with another of Freud’s (1909,
p.229) remarks on the peculiar epistemic position of the Rat
Man as being different from “the superstition of uneducated
people who feel themselves at one with their belief,” it would
also mean that, in the case of Hoffman’s story, our uncanny
experience would be due as well to our intellectual uncertainty as
regards the true status of the Sand-Man. Yet, as Freud remarks,
the story makes it quite clear that the Sand-Man is not really
the Sand-man, nevertheless, “this knowledge does not lessen the
impression of uncanniness in the least degree” (1919, p. 230).
Furthermore, it can even be said that the logic of the uncanny
is directly opposed to the logic of intellectual uncertainty. As
Dolar (1991) points out, the most uncanny thing is not so
much that we are kept uncertain as to the true nature of events,
whether or not what happens is really due some unfathomable
scenario. On the contrary, what is uncanny is that one knows
in advance precisely what is bound to happen, even how and
when it will happen . . . and then, effectively, it really does
happen. So here we seem to have attained a first step toward
establishing our thesis: the uncanny is an experience that is
not altered by a transcendent position of ‘better knowledge’.
The Rat Man knows quite well that ‘wishes can’t kill’, that
these absurd coincidences mean nothing at all, nonetheless, he
is plagued by uncanny feelings and a mythical guilt strangely
proportional to a disavowed belief in ‘the omnipotence of
thoughts’.
Now the second part of Mannoni’s formula arises: could
it be that the uncanny is not only impervious to ‘better
knowledge’, but more strongly, that the latter should be seen as
its enabling condition? This would mean that in the absence
of better knowledge, whenever the distance between myself
and the suspended belief disappears, the phenomenon of the
uncanny would disappear as well. Again, Freud has noted this
point in his subsequent effort, later on in the text, to shift the
emphasis from his earlier material definition of the uncanny in
terms of the content of the appearance, to a formal definition
in terms of the subjective position of those afflicted by the
uncanny toward that very same content. Why, for instance,
would the prompt fulfillment of Polycrates’ wishes induce an
uncanny effect, while the very same appearance of immediate
wish-fulfillment in the story of The Three Wishes produces none
at all? Or whence the uncanniness surrounding the living doll
Olympia in Hoffman’s story, while again the same theme of
coming-to-life of inanimate objects in most fairy tale stories
remains without effect? If it is not the content of the appearance
as such that seems to be responsible for the uncanny feeling
when reading those stories, then, as Freud argues, we should
consider the subjective position from which such stories are
read (1919, pp. 245–246). What sets apart, for example, the
aesthetic of Hoffman’s story from that of fairy tales is that in
the former, at the outset, we are invited to adopt the natural
attitude of everyday life. Within this attitude, we know that such
figures as the eye-robbing Sand-Man do not exist. In fairy tales,
however,
[. . .] the world of reality is left behind from the very
start, and the animistic system of beliefs is frankly adopted.
Wish-fulfillments, secret powers, omnipotence of thoughts,
animation of inanimate objects, all the elements so common in
fairy stories, can exert no uncanny influence here [. . .] (Freud,
1919, p. 250).
Here, precisely, in the enchanted world of fairy tales where
the existence of ghosts, resurrection of the dead, miracles and
other gruesome plots is assumed, we have nothing to fear.
And we have nothing to fear precisely because the difference
between better knowledge and belief is temporarily suspended.
On the other hand, only if we are invited to the enlightened
position of better knowledge, only if we know that wishes are
not causally responsible for certain outcomes in the world, do
we spontaneously react to those outcomes as if we believed that
things could have been different. Similarly, precisely because
the Rat Man was “a highly educated and enlightened man of
considerable acumen” and therefore “did not believe a word
of all this rubbish” (1909, p. 229), did he react with a strange
and compulsory form of credulity in the face of the most
trivial coincidences. Hence, as Freud aptly notes, we must have
“surmounted” certain beliefs in order to be susceptible to the
effects of the uncanny (1919, p. 247).
CONCLUSION
To conclude our article, we will note three points that are
particularly relevant for our discussion. First, as was the case in
the examples discussed earlier, the logic of the uncanny should
be understood in terms of a complex dialectic between better
knowledge and belief. Within this dialectic, better knowledge
does not form the disjunctive counterpart to belief, but should
itself be considered as but one necessary element situated on the
same “plane of immanence” (Deleuze, 2005) in conjunction with
belief (see also Pfaller, 2014, pp. 41–43). Starting from this general
principle, psychoanalytic theory therefore argues for at least two
critical points: first, pace Dennett and phenomenology, we do not
always know what we believe or how things seem to us; second,
we misrecognize the true function of the alleged distance toward
the belief that is expressed through “knowing better” (see Zizek,
1989, pp. 32–33; Pfaller, 2005, p. 118).
Second, this idea also enables us to put forward a further,
finer distinction between psychoanalytic theory and the
aforementioned phenomenological principle of ‘appearance qua
appearance’ (cf. supra). According to this principle, beliefs are
explained by the properties of the apparent object. Because reality
appears in such a way as if, for example, it corresponds to the
immediate fulfillment of my wishes, I (wrongly) believe that
it does. Psychoanalytic theory, however, significantly departs
from this picture: if, for instance, the uncanny appears uncanny
and I strangely react, despite better knowledge, as if I believed
in ‘the omnipotence of thoughts’, then this suspended belief
is not primarily due to the properties of the presented object,
but first of all to the act of presentation. More precisely: on a
psychoanalytic account, the uncanny is uncanny not because I
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confuse appearance with reality, not because I succumb to the
illusion and naively follow the appearance, but, on the contrary,
precisely because I do not follow the appearance, because I am
able to recognize the illusion as an illusion (or at least believe I
can) and therefore picture myself as occupying a transcendent
position of better knowledge. In short: exactly when – to put
it in Husserlian terms – I do not confuse properties of what is
represented with the act of representing. The illusion, therefore,
is not situated at the level of the object, nor is it situated at the
level of judgment toward that object, but in how this very act of
judgment, and the reflexive self-consciousness of that judgment,
contributes to what I ‘objectively believe’.
Third and finally, this notion of ‘objective belief ’ – i.e., beliefs
that are suspended by ‘better knowledge’ – further allows us to
confront in a distinctive way what may be considered as the
defining gesture of Dennett’s heterophenomenology: the rejection
of “the bizarre category of the objectively subjective” (Dennett,
1991, p. 132). According to Dennett, this obscure philosophical
notion of the “objectively subjective” should be disposed of
because it is once again a clear expression of our obstinate
belief in the Cartesian theater. It would correspond to that
mythical moment of pure phenomenological ‘givenness’, where
the ‘given’ is ‘given’ before being ‘taken’ in one way or another,
in a theoretically unencumbered place where consciousness
really happens. As Dennett notes, such a place might be a
comforting image for some philosophers because it preserves
the traditional distinction between reality and appearance at the
heart of human subjectivity, “the seeming-a-certain-way over
and above a believing-that-it-is-that-way” (1991, p. 133). Yet,
the examples we discussed point out that this is perhaps not
the only way in which “the objectively subjective” can be read.
Indeed, instead of believing in “appearances” and not knowing
whether or not they correspond to reality, “objective beliefs”
display exactly the opposite structure: we know that they are
not true, perhaps we even have a thoroughly adequate picture
of reality, but the fact that we are nonetheless defined by them,
that we act on them, remains undetected (Pfaller, 2014). Hence,
from a psychoanalytic view, it is not so much the illusion of the
“Cartesian theater”, but the Dennettian theme of “belief in belief”
considered as an exhaustive account of subjectivity that should be
questioned.
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This article seeks to reopen a major question raised by the Lacanian nosology of the
psychoses, by looking closely at Lacan’s formulations of what he never ceased referring
to as “paranoia”. While almost all classification systems of modern psychiatry, such as
the ICD-10 and the DSM-5, have abandoned the specific category of paranoia, Lacan
always viewed paranoia as a major category of “functional psychosis”. He held that
paranoia was a qualitatively different disorder than schizophrenia, and considered it to
be the principal or exemplary form of psychosis. Furthermore, in the middle period of
his work, Lacan thought of paranoia in much broader terms than those of the definition
proposed by Kraepelin, which he revisited, point by point, developing his theory of
Freud’s concept of “Verwerfung” or foreclosure; the latter became the focal diagnostic
criterion in his nosographic construction. Lacan’s privileging of and evolving theoretical
views on paranoia provide a structural approach to what he called the “resistant nucleus”
of psychosis; his work serves as a counterpoint to the more descriptive neo-Kraepelinian
approach of contemporary psychiatric nosology.
Keywords: DSM, foreclosure, Freud, Kraepelin, Lacan, nosography, paranoia, schizophrenia
INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to reopen a major question raised by the Lacanian nosology of the psychoses, by
looking closely at Lacan’s formulations of what he never ceased referring to as “paranoia”.
The need for such a reopening arises because successive editions of the principal international
classification systems have ceased to use “paranoia” to delineate a unique diagnostic category, to the
point that it seems destined to “fade away,” nosographically speaking (Prudent et al., 2016, p. 193).
Lacan, on the contrary, used the concept intensively, so much so that he considered paranoia to be
the prime example of psychosis. Has Lacan’s approach become outdated? Could it, on the contrary,
remain of interest today, at least on the condition that certain of its subtleties are not overlooked?
We shall argue for the second option.
To this end, we need to consider, jointly and separately, the centrality of the place accorded to
paranoia in Lacan’s work and its increasing marginalization in contemporary nosography. We shall
compare the slow incorporation of paranoia into the schizophrenia group (Marneros et al., 2012)
with Lacan’s paradoxical consolidation of the concept of paranoia, a concept to which he frequently
appealed as the exemplary form of psychosis throughout his rethinking of that problematic.
PARANOIA: CENTRAL FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS, MARGINAL
FOR PSYCHIATRY
Paranoia occupies an absolutely central place in Lacan’s work. From Lacan’s doctoral thesis on
paranoiac psychosis written in 1932 (Lacan, 1975) and his first clinical publications in the 1930s
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(Lacan, 1931b, 1933/1988a, 1938/1988b), through his rereading
of the Schreber case in 1955–1956 (Lacan, 1981/1993) and
his programmatic text, “On a Question Prior to Any Possible
Treatment of Psychosis,” of 1959 (Lacan, 1958/1966/2006b),
to his much later work in the 1970s on knot theory, where it
is reformulated and formalized in topological terms (Lacan,
2005/2016), paranoia was the clinical entity of reference for
his approach to the clinical treatment of psychosis. Beyond
its purely psychopathological denotations, psychosis is also
the paradigmatic nosological form through which Lacan
conceptualized a series of anthropological issues: the “hostile
potentialities” that compose the social bond, for which the
paranoid individual has an incomparable acumen (Lacan,
1975, p. 439); the problem of style in literary and artistic
creation (Lacan, 1933); the “paranoiac structure of the
ego” itself and the logic of analysis as a “guided paranoia”
(Lacan, 1948/1966/2006a, pp. 93, 89); the recurring theme of
“paranoiac knowledge” (cf. Lacan, 1947/1966/2006d, p. 150,
Lacan, 1949/1966/2006e, p. 76); or again, in epistemological
terms, what he called the “closure” of science (Lacan,
2017).
It is thus worthwhile to take a closer look at the reasons for
Lacan’s apparent nosographical privileging of paranoia, both to
identify its historical grounds and to grasp its clinical value. This
is especially the case since, as a countercurrent to the Lacanian
approach, the complex history of the category of paranoia –
which has been at the heart of a certain number of terminological
misunderstandings between European and American psychiatry
(Pichot, 1997) – has led this term to be “overdiagnosed in the
19th century and underdiagnosed in the 20th” (Dowbiggin, 2000,
p. 66). The shift in the frequency of diagnosis resulted from
Kraepelin’s introduction of the category of “dementia praecox,”
which Bleuler (1911/1950) soon renamed “schizophrenia”; this
clinical entity came to absorb discussions of the “question of
paranoia” or “Paranoiafrage” (Lewis, 1970, pp. 4–5) or to relegate
them to the background. This led to Kraepelin’s redefinition
of paranoia “in the strict or narrow sense [im engsten Sinne]”
(Kraepelin, 1899a, p. 170). As a result, while Lacan’s writings
attest to the centrality of paranoia for French psychoanalysts,
modern psychiatrists, especially in North America, have tended
to follow the opposite course, by underrating the nosological
importance of paranoia and giving a hegemonic emphasis to
schizophrenia (Kendler, 1982). The latter has been “broadened”
and “expanded” (Andreasen, 1989, p. 520) to include paranoid
forms, to the detriment of paranoia as a category.
Where does this sort of overrepresentation of paranoia
in Lacan’s work come from? How did Lacan make the
seemingly anachronistic choice to focus on paranoia, at a time
when his contemporaries in psychiatry were concentrating on
schizophrenia?
To reply to this question, we shall reassess how the theme
of paranoia is situated with respect to Lacan’s theoretical path,
which we view as being broadly organized into three major
conceptual periods (Nobus, 2000; Vanheule, 2011). We shall
concentrate on the first two of these, because they are decisive
for the question of paranoia.
EARLY WRITINGS: LACAN WITH
KRAEPELIN, 1931–1952
Although Lacan wrote several clinical articles about paranoia
during the initial years of his work (Deloro, 2011), it is his
doctoral thesis in medicine (Lacan, 1975), defended in 1932, that
presents his first theoretical conception systematically.
In this thesis, Lacan referred to Bleuler, Kretschmer, and
Jaspers to define paranoia as a “mode of reaction” (Lacan,
1975, p. 49), rather than as a developmental anomaly or an
organic process; he intended to draw out the direct connection
between the “events experienced” by the patient (p. 101), the
ensuing “internal conflicts” (p. 277), and the psychotic break
[déclenchement], understood as “the subject’s reaction to vital
situations” (p. 77). His views were generally psychogenetic, and
contrasted with the constitutionalist theories of Genil-Perrin
and the organicist approach of Clérambault, which dominated
psychiatry in France at the time. They also differed from Lacan’s
own later views, when his “return to Freud” (Lacan, 1981/1993,
p. 71) led him a position that was diametrically opposed to his
initial “comprehensive” approach (p. 316).
Although writers such as Cox-Cameron (2000) and Vanheule
(2011) have highlighted the implications of Lacan’s paradoxical
and precocious early writings, it is noted less often that Lacan
was also working to achieve a precise nosological definition and
this led him to set out a lasting representation of the diagnostic
concept of paranoia.
On this point, Kraepelin is the psychiatrist whom Lacan cites
most frequently in his thesis, and whose work constitutes his
major reference. After recalling the insoluble ambiguities and
the “apex of the period of [nosological] confusion” around the
Paranoiafrage, he concludes his history of the concept by noting,
“Then came Kraepelin, at last, as it were, with the Germanic clarity
of his conceptions”; for Lacan, Kraepelin’s definitions marked the
“maturity of the work of delimitation as applied to the notion of
paranoia” (Lacan, 1975, p. 23).
As Lacan notes (Lacan, 1975, p. 23), Kraepelin’s decisive move,
which occurred in the sixth edition of his renowned Lehrbuch,
consisted in “according a completely novel place to the concept
of paranoia” (Kraepelin, 1899b, p. 430); in this, he diverged from
traditional authors, who still associated paranoia with “a series of
clinical pictures that no longer had any relation to the original
concept, such as amentia, alcoholic hallucinations, and many
other pathological states, which almost without doubt belong to
dementia praecox or manic-depressive insanity” (p. 427).
This established the modern Kraepelinian concept (Kendler,
1988), to which those since Lacan have often returned, in
which paranoia is limited to the “gradual development of a
stable progressive system of delusions, without marked mental
deterioration, clouding of consciousness, or disorder of thought,
will, or conduct” (Kraepelin, 1899/1915, p. 423) – in opposition
to the poor prognosis of the schizophrenia group.
Lacan refers to this “strict” Kraepelinian definition as
“legitimate paranoia” (Lacan, 1975, p. 23). However, the
definition, which is both the most orthodox psychiatric definition
and one of the essential determining influences on how Lacan
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viewed paranoia, would be profoundly reworked in the course of
his thorough rereading of Freud.
THE RETURN TO FREUD: LACAN WITH
SCHREBER, 1953–1962
It is noteworthy that Lacan went on to revisit Kraepelin’s original
definition of paranoia. Given his formulations in his thesis, it is
even surprising that, 20 years later, Lacan opened his seminar
on the psychoses (Lacan, 1981/1993) by going back to his critical
point of departure and reworking the canonical definition, which
has rarely been called into question by later psychiatrists, not even
by members of the Saint Louis school (Winokur, 1977; Kendler,
1980, 1984) who instigated the neo-Kraepelinian revolution that
inspired the DSM-III, DSM-IV, and DSM-5 revisions. Lacan
actually repudiates Kraepelin’s definition in its entirety, to the
point of stating that, “There isn’t a word of truth in it” (Lacan,
1981/1993, p. 17). He takes it apart point by point, casting doubt
on each of its propositions successively: its supposedly gradual
and continual development, the dependence of its etiology on
purely endogenous causes, the illusory immutability of the system
of delusions and the “total preservation of clarity and order in
thought, will, and action” (p. 18).
Should we see in this apparent reversal a paradox in Lacan’s
approach? While it could be thought that Lacan is quite simply
going back to a pre-Kraepelinian conception, which he had
rejected unambiguously at an earlier point, the situation turns out
to be more complex.
On the one hand, several of Lacan’s criticisms had already
been sketched out in his publications of the early 1930s.1 If he
was able to express his criticisms more frankly in 1955, it might
have been because his relation to psychiatry, and also to the
rigors of pursuing a career within the hospital and university,
was freer than it could have been in the 1930s. He could thus
distance himself publicly from the authority figure of his thesis,
and at a time when he had a robust conceptual framework that
provided a new consistency to the different aspects of his critique
of Kraepelin’s definition.
On the other hand, despite his thoroughgoing criticism, Lacan
continued to praise Kraepelin’s conceptual prowess; this was still
the case at the time of the publication of his Écrits in 1966, in
which he reiterated his admiration for the German psychiatrist’s
“clinical genius” and his “faithfulness to the symptom’s formal
envelope” (Lacan, 1966/2006c, p. 52).
Nevertheless, alongside the methodical criticism intended
to free the concept of paranoia from the “strict” psychiatric
definition, Lacan’s response – by directing attention to questions
of structure rather than to symptoms alone – had the effect of
reopening the semiological framework of paranoia, to include
1The discontinuous or episodic progress of the disorder was emphasized in Lacan’s
article on “schizography” (Lacan, 1931a); the basing of the etiology on external or
social and intersubjective, rather than internal, causes, was developed in several
works of the period (Lacan, 1931b, 1933, 1933/1988a) as well as in the 1932
thesis (Lacan, 1975). Lacan had also already begun to question the supposed “total
preservation of clarity and order in thought” in his thesis, in relation to the case of
Aimée and the retroactive reconstruction of the past imposed by the dynamic of
the delusion on the subject’s relation to her history.
“elementary phenomena” and the effects of “personal [. . .]
meaning” (Lacan, 1981/1993, pp. 19, 54) as well as verbal
and auditory hallucinations. Lacan considered these to be the
paradigms of paranoiac functions, whereas Kraepelin found they
occurred “only quite occasionally” (Kraepelin, 1901/1904, p. 145).
The relaxing of the Kraepelinian frame was certainly
consistent with Lacan’s overall conceptual development. Further,
his emphasis on the structural analysis of “signifying effects”
[effets de signifiant] in Freud’s case histories, and especially in
the case of Schreber, ultimately led him, in this period of his
work, to identify a particular mode of defense that would provide
psychosis with its own specific etiology: the “foreclosure of the
Name-of-the-Father,” which intervenes from the place of the
Other (Lacan, 1958/1966/2006b, p. 477). The “failure of the
paternal metaphor,” which serves as both the “essential condition”
of psychosis and “the structure that separates it from neurosis,”
has the necessary consequence of relegating the preoccupation
with the nosography of paranoia to the background, for the sake
of providing a clear characterization of psychotic structure as
such (p. 479).
The downplaying of Lacan’s initial interest in differential
categories, if not his discarding of a nosographical definition
acquired with great effort during his thesis, derives, for the
most part, from his deepening of the Freudian approach, to
the detriment of psychiatry. This approach was reinforced by
the contributions of linguistic theory, a theory that finally
enabled him to give an epistemological heft to the term
“structure,” which he had used more intuitively 20 years
earlier.
Yet it is possible that Lacan was also taking his cues from
another source. For a long time, Freud continued to privilege
the earlier understanding of paranoia, rather than embracing the
more modern dichotomy between paranoia and schizophrenia;
this is shown by the many occasions in which he used these two
terms as if they were interchangeable (Freud and Jung, 1974).
Freud did so because his deciphering of the clinical aspects
of the psychoses was based on a pre-Kraepelinian nosography,
with its broader and obsolete concept of paranoia. It can thus be
noted that Freud’s first diagnosis of paranoia, which would inspire
Lacan’s own concept of foreclosure, was explicitly corrected
by Freud himself; once he had become aware of Kraepelin’s
dismantling of the concept, he came to view the case as one of
“dementia paranoides” (Freud, 1896/1962, p. 174, note 1, added
in 1924; Freud, 1925/1959, p. 60). He was thus late to recognize
Kraepelin’s revolution, for he only spoke of it in 1911: “I am
of the opinion that Kraepelin was entirely justified in taking
the step of separating off a large part of what had hitherto
been called paranoia and merging it, together with catatonia
and certain other forms of disease, into a new clinical unit. . .”
(Freud, 1911/1958, p. 75). This rather laconic statement covers
over a radical upheaval in the psychoanalytic nosography of the
psychoses, through which it came to meet up with the modern
psychiatric view that separates schizophrenia and paranoia, after
long having allowed paranoia to occupy the nosological place of
schizophrenia.
However, even after having imported Kraepelin’s categories
into his own nosography as of 1911, Freud continued to use
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the concept of paranoia in its more extended sense, and this is
what Lacan encountered. The ambiguity of Freud’s diagnosis of
Schreber is a testament to this. Kraepelin, Bleuler, and Jung were
unanimous in arguing that, as Jung put it, “Schreber’s case is not
a pure paranoia in the modern sense” (Jung, 1912/1916, p. 510,
note 8), but rather a case of dementia praecox (p. 141); Freud
nevertheless retained his anachronistic diagnosis of paranoia.
Lacan would then follow in his footsteps, as if taking no heed of
the ambiguity of the double diagnosis that appears in the full title
of Freud’s case history, which mentions both a “Case of Paranoia”
and, parenthetically, “(Dementia Paranoides)”.
We can thus understand why Lacan began his seminar on the
psychoses by emphasizing Freud’s privileging of paranoia:
In what has been done, is done, and is now in the course of being
done concerning treatment of the psychoses the schizophrenias
are much more readily explored than the paranoias, a much more
lively interest is taken in them, and greater results are expected
from this. Why then does paranoia, on the contrary, have a rather
privileged position for Freudian doctrine – that of a knot, but also
of a resistant nucleus? (Lacan, 1981/1993, p. 3).
What remains surprising is that, in noticing, supporting,
and taking up this emphasis himself, Lacan fully recognizes the
anachronism of that approach; he states expressly that he thinks
that the historical reduction of the scope of paranoia had passed
Freud by: “In this respect, as sometimes happens, Freud is not
absolutely in step with his time. Is he way behind it? Is he way
ahead of it? There lies the ambiguity. At first sight he is way
behind it” (p. 4).
We see that Lacan was simultaneously emphasizing the central
character of paranoia as a sort of historical scar and embracing
it as a theoretical paradigm, as if he were hesitating between
a purely historical privileging and a decidedly methodological
preference. . .. In reality, Lacan was using what seemed to be a
mere effect of history as a way of foreshadowing the structural
framework that he was working to establish.
CONCLUSION: LATER WRITINGS,
1962–1981
In his clinical approach to paranoia during the last period of his
teaching, Lacan ultimately drew out its structural traits, thereby
fully revealing, within the generic conceptualization of psychosis,
the inadequacy of the distinctions between schizophrenia and
paranoia that had been proposed before then.
If his return to Freud was primarily under the auspices of the
logic of the signifier and lent support to the broad definition of
paranoia, Lacan’s later work would focus instead on the limits
of the symbolic, developing concepts related to jouissance and
the object a. These concepts in turn had decisive effects on his
ensuing work on psychosis in the 1960s, allowing him eventually
to arrive at a “more precise definition of paranoia, as identifying
jouissance in this place of the Other as such” (Lacan, 1966/2001,
p. 215).
This fully fledged definition, with its structural criterion that
is both more precise and extensive than our contemporary
“diagnostic criteria,” also involves a complete parting of the
ways between psychiatric and psychoanalytic nosographies.
It does so by confirming the privilege of a definition that
has been enlarged to cover all of what can be called the
“elaborative psychoses,” which go far beyond the “delusional
disorders” described in recent editions of the DSM. On this
point, this new gulf between the structural definition provided
by Lacanian psychoanalysis and the definition given by “neo-
Kraepelinian” psychiatry seems, in the end, to renew and extend
an earlier gulf: the one that had originally separated Freud’s
initial broad definition from Kraepelin’s “strict sense” of the
term.
For Freud, for whom paranoia, as he said in a letter to Jung,
“remains the [major] theoretical concept” (Freud and Jung, 1974,
p. 47), and for Lacan, for whom it constituted the most vivid
clinical form of the foreclosure of the paternal function, paranoia
continued to be the “resistant nucleus”. Perhaps psychoanalysis
may be thought, in some sense, to play a similar role for clinical
psychiatry.
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This article aims to define the conceptual field of jouissance in Lacanian theory, and put
forth the hypothesis of a relationship between certain neurophysiological mechanisms
and specific clinical phenomena where jouissance is “kindled” and outside the control
of the symbolic process. First, the author briefly introduces Lacan’s notion of jouissance
and the way it draws on Freud’s theorization, and describes the preliminary stages of
this conceptual field in Lacan’s work. Then, the jouissance related to two other concepts:
repetition, with its Freudian and Lacanian nuances, as well as the—exclusively—Lacanian
concept of the object petit a. Lacan’s later conceptualization of language as jouissance
(the notion of lalangue) is then discussed in relation to Freud’s early ideas (“Letter 52”)
on the different kinds of inscriptions that help form the mental apparatus. Finally, the
author tries to formulate a hypothesis regarding specific neurophysiological mechanisms,
based on clinical situations where jouissance becomes “kindled” and escapes the control
of the symbolic processes through the neurophysiological mechanisms of conditioning,
“kindling-sensitization” and “excitotoxicity.” In these cases, jouissance can have a
destructive effect on the body and can affect, among others organs, the brain—a process
the author has previously described heuristically as the “psychosomatic diseases of
the brain.” This would be a special mechanism of automatism that would be triggered
under the specific conditions of the fragility of the signifying chain (foreclosure of the
Name-of-the-Father or solidification of the signifying chain) in combination with biological
factors, including genetic factors. In this process, signifiers are reduced to signals, which
in turn may be reduced to stimuli, with a tendency toward self-perpetuation, while affects
are reduced to emotions and moods. Thus, conditioning and kindling-sensitization could
also be understood in terms of a “semiotic reduction.” Can we therefore consider that
certain phenomena of automatism and certain deficits (delusional moods, schizophrenic
apathy, etc.) could be seen as psychosomatic disorders of the brain? The phenomena in
question might also serve—albeit at random—as a kind of shield to mitigate excessive
jouissance.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, freud, lacan, kindling, sensitiztion, conditioning, psychosomatic disorders, brain
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Jacques Lacan, in his 1969 seminar The Other Side of
Psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1969–1970, session of 11 February 1970),
said that if analysis had one task to complete, it was to create
a new field of energetics, the field of jouissance, which would
require other structures than those of physics. He also expressed
regret that this field would not be called, as he would have
wished, the “Lacanian field,” because with the little time he had
left, he would not be able to even sketch out its basics. In
the course of his teaching, Lacan designated seven versions of
jouissance: of the Thing, of Being, of the Other (as subjective
and objective genitive), of the body image, of the phallic image,
sexual jouissance, and the jouissance of life. Things are quite
different for Freud, who instead described different situations
potentially referring to jouissance and including joy, pleasure,
extreme pleasure, ecstasy, beatitude, sexual pleasure related to
sexual satisfaction, the libido, and preliminary sexual excitement.
The list already gives us an idea that jouissance is not pleasure,
but rather, as Lacan announced in his lecture on Psychoanalysis
and Medicine, pleasure is “what necessarily stops us at a certain
point, at a respectful distance from jouissance” (Lacan, 1967, p.
46). In the same lecture, Lacan says that jouissance is “always of
the order of tension, of forcing, of expenditure, even of exploit.
Jouissance is undoubtedly there at the point where pain begins to
appear” (Ibid).
PRELIMINARIES AND THE BIRTH OF THE
NOTION OF JOUISSANCE
We will trace the trajectory of the concept of jouissance in Lacan,
which not only has the status of the session of 5 March 1958 in
his seminar The Formations of the Unconscious (Lacan, 1957–
1958), where the term jouissance is introduced and contrasted
with the notions of desire and the signifier. Two sessions later,
on 25 March, Lacan says: “What we find at the basis of the
analytical exploration of desire is masochism—the subject grasps
himself as suffering; he grasps his existence of a living being
as a signifier, i.e., as subject to desire,” and later: “The subject
does not simply satisfy desire, he enjoys desiring (jouit de
désirer) and this is an essential dimension of his jouissance.”
Lacan will examine, while gradually revising it, this antithesis
between jouissance and desire (but also between jouissance and
the signifier) throughout the different stages of his teaching
from 1957 to 1975, especially in his seminar R.S.I. Miller (1999)
calls the first of the six consecutive examples of jouissance
he finds in Lacan’s work the “imaginarization” of jouissance,
because the latter appears, he argues, as what resists symbolic
elaboration, whether it is acting out, temporary perversions (e.g.,
in Seminar IV On the Object-relation), or the figure of the
ferocious Superego. Following Miller’s argument, we could say
that, at this stage, Lacan’s thinking about jouissance—which has
not yet been named as such1—remains linked to the “beyond of
the symbolic elaboration, on the broken horizon of which appears
the fantasmatic products of jouissance.”
1“A signifier in the Real of the analytic experience,” he says on 30May 1967, “a new
term” on 14 June 1967, the year of his unpublished seminar on The Logic of Fantasy
(Lacan, 1966–1967).
Aside from these preliminaries, the seminar where Lacan first
develops the concept of jouissance is Seminar VII, The Ethics
of Psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1959–1960a,b). Here he approaches
jouissance through the prism of the impossible, linked to the
notion of the Freudian Thing (Freud, 1950), das Ding, the
subject’s absolute Other. This is a “Real” as the subject’s intimate
exteriority, in other words, as what is most external yet closest
to him. Likewise, the Thing is both the essence of Evil and
the source of sublimation. The forbidden mother appears in
this seminar as the incarnation of this absolute Other, i.e.,
of the Thing. Beyond the prohibition lies an impossibility—of
the Real—announcing the divorce between jouissance and the
signifier. The Thing is what cannot be found, due to not just
prohibition but principal impossibility. The Oedipal prohibition
therefore becomes a “mythical” version of this primordial
impossibility. The jouissance of the Thing is impossible, hence
Lacan’s initial definition of jouissance as “the jouissance of the
Thing as impossible.” In the same seminar, Lacan tries to
define the notion of jouissance as the satisfaction of the drive—
rather than need—a definition that he later never repeats. The
aim of the drive is not satisfaction but, to the contrary, the
failure of satisfaction, which restarts its circuit. Consequently,
if jouissance is to be the satisfaction of the drive, it is only
insofar as any drive is ultimately the death drive, in other
words, insofar as the drive can run jouissance through the chain
of signifiers, thus historicizing the subject and, by the same
token, bringing jouissance out of the exclusive circuit of the
living.
THE RELATION OF JOUISSANCE TO THE
OBJECT PETIT a AND TO REPETITION
In his seminar onAnxiety (Lacan, 1962–1963), during the session
of 3 July 1963, Lacan says that for us, jouissance is not by nature
promised to desire and that desire can only strive toward it. In
the same seminar he speaks about jouissance via the operation
of “subjective division” (Figure 1). In this division, the link
between the signifiers and the desire of the Other is established
(or not) through a process of subjectification, with anxiety as
the intermediate level. The word “division” concerns the bar
dividing A, the big Other, by the subject, who is inscribed as a
FIGURE 1 | Second schema of subject’s division, J. Lacan, seminar Anxiety.
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quotient. How many times can the S fit into the A? The first
stage of this division is the stage of mythic jouissance (“jouissance
of Being,” marked as X in the schema of Figure 1) of the first
undivided subject; this first relationship with A creates the liaison
with the first signifier of the “desire of the Other.” This raises
the question of “what the Other wants from me” in saying this
or that to me, a question that produces anxiety—hence Lacan
calls this second logical moment the “moment of anxiety.” It
produces the inscription of jouissance as the object petit a, which
is the remainder, the residue of this division. It is the subject
who appears as petit a for the Other, who wants something from
him and who is thus lacking (barred). The result of this division
is the barred Other, who consequently appears as lacking. The
subject, after having moved through the position of the petit a
for the Other, who is lacking, divides, in the rest of the process,
the petit a by the S, and at the same time is himself divided
between the first signifier and the remaining signifiers coming
from the Other. This is the logical moment of division, which
creates the possible passage—via anxiety, as we have seen—from
the subject’s jouissance to his desire. The object petit a is thus
the cause of this desire. In the seminar, Lacan announces that
“only love allows jouissance to condescend to desire” (p. 179),
referring to the fact that the coincidence of desire and love,
however contingent—through love—is not an indispensable
condition.
In the following seminar, The Four Fundamental Concepts
of Psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1964), Lacan further elaborates the
link between the petit a as an element of jouissance and the
massive jouissance of the Thing it replaces. The petit a is, on
the one hand, an essential figure of the Thing, but, on the
other hand, it is linked to the Other as the locus of signifiers.
Its role is to mediate between the Thing and the Other. The
object petit a is an element and from this perspective resembles
the signifier, which is also an element, namely because it is
discontinuous. However, at the same time it has something to
do with the essence, just like the Thing, in other words with the
first bodily excitations and especially the body’s orifices. Contrary
to the Thing, the excitations of the object petit a have been
subject to the desire of the Other, the Other who is lacking,
as we have seen. This is because something in the structure
of the body—in the functioning of the drives—is isomorphic
to the structure of the unconscious. In this seminar, Lacan
describes the unconscious as a dynamic system, rather than
as a static series of repeating signifiers: it becomes a kind of
edge that opens and closes, like an erogenous zone, like the
mouth, and the anus. The lack of the signifier is articulated
around the lack of the body. However, the latter is not the
result of the signifier, rather it is natural and primary. Jouissance
remains untamed as the jouissance of the raw body, of the
living organism, yet it is also likely to become inscribed in
the system of the signifiers of the unconscious, albeit never
completely. In this seminar, jouissance is therefore not defined
only negatively, as what is not assimilated by the Symbolic (the
way we saw it in the seminar on Ethics). The link between
jouissance and the signifiers of desire forms the condition for
the relationship to something that exists outside the body and
has to do with signifiers. In the 1970s, Lacan will name this
type of jouissance—outside the body and related to signifiers—
“phallic jouissance2,” because signification is always related to the
Phallus (8). In The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectics
of Desire (Lacan, 1960b), he says that the phallic signifier is the
signifier of jouissance and as such represents an exception in
the signifying chain, because without it signifiers do not signify
anything.
In the seminar The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (Lacan,
1969–1970) Lacan defines jouissance in relation to the notion
of repetition. In this new conceptualization, it is jouissance that
drives repetition, or, to put it otherwise, repetition strives for
jouissance. Previously, the notion of repetition was related to
the signifying chain and the regular return of certain signifiers.
In this new version (Lacan, 1969–1970), Lacan tries to revise
the notion by making use of the concept of “unary trait,” a
neologism introduced in different forms as early as in his seminar
on Identification. It is based on Frege’s set theory, but also and
especially on Freud’s term einziger Zug. In Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921, p. 107), Freud speaks
about this “single trait” in the context of identifying with the
group leader through the ego-ideal. In the same text, he has
already mentioned identification through the symptom as the
second version of this single trait. The classical example is
Dora’s hysterical cough, a characteristic trait she copies from
her father and through which she identifies with him. Lacan
prefers the neologism “unary trait”, but when he speaks about it
specifically with regards to jouissance, he says that it originates
in the contingency of an encounter and instead of collectivizing,
identifying the subject as in the other two cases, it characterizes
him in a unique way and therefore is “distinct”. He says:
What necessitates repetition is jouissance, a term specifically
referred to. [...] As everything in the facts, in clinical
experience, indicates to us, repetition is based on the return
of jouissance. And what, in this connection, is well spelled out
by Freud himself is that, in this very repetition, something is
produced that is a defect, a failure” (p. 45–46). “Repetition
is the precise denotation of a trait that I have uncovered for
you in Freud’s text as being identical with the unary trait, with
the little stick, with the element of writing, the element of a
trait insofar as it is the commemoration of an irruption of
jouissance. (Lacan, 1969–1970, p. 77).
We have previously found this type of stigmata, as Soler (1991–
1992) reminds us, in Freud’s theory of the choice of the erotic
object. Soler cites the example of the Wolfman, for whom,
regardless of the reality of the primal scene—the coitus a
tergo between his parents that he witnessed sometime between
6 months and one-and-half year of age—what remains as a
memory of jouissance is the scene, at two-and-half years, of
the governess Grusha on her knees, scrubbing the floor, and
of himself looking at her from behind and urinating, which
translates the child’s phallic jouissance. According to Freud, this
jouissance is a trait we find throughout the Wolfman’s life and,
as Soler (1991–1992) puts it, it functions quasi-automatically in
2Later, in his seminar “Les non dupes errent” (Lacan, 1973–1974), he calls this type
of jouissance “semiotic jouissance” (session of 11 June 1974).
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all its different metonymical displacements. In other words, the
woman “placed” in this way on the floor is one way among others
of “debasing” her (a moral degradation being another option)—
and from what Freud tells us, Sergei continued to feel attracted
to not only maids in this position, but also to women of “loose
morals.” In other words, despite Freud’s efforts to give this trait,
as Soler says, an Oedipal meaning through the primal scene, “in
reality, it has no meaning [sens]; it is a trait that stigmatizes the
experience of jouissance. So, if we want it to have a meaning, this
meaning is no other but jouissance” (Soler, 1991–1992, lecture
of 13 May 1992). Which might help make the link, in a certain
way, between, in this case, the choice of the erotic object—such
and such type of woman in such and such situation—and the
theme of jouissance, in this case phallic jouissance, in the form
of urination. It is a simple way of thinking about the unary trait
as a characteristic of the experience of jouissance, which repeats
automatically.
But repetition is not simply the repetition of the unary trait.
It is also one of the consequences that the existence of the
trait has for jouissance. According to Lacan3, we need three
moments in the repetition of the unary trait for repetition to
function. The first moment is the encounter with an experience
of jouissance, i.e., a moment in which the unary trait erects a
“monument to jouissance,” as he puts it. The second moment is
the repetition of the trait, or rather an attempt at its repetition,
because the striving for repetition results in what he calls an
“immixtion of difference4.” In other words, what is repeated
is already different, giving rise to loss as the gap between
the first jouissance commemorated by the monument and the
jouissance that remains after the attempt at repetition. In terms
of physics, this loss is entropy5. The difference and loss create a
supplementary “subject” to be repeated. What the third moment
then repeats is then as much loss as it is the element of the
jouissance with a difference. The unary trait introduces the
dimension of repetition in two ways: as the nostalgia of loss
and the search for its retrieval. In this seminar, Lacan introduces
the object petit a as a “surplus jouissance” [plus de jouir],
corresponding toMarx’s notion of surplus-value [plus value]. The
ambiguity of the term plus [“surplus” or “nomore”] demonstrates
that shutting down of jouissance is indispensable to the search
for its “profit”: the object petit a commemorates the “loss of
jouissance.” However, because it represents—as an object—the
remainder of jouissance that has escaped the signifying process,
Lacan calls it “surplus jouissance.”
LANGUAGE AS JOUISSANCE
Three years later, in seminar Encore (Lacan, 1972–1973), it is
the linguistic code itself that becomes understood as primarily
3See Lacan’s Seminar ...ou pire (Lacan, 1971–1972) in Autres Écrits.
4“It is this act which produces, anachronically, the immixtion of the difference
brought into the signifier. What it had been, when repeated, it differs, becoming
a subject to repetition.” Lacan, Compte rendu avec interpolations du Séminaire de
l’Éthique (Lacan, 1959–1960b).
5In his well-known book on repetition, Kierkegaard argues that repetition is always
new and it is oriented toward the future rather than the past. For more details on
precisely this question see Adam (2005).
FIGURE 2 | Schema from S. Freud’s letter no 112 (ex-52) to W. Fliess.
jouissance, i.e., its communicative value becomes secondary. To
name this jouissance, Lacan uses the term lalangue, a neologism
he created, as he explains in his Geneva Lecture on the Symptom
(Lacan, 1989), from the word lallation,which refers to the sounds
emitted by a newborn before he can articulate them as speech.
The signifier becomes dissociated from the signified: the first
refers to jouissance and the second to signification. The jouissance
of speech, of the “bla bla,” therefore acquires this dimension of the
separation from the meaning of speech.
According to Braunstein (2003, p. 112), we find a prefiguration
of the idea of the linguistic code as jouissance already in Freud’s
letter to Fliess from 6 December, 18966 (Freud, 1896b, p.
207–214). The letter outlines three consecutive systems of
inscription (Niederschriften) of perceptions (Wahrnehmungen)
(Figure 2). In the first system (Wahrnehmungszeichen),
perceptions are inscribed in no specific order, as sign-traces.
Following Braunstein’s commentary (Braunstein, 1994, p.
176) and using the Lacanian terminology, we could say that
this logical time corresponds to the mythical jouissance, the
“jouissance of Being” of the first subject, which precedes the
arrival of the divided subject. The first codification happens
at this moment through the notion of the trace (rather than
the signifier) inscribed in the body (or rather in the flesh,
which this very process of inscription transforms into a body)
which Braunstein rightly situates as what the Freud of the
second topography calls, at the time of the Mystic Writing-
Pad (Freud, 1925), the “id” (das Id). In this first inscription,
the experiences of the Real are written simultaneously and
without any (chronological or logical) order7. We can say that
the jouissance of lalangue is the jouissance of Being not yet
dependent on the Other’s signifiers, because even though it
is related to them, there is not yet any separation from this
Other and, as a consequence, this Other is not “perceived” in
his dimension of otherness. The second system of inscription is
that of the unconscious in the first topography (das Unbewusste),
which according to Freud is not dominated by relations of
synchrony, but by other, perhaps causal, relations, which lack the
linear, syntactical and logical structuring of conscious thought.
However, it is already a decoding, a decryption of the signs
6In the French context, this text is known as the “Letter 52”—Transl. Note.
7Lacan compares them to lotto tickets. See Lacan (1960a, p. 658).
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from the previously described first moment of inscription, and
it follows the primary processes of the unconscious, which,
governed by the metaphorical and metonymical processes, is
structured like a linguistic code. The synchrony of inscription
applies here as well and, like in the precedent system, there is
no contradiction and no representation of death. On the other
hand, these inscriptions are linked to the Other; jouissance is
subject to the phallic signifier and to the—non-linear—logic
of “deferred action.” During the third moment of inscription,
the unconscious thing-presentations of the previous moment
are subject to the interpretation by the secondary processes of
the preconscious, das Vorbewusste, and connected to word-
presentations. Diachrony and temporality—in the classical
sense—are applied to this system of inscriptions, which is
dominated by the rules of classical logic.
Closing this short parenthesis devoted to the Lacanian
elaboration of the Letter 52, let us now return to Seminar Encore.
In this seminar, the body [le corps] is paramount and, as Lacan
points out, homophonically contained in its very title [En-corps].
There is no jouissance outside the living body. He says: “Isn’t
it precisely what psychoanalytic experience presupposes?—the
substance of the body, on the condition that it is defined only
as that which enjoys itself ” (Lacan, 1972–1973, p. 23). In this
sense, there is a dissociation between jouissance and the big
Other, an absence of relationship. The fact that there is no
sexual relationship is the leitmotif of this seminar. According to
Lacan, sexual jouissance is an impasse, because neither sex derives
jouissance from the Other. For both, jouissance is mediated by
the Phallus. More specifically, Lacan says: “What is known as
sexual jouissance is marked and dominated by the impossibility
of establishing as such, anywhere in the enunciable, the sole One
that interests us, the One of the relation “sexual relationship””
(p. 7). He later adds: “Jouissance, qua sexual, is phallic—in other
words, it is not related to the Other as such” (p. 9). Subsequently,
when he explains the notion of the Other in the terminology
of this seminar, he says that it can only be the Other sex. His
formulation of Woman and the feminine jouissance are also key
elements of this seminar: this is the Other jouissance, known as
the jouissance of the mystics, who too had access to it. Hence,
women have access to “phallic jouissance,” but their jouissance is
not-all phallic, because, as Lacan says, “there is a jouissance that is
hers, about which she herself perhaps knows nothing, if not that
she experiences it” (p. 74). However, he explains that this does not
happen to all women. This “Other jouissance” (which is not the
“jouissance of theOther”—as Lacan has previously demonstrated,
the latter is, by virtue of being the jouissance of the Other sex,
impossible) is supplementary rather than complementary; the
idea of complementarity would in fact create an illusion that the
sexual relationship does exist.
The table of “writing” the sexual relationship—as a failure—
which we find in the Seminar Encore (Figure 3) suggests that men
fail in their attempts to relate to the Other sex, because they are
in a relationship with the object petit a via fantasy. The body of
the Other is thus reduced to the object petit a (written in the
woman’s part of the column) and all their jouissance is phallic
jouissance, which contains its own limit through castration (–ϕ).
In any case, even in the sexual act, where we could say that
FIGURE 3 | The diagram of sexual difference, J. Lacan seminar Encore.
for the man the Phallus is momentarily embodied by the penis,
the orgasm induces a refractory period that restricts jouissance;
the latter remains a jouissance of the penis as an organ and not
of the Other sex. On the other hand, for, the cause of her desire is
the Phallus she does not have. Thismeans that while in a sense she
avoids the castration complex, she attaches herself to the Phallus,
even if in order to do so she needs a man as her intermediary, for
example by having a child.
In this case, her jouissance is also phallic, but it leaves her the
possibility of accessing the Other, “supplementary” jouissance.
This is why she is “not-all” and is marked as barred. In the
schema of the formulas, two arrows are drawn starting from the
barred Woman, one toward the Phallus, which we find in the
man’s part of the table, the other toward the S(A), which is the
symbol used in the graph of desire (Figure 4) as the signifier of
the lack in the Other. This signifier represents jouissance, because
it replaces the phallic signifier, absent from the signifying chain.
As Valas (1998) points out, the jouissance that is excluded from
the place of the Other returns in the Real, especially in the body
itself. The arrow pointing toward the S(A) remains in the column
that concerns Woman, who is therefore not entirely phallic. As
to love—and similarly to what we have seen in the seminar on
Anxiety—here again Lacan says that “what makes up for [ce qui
supplée] the sexual relationship is, quite precisely, love” (Lacan,
1972–1973, p. 45). We could say that in her relationship with a
man, the woman gives what she does not have by representing
the Phallus (which she does not have) for a man, and this gift
is love, following Lacan’s definition of it, namely as “giving what
one does not have.” After his reference to “feminine jouissance” in
Encore, Lacan in fact never mentions it again. As a result, Lacan’s
belief is that the jouissances of the two sexes are “asymmetrical”
and thus can never meet, which is another way of saying that the
sexual relationship does not exist.
We will finish with the seminar R.S.I. (Lacan, 1974–1975) and
Lacan’s third lecture in Rome (Lacan, 1975)—usually referred
to as La troisième—where he makes a distinction between two
types of jouissance: “phallic” jouissance and the “jouissance of the
Other” in the sense of the objective genitive. We will not discuss
this stage of his theorization of the notion of jouissance in great
detail, because it would require an introduction to his use of the
Borromean knot. We will only briefly mention that the object
petit a is “squeezed in” (Figure 5) between:
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FIGURE 4 | The graph of desire—complete graph, J. Lacan seminar Desir
and its interpretation.
FIGURE 5 | The Borromean knot, J. Lacan, conference “La troisième.”
(a) meaning, which forms the intersection between the
Imaginary and the Symbolic;
(b) “phallic jouissance,” which we find between the Symbolic and
the Real;
(c) the “jouissance of the Other” (objective genitive), which is
found between the Real and the Imaginary and thus outside
language. Lacan also calls it the “jouissance of life,” contrasting
it to the “phallic jouissance,” which is the “jouissance of death,”
because, as we have already said, it refers to the signifier and
historicizes the subject, thus “helping” to kill, i.e., evacuate,
other types of jouissance.
THE POSSIBLE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS
OF JOUISSANCE ON THE ORGANISM
Having followed the different stages in the development of the
conceptual field of jouissance in Lacan’s teaching, we are now
going to look at the specific question of the potentially destructive
effects that jouissance can have on the human organism, i.e., the
possibility that jouissance produces organic deficits, especially
in cases where it is not limited by the phallic function and
thus regulated by language. As we will see, this will allow us
to make a link between the concept of jouissance and certain
neurophysiological notions8. Yet before we speak about organic
deficit, let us first look at the relationship between a deficit and
a flaw [faille]. As Lacan’s teaching progresses, the essence of the
human condition in fact becomes articulated to an idea of a
“flaw.” In his commentary on Lacan’s Presentation on Psychical
Causality (Lacan, 1946) and critiquing theories that understand
madness as a deficit, Jacques-Alain Miller argues:
A deficit can be identified in physical reality, and it is still the
case that in order to treat a certain number of dysfunctions, we
try to identify, via brain imaging, insufficient activity in this
or that area of the brain. So these are fundamentally physical
deficits. On the contrary, the flaw in question is a signifying
fault, which Lacan understands as a split [faille] between the
ego and the subject’s being [...] (Miller, 2008, 30 January 2008).
Lacan therefore shifts the question from the deficit to the flaw and
the subject will be considered by him as a gap between signifiers;
the term “rift” [déchirement] was already present in all his early
work on psychosis (Lacan, 1938, p. 842–843) and also in his
article on the Mirror Stage (Lacan, 1949). In the course of his
teaching, this same flaw will be located on the level of the Real
as impossible, on the level of the “sexual non-rapport” and in the
concept of “not-all.”
The Lacanian theory, by way of its conception of the subject
as a “flaw” (flaw because of the premature nature of the human
being at the moment of his birth and, correlatively, because of
its dependency to the Other of the language in regard to the
formation of the organism itself, including the brain), allows us
to clearly distinguish between the “subject” and the “brain of the
person”; and this despite the tendency, in the last decades, toward
the progressive cerebralization of personal identity9, as described
by both anthropologist Vidal (2005) and sociologist Ehrenberg
(2004). However, it is precisely the fact that the subject—as a flaw
that enables the constitution of the human being—is separate
from its brain that allows us to conceive the possibility, among
other things, of the existence of psychosomatic affections, which
affect the brain, and, consequently, the presence of deficiencies at
that level.
Can Lacanian theory help us think about the appearance of
an organic deficit? Lacan’s reference to the Oedipal complex in
Presentation on Psychical Causality (Lacan, 1946) makes it clear
that what the establishment of the symbolic ternary prevents is
precisely the processes of “sensitization.” He writes: “I would not
hesitate to say that one could demonstrate that the Oedipal crisis
has physiological echoes, and that, however purely psychological
its mainspring may be, a certain “dose of Oedipus” can be
considered to have the same humoral efficacy as the absorption
of a desensitizing medication” (Lacan, 1946, p. 149). Much later,
8Jadin and Ritter (2009) argues that the Project is in fact a text on the
neuropsychology of jouissance.
9See also Dimitriadis (2012a).
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in his seminar The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan implicitly
speaks about the potentially destructive power of jouissance over
the living organism. We cite: “I have already said enough to
you to know that jouissance is the jar of the Danaides, and
that once you have started, you never know where it will end.
It begins with a tickle and ends in a blaze of petrol. That’s
always what jouissance is” (Lacan, 1969–1970, p. 72). As he
points out, the process of sensitization is physiological and
even—if we adjust this to our current knowledge about the
process—mostly neurophysiological (although there are some
allergic and other physiologic mechanisms of sensitization that
are not neurophysiologic); Besides, the term “sensitization” is
quite similar to the term “conditioning” and according to Kandel
(1991), who studied those mechanisms on aplysia, conditioning
is a product of the sensitization mechanism.
THE KINDLING—EXCITOTOXICITY
HYPOTHESIS
Taking Lacan’s comments as our starting point, we can then
pose the following audacious question: Can the mechanism of
sensitization and its neurophysiological extensions of kindling
and excitotoxicity account for the deficient phenomena affecting
for example the brain10? In my previous work, we tried to show
that the neurophysiological mechanism of kindling, which is
related to the limbic system and has been described in psychiatry
by Post (1992)11, initially in the context of manic-depressive
psychosis, lends itself very well to such hypothesis. Post (1992)
formulated the hypothesis of the neurophysiological mechanism
of kindling in order to understand certain phenomena of mood
disorders and other psychiatric disorders. Concerning mood
disorders, he argued that a manic depressive illness can progress
from a reactive mode of functioning toward an automatic
mode of functioning. This happens through a series of affective
episodes, which at first become reactions conditioned by specific
circumstances. At a later stage, if these episodes are repeated with
sufficient frequency, they become autonomous, in other words
automatic.We should note that automatism depends on a state of
excitation that has a tendency to self-perpetuate, hence the term
“kindling.” According to Post et al., the mechanism of kindling
could be linked to a certain type of genes.
Stahl (2002, from p. 385) argues that this neuronal excitation
can even become toxic and destroy certain neurons. According
to this author, in some clinical situations such as schizophrenia,
depression, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, Alzheimer’s disease,
Parkinson’s disease, and others, this excitotoxicity provokes
neuronal apoptosis and makes these conditions irreversible, at
least to some extent. Excitotoxicity is indeed a pathological
process of neuronal alteration and destruction (or neurotoxicity)
10Surely, the jouissance affects not only the brain, but the whole organism, since,
as Lacan remarked (Lacan, 1972–1973), the jouissance is a manifestation of life.
As we suggested previously, the brain is nor the subject, nor the person, despite
the nowadays tendency to identify it to the latter. This is the reason, according
to our hypothesis, that it could be affected—like other organs—by psychosomatic
affections.
11Concerning the neurophysiological mechanisms of sensitization and kindling,
we refer the reader to our article on Post’s work (Dimitriadis, 2012b).
through the hyperactivation of glutamic acid and its analogs.
However, we can see that the last author creates an amalgam
between neurological (Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases) and
psychiatric diseases (schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder,
panic disorder), a danger we are trying to avoid by using the
concept of the psychosomatic diseases of the brain. How to
avoid such a confusion? We can consider psychiatric diseases
as states, which are related, although not in a constant manner,
to neurophysiological disorders, or even to neuropathological
diseases that occur in the form of psychosomatic afflictions,
which affect the brain. In the same way we consider that one
intestinal disease may have a purely somatic origin whereas
another might have a psychosomatic one, we can by the same
token consider that some cerebral networks may be affected by
a purely organic cause (neurological diseases), whereas some
others, as in the case of some psychiatric disorders, may be
affected by psychosomatic processes, by way of the kindling
mechanism and its possible ecxitotoxicity outcome. Sometimes,
the same cerebral circuits could be affected either by purely
somatic causes, or by psychosomatic processes, and in that case,
we can obtain resembling clinical configurations as we have
previously suggested (Dimitriadis, 2013a), for example some
catatonic-like states of a purely organic origin (such as the
neuroleptic’s malignant syndrome) which nevertheless possess
some characteristics that resemble those of psychotic catatonic
syndromes.
THE SEMIOTIC REDUCTION
Beyond these questions about the neurophysiological mechanism
of sensitization, the theory of psychosomatic phenomena put
forth by Lacan in Seminar XI (Lacan, 1964) takes into
consideration Pavlov’s classical conditioning which is, according
to Kandel, an elaboration of the sensitization mechanism.
Specifically, Lacan argues that in cases where the signifying
chain has become solidified, the dialectic of desire comes to a
halt and, as a consequence, the “signifier of the desire of the
Other” acquires a kind of opacity and becomes enigmatic. In
this situation, it stops referring to another signifier and instead
of reinitiating the subject’s dialectic of desire it turns into an
inductor, a signal, inducing disruptions to the needs of the
soma. Thus, Lacan relates Pavlov’s theory of conditioning12 to
his own hypothesis of the solidification of the signifying chain
in psychosomatic phenomena. In other words, he believes that
there is an analogy between the solidified signifier and the signal
of the experimenter (who rings a bell instead of showing the
meat) in Pavlov’s scenario, which is trying to condition a dog, a
domesticated animal, i.e., one that is sensitive to the signs coming
from the human other. This theorization allows us to correlate
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory on psychosomatic phenomena,
firstly to semiotics, and secondly to neurophysiology. As we said
before, in this kind of process, the signal, thus produced, acquires
an imperative “capacity” for the subject and conditions its soma;
12According to Pavlov (1954), there is an intricacy between two systems of
signaling in the human being: one related to the image (shared with animals), and
another proper to the human language, the signals of the signals.
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consequently, it can cause a disruption of the functions, even
lesions.
When we talk about needs, we refer not only to hunger or
the need for exemption. It is a matter of several homeostatic
circuits of the organism that can be disturbed by desire and drive.
We believe that we contribute to this question by generalizing
the Lacanian theory, i.e., by positing that, by way of such a
semiotic process, the brain’s homeostatic circuits may be affected
as well. That is to say that, in our opinion, the signal can
condition not only the homeostatic circuits of the peripheral
soma, but also those of the brain. We named the reduction of the
signifier into the signal, or even into stimuli that self-maintain
themselves, “semiotic reduction process” (Dimitriadis, 2013b,c).
The tendency stimuli have to self-maintain themselves may be
explained by way of the kindling mechanism we referred to
before. As we will see below, the circuits that regulate our mood
might be, in that regard, a preferential target.
THE SEMIOTIC REDUCTION PROCESS
AND PHANEROSCOPY
We believe that this reduction process, from the signifier to the
signal or to the stimuli can be explained with the aid of Pierce’s
Phaneroscopy13 (the theory of phenomenology’s categories)
(Peirce, 1978), and its three categories: firstness, secondness, and
thirdness. Firstness is “the mode of being of what is, as it is,
positively and with no reference to anything else.” Secondness is
“the mode of being of what is, as it is, in relation to a second,
but without considering any third one.” Thirdness is “the mode
of being of what is, as it is, by putting a second and third one
in a reciprocal relationship.” Firstness relates to the immediate
sentiment, secondness to reaction and to current events, and
thirdness to language, law, and representation. Thirdness would
be the strictly human category. The semiotics of the human
being is determined by these ternary dialectics since the dialectics
of his desire, processes like the co-modalization of different
sensory fluxes, shared attention, play pretend, the so-called meta-
representations, jokes, the structures of kinship etc. are all ternary
processes. In the case of animals, it is the secondness of the signals
that determine their semiotic systems.
According to ethologist Vidal (2011), “these registers of
signals, of which anyone is in close relation with the stimulus
it signals, to such an extent that it functions in the same way,
are derived from dyadic links systems or from the secondness
principle, whereas stimuli themselves act solely as “monads,”
according to the principle of firstness.” For the signals, shifting
is restricted to a relationship of synchronic presence (temporal
or spatial contiguity, for example), and not to a (diachronic)
relationship in reference to the absence of something, words for
example. The function of language, according to Lacan (1956), is
not to inform but to evoke. Therefore, the natural or conditioned
reflexes, and more generally, the immediate reactions to a signal,
belong to the secondness category. Stimuli do not even need
another signal in order to be efficient; they act in closed-circuit
13Other authors have used Pierce’s Phaneroscopy categories in the field of
psychopathology (Roulot, 1992; Balat, 2000; Delion, 2000; Muller, 2000).
(as monads) and are thus able to self-maintain themselves. With
the help of Pierce’s Phaneroscopy, we therefore suggest that
several psychopathologies are related to a gradual transition from
thirdness toward states that fall under the secondness or firstness
category, a transition toward more and more automatic states.
More precisely:
– On the semiotic level, going from thirdness to secondness
would mean going from the signifier to the signal, and on
the clinical level, producing conditioning phenomena, and
more generally, reaction phenomena. In this regard we have
some classical psychosomatic phenomena like the conditioned
anxiety crises, some conditioning phenomena in the case of
drug addicts, reactive depressions or reactive manic states, the
repetition syndrome in traumatic neuroses, certain “action-
like “symptoms” etc.
– The transition from thirdness or secondness to firstness would
even go beyond this reduction “stage.” We could maybe say
that we go from the signifier or the signal to the stimuli
themselves. In this event, we have even more automatic
states, like automatic mood disorders: e.g., stable delusional
mood or athymhormia in the case of schizophrenia, maniac,
and depressive states that have become autonomous from
their initial triggering causes, automatic states of panic, some
psychosomatic phenomena that are automatic etc. In all of
these situations, the signs do not come from the other, unlike
conditioning where there is the signal from the other that is
the triggering factor. In this case, stimuli in a way self-maintain
themselves.
Needless to say that we do not maintain that there is continuity
between animal and man on the basis of such an eventuality
of semiotic reduction. Thirdness, even in case of these extreme
situations, does persist, since it plays a constituent role for the
human being, who cannot escape from it. In human beings,
ternary structures subjugate (and in some way, “de-naturize”)
ethological signaling systems (signals and stimuli). The fact that
when thirdness is compromised as was the case in the states
previously stated the human body makes itself sick, can be
regarded as a strong proof of such an assertion.
LOGIC OF THE SIGNIFIER VS. LOGIC OF
THE SIGN
Independently of Pierce’s Phaneroscopy, we can specify this
semiotic reduction process in relation to the psychoanalytic
concepts of “deferred action” and “repetition.” The symbolic,
i.e., the signifiers’ network of a particular subject, is not an
enclosed system. Each encounter with chance may modify the
string of its signifiers. Each signifier can change the whole of
the signifying chain of a subject. In the case of psychoanalytic
therapy, isolation of the signifier (of a padding button) may
allow the subject to provide a new, retroactive meaning of his
whole history. If we consider that for a given subject some
signifiers have played a special role, they can be assigned
different meanings during different stages of the subject’s life,
but they never cease being of decisive importance to the
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subject. However, this recurring re-determination, around the
different possibilities the symbolic dictates to the subject, in
the same time opens up new dimensions, on condition that
the subject manages to “admit” to himself his inscription in
the symbolic, i.e., that he manages to accept the limit of the
castration that his personal story dictates for him. This logic
is diachronic and of recurring retroaction, in the sense that
the end result can influence its own cause and change it after
the fact14. On the other hand, the logic of the signal or that
of the sign is a linear logic, valid for the reflexes, be they
natural or conditioned, and entails an objectification, a certain
universality of reactions. This logic also entails a synchrony
and/or a spatial contiguity and determines the learning process
in animals.
We may therefore consider the “semiotic reduction” also in
relation to its consequences regarding the termination of the
“padding” by the signifying chain. As we have seen, the end
of the padding may occur in various situations. The padding
buttoning dictates a subjective and diachronic assumption as far
as it puts in relation through the signifiers. The padding is also
an assumption of contingency, of whatever new happens to the
subject. According to Lanteri-Laura’s expression (Lanteri-Laura,
1992), it is therefore a creative automatism15. When the padding
buttoning stops, the encounter with the signifiers of the desire of
the Other, as we stated previously with regard to psychosomatic
phenomena, acquires a certain objectivity and a certain reality of
presence, the latter having the force of an order, in other words
the characteristics of a signal. These frozen and “imperative”
signifiers are pseudo-signifiers, “cut off” from the subject’s
history (diachrony). They are actually signals that can trigger
psychosomatic processes. This is another way of conceiving the
“actual neuroses,” since the signals, unlike the signifiers, act in
a synchronic and actual manner. At this stage, the jouissance in
relation to the signification obtained in deferred action (of the
mediation of the Other), that is to say the phallic jouissance (that
has an out of body component), fades in favor of a jouissance
of the body (of life) that is erratic and deregulated. Thus, the
laws of life, in this case those of the human organism, can freely
reveal themselves, instead of being subsumed and ”de-naturized”
by the effects of signification as before. And the physiological
mechanisms (related, amongst others, to different processes
like conditioning and kindling) can emerge spontaneously
in the form of classical psychosomatic phenomena, various
psychotic phenomena, panic attacks, addictive phenomena, post-
traumatic phenomena, mood excesses, etc. More specifically,
in the case of mood disorders the semiotic reduction (or
the stop of the padding buttoning) might be that the affects,
which are linked to the subject’s signifiers—although in an
indirect manner—lose that connection; they become estranged
from the signifying function, thus transforming themselves into
emotions (of secondness order) or into mood (of firstness
order).
14Ansermet and Magistretti (2010a) have written about this operation, in
connection to neuroplasticity.
15See also Dimitriadis (in press).
THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN
NEUROSCIENCES AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
Alain Vanier begins the preface of a book (Dimitriadis, 2013b)
with the following paragraph:
Ansermet and Magistretti (2011) distinguish between four
possible positions in order to work toward an articulation of
neurosciences with psychoanalysis.
– In the first place, that of an “absolute heterogeneity”
which leads to neurology absorbing part of psychiatry, since
it implies an exclusive alternative between psychical “or”
neurological atiology; in other words, nothing more than the
old antagonism between psychogenesis and organogenesis.
They observe in this respect that the question of the subject
remains unresolved.
– Another approach is “superposition,” which favors an
analogical model, this time without leftovers: this is the
neuropsychoanalysis orientation.
– Thirdly, a “joining” model, which offers a potentially very rich
perspective that, includes a certain idea of complexity.
– Finally, an approach that consists of a “crossroads of two
heterogeneous orders” which is the subject of their studies
(Ansermet and Magistretti, 2004, 2010b), with no hope of
a “unified science,” to use Pierre Fédida’s words16 as quoted
in the publication. An interdisciplinary approach then, in a
perspective where neurosciences and psychoanalysis are two
very distinct fields, presenting some intersection points from
which we can question their respective limits (Dimitriadis,
2013b, p. 9–10).
We criticized the first position (Dimitriadis, 2013b), which is
adopted, among others, by Zénoni (1998), when he sustains
the abolition of the anatomical and the biological, as far as he
considers those fields irrelevant in regard to the causality of
the human body’s behavior—and the radical separation from
animal determinism. He states for example: “There is no clash
between biology and psychoanalysis because there is no conflict
of jurisdiction between them. A clinical phenomenon’s causality
falls within the jurisdiction of either psychoanalysis or biology,
it never proceeds from the interaction of the two.” We also
criticized the second position (Dimitriadis, 2013b, 2015b), which
can be found within the clinical-anatomical correlation method
of Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2002), according to which the issue
is to find anatomical connections between Freudian concepts and
cerebral structures. The hypotheses presented in this paper, in
regard to the concept of jouissance, fall under the fourth position.
The intersection we have chosen is the concept of jouissance, in
order to question the intricacy between the psychical factors and
the purely organic ones—some genetic—within the development
of some psychopathological phenomena, in relation to the
potentially destructive effect of an excess of jouissance on the
16“where comparative epistemology of the models and their critical theoretical
functioning would play the deciding role into realizing their operative limits and
their aptitude to be transformed reciprocally; in which case, the aim would be a
mutual communication rather than the aspiration toward a unified science,” Fédida
(1992), p. 295.
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organism, more particularly on the brain, although destruction
can reach other organs and functions, even life itself.
This type of approach seems important given the importance
biological psychiatry has nowadays acquired within the field of
psychiatry, whose studies are mostly about the brain, all the more
so as psychotropic drugs work mainly on that level. According,
for example, to Morin (2017), it is reasonable to ask ourselves
if some psychoanalytical postulates, like childhood amnesia, are
compatible with what is actually known about the brain. The
author, a neurologist and psychoanalyst who worked by means of
her psychoanalytical listening with patients with cerebral lesions,
speaks in the same book of the benefit of a non-integrative
approach (between neurology and psychoanalysis) in the case of
some of these particular patients; an approach which, according
to the author, could instruct us as to the impact of the body’s
image in identifications.
The approach we have chosen might contribute to a new
distinction between neurology and psychiatry17, because today
several researchers18 are looking forward to a new integration
of the two fields. It could be of help to the study and
explanation of certain pathologies which are on the fringes of
neuro-psychiatry (e.g., catatoniform phenomena, athymhormia,
mental confusion...19). It could also boost the study of biological
vulnerability—genetic or epigenetic amongst others—in relation
to psychopathologies. There could be for example some kind
of dialogue with the genetic studies of Crow (2000, 2002) who
maintains that schizophrenia is the price man has to pay for
the ability to speak. If we were to follow Crow’s viewpoint,
language and the schizophrenic being are two sides of the same
coin; Lacan (1946) affirmed the same thing (even though from
a point of view quite distant from Crow’s) in his address at the
Bonneval Colloquium when he maintained that the man cannot
be understood without insanity.
This approach could be of help for the double “therapies,” i.e.,
when a psychoanalytic cure is combined with the prescription of
biological treatment by a medical doctor20, especially in defining
the respective limits of those two oh so different approaches. It
could also contribute to studies that look into the clinical effect of
psychotropic drugs, as it can be perceived in transference21. This
research begun in the 60’s by some psychiatrists that worked also
as psychoanalysts22, and is still ongoing23.
FINAL REMARKS
Can the term “kindling” be directly referred to the notion
of jouissance? Such a claim would of course be unjustified
and we have critiqued precisely this type of amalgamation of
17In France, these two specializations are considered distinct since 1968.
18See, for instance, Price et al. (2000).
19See Dimitriadis (2013a).
20See Dimitriadis (2014).
21Incidentally, the prescription of anti-epileptic drugs in the case of mood
disorders has increased firstly because of some observations by Lambert et al.
(1966) about Depamide R©, and secondly in connection with Post’s research
concerning the kindling mechanism, which was initially conceived by Goddard
(1981), in relation to epilepsy.
22See, for instance, Conté (1963), and Green (1961).
23See, for instance, Kapsambelis (1994) and Dimitriadis (2014).
concepts from different epistemic fields in my previous work
(Dimitriadis, 2013b, 2015b). However, if we were to think
about a neurophysiological mechanism that could account for
the neurobiological support of jouissance—as a phenomenon
of the living being—a mechanism of this kind (of reverse
tolerance, like kindling) might be suitable. Bazan et al. (2016)
have also suggested to instantiate jouissance physiologically,
namely through the reward system of the mesolimbic pathway.
This system can register a hypersensitivity for action that
has previously been sealed by an experience of satisfaction
and a jubilatory release of dopamine. However, the system
also dissociates action from its results, which makes it
structurally bound to produce derailments (the phenomenon of
autoshaping), just like jouissance involves a derailment on the
clinical level. In other words, it is the activation of the drive,
a unique state of wanting and anticipation, that is intrinsically
gratifying yet not pleasing—in the common sense of the term—
and this pleasure of the drive fits very well with the notion of
jouissance. These authors refer to the works of Robinson and
Berridge (1995), who suggested that the key change in addiction
had to do with a hypersensitization, via the long-term adaptations
in the circuits of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system. Their
theory of “incentive salience” shows the malleability of the
mesolimbic dopaminergic to historical imprints, i.e., the mark
through which the drive insists and commemorates at the
same time. The development of an addiction would then be
a concrete example of this dissociation: a situation where the
drug becomes an object of pathological want even though its
appreciation continues to decline. Yet the authors do not try
to create an equivalence between the theoretical corpus and
a physiological circuit, because psychical regularities become
autonomous from physiology, even though the body imposes
certain constraints on the constitution of the psyche. We should
point out that while we have worked a priori independently from
these authors, we have come to similar conclusions with respect
to the type of physiological mechanism (sensitization) which,
rather than explain can “prepare the grounds” for the types of
repetitive phenomena and even neuronal destruction that we
have described as the psychosomatic phenomena of the brain24.
More specifically, we have put forth a hypothesis (Dimitriadis,
2013b,c) of the “brain’s psychosomatic participation”25, which
could potentially also be applied to psychopathological contexts
other than manic-depressive psychosis (e.g., schizophrenia26,
addictions, depression27, catatonia28, repetitive panic attacks,
traumatic neurosis, and others).
Why then not presume that under certain conditions, where
there is a “foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father” or the
signifying chain becomes “solidified,” the laws of the organism—
such as the processes of “sensitization” and “conditioning”—can
24It is perhaps also not a coincidence that among the first psychoanalytic works
on the search for neuronal mechanisms—that could be related to certain psychic
processes—we find Lawrence Kubie’s work (Kubie, 1941) on the repetition in
neurosis. According to some authors (for example, Le Roux, 2007), Lacan was
familiar with Kubie’s theory of “reverberating closed circuits.”
25Silvano Arieti discussed this possibility as early as in the 1960s. For a review of the
literature on the prehistory and history of this hypothesis, see Dimitriadis (2012a).
26See Dimitriadis (2013b,c, 2015a).
27See Dimitriadis (2014).
28See Dimitriadis (2013a).
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“switch on” and produce occasional deficits or even sequelae.
As we have argued earlier, sensitization and conditioning could
be considered as processes of “semiotic reduction.” In this same
way, why not consider that certain phenomena of automatism
and certain deficits (delusional moods, schizophrenic apathy,
etc.) in the context of the psychoses (but not only) could be
seen as psychosomatic disorders of the brain. The phenomena
in question could also serve—albeit in random ways—as a kind
of shield that mitigates excess jouissance. Calling these “deficient
phenomena” might appear somewhat pejorative; however, the
“psychotic prognosis” is often pejorative as well. This does
not prevent such phenomena from being able to facilitate a
certain stabilization, as if in these cases the de-symbolized body,
i.e., the soma, “treated itself,” trying to pacify the excess of
jouissance. In other words, if the Name-of-the-Father does not
provide a “desensitizing medication” (as Lacan evoked in terms
of Oedipus), the body can sometimes produce a condition that
“functions” as this kind of medication via the psychosomatic
suppléance, namely an illness of the brain that affects mood,
motor skills and so on. Does this mean that in such cases we could
speak about the suppléances of the Real of the body? In other
words that, in the absence of another suppléance or compensation
coming from the Symbolic, the Imaginary or the Real, the Real
of the body self-mutilates and disconnects from the Other—and
from his jouissance.
CONCLUSIONS
To sum up the “types” of jouissance discussed above, we could
say that we can distinguish three aspects of jouissance in Lacan’s
teaching: (1) a jouissance that is linked to signifiers, i.e., “phallic
jouissance,” which is subject to castration and the Name-of-
the-Father; (2) a jouissance prior to the relationship with the
(non-barred) Other, one that is below [en deçà] the level of the
signifiers and refers to the first experiences with the Other, i.e.,
the jouissance of the “Freudian Thing” that is inscribed in the
body as traces (and is therefore the jouissance of the body), but
at the same time cannot be named and therefore remains a myth.
This “jouissance of Being” can only be deduced retrospectively,
following the subject’s division by the signifier, but the subject
can no longer access it and it is therefore impossible. Finally,
(3) a jouissance beyond signifiers, beyond the functioning of the
Phallus and the Name-of-the-Father. This is the supplementary
“Other jouissance,” accessible to women and mystics, which is
beyond language and which speaking beings cannot articulate in
words, even though women can feel it, although not all women.
However, this Other jouissance is logically conditioned by the
phallic function, even though it lies beyond this function: it
exceeds language, but is not exempt from it.
Nevertheless, the jouissance underneath language (pre-
discursive but not preverbal), the jouissance of the living,
always remains subjacent, acting like a “parasite” toward other
types of jouissance. It can have destructive effects on the
body through physiological mechanisms that we tried to sketch
out using the neurophysiological phenomenon of kindling,
where the excess of excitation can produce toxicity, causing
neuronal destruction. This kind of neuroplasticity, which we
have described heuristically as the “psychosomatic disease of
the brain” could affect, among others, brain structures related
to affects, which would thus be reduced to emotions and
moods. Through this same process, signifiers would be reduced,
respectively, to signals, which in turn could be reduced to
stimuli, with a tendency toward self-perpetuation. This would
be a special mechanism of mental automatism, which could
be triggered under the specific conditions of the fragility of
the signifying chain (foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father or
solidification), in combination with biological factors, including
genetic factors. Let us then give the last word to Freud, who
writes, in Draft K (Freud, 1896a, p. 146): “I should say that
heredity is an extra determinant in so far as it facilitates
and increases the pathological affect—the determinant, that
is, which in general makes possible the gradations between
the normal and the extreme case. I do not believe that
heredity determines the choice of the particular defensive
neurosis.”
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This article sets out to shed light on the Lacanian concept of cut
(introduced in 1961–1962): it refers to the symbolic (i.e., linguistic) operation which
produces the object a and thereby enables separation, through which the subject
emerges. To that effect, we show how this concept benefitted from Lacan’s interactions
with Maud Mannoni (1923-1998), who focused on clinical situations where implementing
a cut in the subject’s environment is the only way to enable a separation between the
child and the Other. Lacan first drew on Mannoni’s clinical elaborations about the
retarded child’s alienation to the maternal fantasy: when the mother’s unconscious
doesn’t leave room for the cut, it prevents the separation through which the child
could become a subject. Lacan generalized this in the late 1960s: he broadened
Mannoni’s alienation to the maternal fantasy to characterize a type of child symptom,
where children become their mother’s non-separated, de-phallicized object a. Then,
in the 1970s, Mannoni proposed an original theoretico-clinical setting to address the
configurations where the object a isn’t separated: in the splintered institution, the team
follows on projects of activities (professional, personal, etc.) outside the institution voiced
by children who haven’t previously encountered the symbolic cut, by helping them
realize these external projects. By thus acknowledging their attempts at establishing
a cut and giving them consistency, the splintered institution helps them psychically
elaborate separation.
Keywords: cut, psychosis, family, Lacan, Maud Mannoni, mental retardation, maternal fantasy, object a
INTRODUCTION
Lacan introduced the notion of cut in the early 1960s: its refers to the operation (broader
than castration, both in scope and in nature) through which the infant’s mothering figure (the
maternal or primordial Other) enables psychical separation, by introducing the infant to a
representation of him as symbolically distinct from her. Receiving this representation enables the
infant to ultimately acknowledge his separation from her body; in Lacan’s view, only then does the
infant become a subject.
In this paper, we shed light on the theoretical and clinical fruitfulness of this concept of cut
by addressing it from a specific perspective: that of the cases where the paradigm representation
enabling the cut—the Name-of-the-Father, Lacan’s rewriting of the Oedipus complex—isn’t
transmitted to the infant, thereby precluding the cut to be established in the child’s psyche. How
should one characterize such cases? Our hypothesis is that MaudMannoni’s clinical and theoretical
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elaborations on the psychotic dimension of such cases, which
took place in a constant exchange with Lacan, provided him with
crucial clinical material to conceptualize such situations and give
the concept of cut its final shape. In return, she used Lacan’s
concept of cut in a very original fashion, by putting together a
new type of institution trying to enable the emergence of the cut
within the unconscious of children not heretofore presented with
the Name-of-the-Father, by providing them with representations
to implement the cut according to their structure (neurotic,
psychotic, perverse, or autistic).
We first lay out the concept of cut as Lacan established
it in the early 1960s, and insist on its paradigm condition—
the Name-of-the-Father. We then show how Lacan first drew
on Mannoni’s clinical elaborations about the retarded child’s
alienation to the maternal fantasy: when this fantasy doesn’t leave
room for a paternal cut, it prevents the separation through which
the child could become a subject. He expanded on this in the late
1960s, in the first “Note on the Child:” the child can come to
embody the object of the maternal fantasy and thereby become
the mother’s non-separated, de-phallicized object a—which these
cases help characterize. Finally, we show how Mannoni, in the
1970s, proposed an original theoretico-clinical setting to address
the configurations where the cut hasn’t been implemented due
to a lack of paternal metaphor, and the object a therefore hasn’t
been separated. The splintered institution is a therapeutic setting
which assumes the cut by taking up desires of outside projects
expressed by its young hosts: children are accompanied outside
to participate in projects wherein they identify with a different
representation of themselves, and thereby experience themselves
as separated.
THE CUT ACCORDING TO LACAN, IN THE
EARLY 1960S
Alienation, A Precondition to the Cut
The Lacanian concept of cut, or better the “function of the
cut” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 206), refers to a structural sequence: it is
not an event taking place at a determinate time in individual
development, but a logical moment in the constitution of the
subject. It is the result of the encounter between a real infant
and the family and social configuration with which the infant
is presented by the Other. (The term Other refer to the infant’s
primitive environment, the mother or the mothering adult).
The function of the cut is to enable the constitution of the
subject through separation with the Other—we will come back
to this point in detail. This separation has a prerequisite: the
first sequence of the constitution of subjectivity, which Lacan
calls “alienation” (Lacan, 1998a). Upon meeting the Other, the
infant is exposed to language: in responding to his cries and
behavior, the Other names him, he refers to him. In this exchange,
the infant comes to realize that in order to become a subject,
he must use what Lacan calls signifiers (characteristic of the
symbolic order)—they are the discrete elements of language
considered as different sounds, independently of their usual
socially determined meaning. In particular, the infant gradually
sees that in order to interact with the Other, he must endorse
the signifier through which the Other designates him, called the
primary or master signifier (S1)—the future object of primary
repression. Lacan calls this operation ≪ alienation ≫ not only
because the infant, generally speaking, receives the discourse of
the Other through his speech, but most importantly because in
this encounter with the Other, he receives a specific signifier
S1, the assumption of which conditions his existence for the
Other, and in particular communication with him. The signifier
“functions as a signifier only by reducing the subject in question
to being no more than a signifier, to petrify him in the same
movement it calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject”
(Lacan, 1998a, p. 207, mod. tr.).
The question then becomes, in order for the infant to become
a subject properly speaking, to know what he represents for the
Other, what the Other ≪ wants from him ≫ (Lacan, 2014)—
that is, what is the meaning of this S1 which designates him?
Since a single signifier, as such, has no meaning, S1 can only
acquire one by becoming part of a series of other signifiers
coming from the Other (Lacan calls S2 the ensemble of these
additional signifiers). In other words, alienation does not suffice
to constitute the subject because, far from enabling the infant to
gain access to a knowledge of what he is, it instead opens him to
a never-ending series of equivalences between S1 and S2. It is this
series of equivalences that enables the explorations of infantile
curiosity (Lacan, 1998a, part 3), and more generally accounts for
the effects ofmetaphor andmetonymy throughwhich formations
of the unconscious can be interpreted.
The Cut and the Desire of the Other
It is at this very point, in these “intervals which cuts between
the signifiers” S1 and S2 (Lacan, 1998a, p. 214, mod. tr.) that
the second part of the structuring effect of the signifier on the
subject comes to play: that is, the function of the cut. Endorsing
S1 opens a≪ Spaltung [splitting] in the subject≫ (Lacan, 1998a,
p. 63): he becomes cut, ≪ divided ≫ because the relationship
between S1 and S2, far from being immediately obvious (since
they both lack intrinsic meaning), only makes sense through
metaphorical and metonymical equivalences within a specific
network of signifiers which characterizes the constellation laid
out by the Other specific to every subject. The unconscious effect
of any S1 will thus depend, for each subject, on the S2 with which
it is paired.
Thus, the constitution of the subject requires the cut in
addition to alienation because the interval between S1 and S2, the
repressed primary signifier and its equivalents in the discourse
of the Other, draws on equivalences that are specific to the
discourse of every particular Other, the desire of whom is the key
to understand these equivalences. “It is in the interval between
these two signifiers that resides the desire offered to the mapping
of the subject of the discourse of the Other, of the first Other he
has to deal with, let us say, by way of illustration, the mother”
(Lacan, 1998a, p. 218). Thus the cut enables the constitution of
the subject by leading the infant to wonder what the desire of the
maternal Other is, what she wants from him (this question drives
the analytic process, which will regressively lead to discover what
one’s S1 is, as well as the ultimately arbitrary, contingent nature
of its equivalences with S2). “It is in so far as [the subject’s] desire
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is beyond or falls short of what she says, of what she hints at,
of what she brings out as meaning, it is in so far as his desire is
unknown, it is in this point of lack, that the desire of the subject
is constituted” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 218).
The Fort-Da: Separation as an Effect of the
Cut, and the Introduction of Object a
Lacan believed that the subject’s question about the desire
of the Other, located in the cut between signifiers, can be
paradigmatically illustrated by the sequence of the Freudian reel
play (the≪ fort-da≫). This sequence illustrates the dependence
of the subject’s being on the desire of the Other.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 2001, written in
1920), Freud describes how an 18-months infant—most likely
his grandson Ernst—symbolizes the absences of his mother by
playing with a reel attached to a string, thereby gradually enabling
the introjection of the absented parent. Upon throwing the reel
away from his cradle, he gives vent to a loud≪ o-o-o-o≫ (which
means “fort” [away] in German), before pulling it back into view
and hailing its appearance with a gleeful “Da !” (“There !”). In
analyzing the infant’s play, and in particular the substitution of
the reel to the absent mother, Freud insists on the psychical
achievement of becoming able to acknowledge her absence and
to withstand it, by figuratively becoming the agent of this absence
(in throwing the reel away).
But for Lacan, compensating for her absence by converting
passivity into activity is “of secondary importance” (Lacan, 1998a,
p. 62). He starts by pointing that the second step of the play
(the “da!”), by introducing a phonemic alternation, represents
the comings and goings through a pair of signifiers, S1 (“o-o-
o”) and S2 (“da!”). Thus, the fort-da play presents us with the
paradigmatic example of the effect of the cut (S1-S2 pair) on
the subject—that is, separation. The physical disappearance of
the maternal Other (endowed with a breast) can only become
meaningful for the subject insofar as, by drawing on the “o-o-
o/da!” pair, he is led to wonder what type of object he is in the
eye of this Other who keeps coming and going. In other terms,
it is the phonemic opposition that enables the infant to wonder
what takes place inbetween S1 and S2–which refer to absence
and presence. Therefore, in throwing the reel, the infant stages
this very question: the reel represents him as an object separated
from the body of the Other—Lacan calls it “object a,” a non-
empirical object which causes the desire of the Other once it
is separated from his body (Lacan, 2014). By thus staging the
Other separating from the object (reel-baby) and then coming
back to it, the infant understands the comings and goings of the
Other as manifestations of her desire, on which the infant draws
in order to and correspondingly become a desiring subject. For
in this sequence, he realizes that he lacks what the desire of the
Other can give him, namely the bodily part (especially the breast)
experienced as separated from him, which in turn becomes a
separated object a for him (Lacan, 1998a, p. 62). Thus the fort-
da play, which draws on the function of the cut in its simplest
expression (“o-o-o”/ “da!”), produces a separation by leading the
infant to wonder what object a he is to the Other and thereby to
develop a desire echoing that of the Other (ibid.).
The question then becomes to know what conditions, on the
side of the Other, the subject’s access to the function of the
cut, and the consecutive representation of a separation with the
Other and the corresponding loss of the object a. To address this
question, we start by examining the paradigmatic condition to
access the cut (the paternal metaphor), and the corresponding
version of the cut: castration.
The Paradigmatic Condition of the Cut on
the Side of the Other: The Paternal
Metaphor, and Its Absence
Since the function of the cut puts to work a relation of
metaphorical and metonymical substitution between S1 and S2,
the paradigmatic condition of its implementation in the infant’s
psyche is what Lacan calls the paternal metaphor (Lacan, 1966,
1998b,c). This concept, which refers to Lacan’s rewriting of the
Oedipus complex, helps specify an Oedipal mode of representing
oneself as separated from the Other and thereby as object a of
their desire.
The paternal metaphor is what enables the child to understand
the mother’s (or mothering figure’s) absence as an Oedipal
separation: this metaphor refers to the effect of the introduction,
by the Other, of a specific signifier called the Name-of-the-Father
(Lacan, 1966, p. 557). This signifier is meant to introduce the
infant to the symbolic operation of castration, which entails two
things. First, the Other’s desire also has another object, referred
to by this signifier (it can be the real father, but anyone can be
in this position); therefore, the infant doesn’t play the role of a
phallus, that is of an object fully satisfying the mother’s desire.
And second, the Other’s desire is nonetheless related to the infant,
since its object stands in a symbolic relation of filiation with
him. The presence of a Name-of-the-Father on the side of the
Maternal Other thus conditions the infant’s access to theOedipus,
and it plays a role even before the infant’s birth by largely
contributing to lay out the coordinates of his future subjective
structuration. For if the Name-of-the-Father is no guarantee
that the infant will be neurotic, it at least presents him with a
triangular configuration which can protect him from depending
exclusively on the desire of an almighty mother (with its potential
arbitrariness), thanks to the presence of another object of desire
on her part: her disappearance in the fort-da can be understood
by the infant as a manifestation of her desire for someone else.
Thus, insofar as the Name-of-the-Father indicates both that
the mother’s desire has another object and that this object is
nonetheless related to the infant, the presence of this signifier in
the Maternal Other enables the child’s primary identification to
the father: by making it possible for the infant to acknowledge the
presence of another object for the Mother’s desire, this signifier
enables him to becomes a representative of the Name-of-the-
Father (this is the positive side of symbolic castration for the
infant: while he is no longer the mother’s phallus, he becomes in
exchange a paternal representative). Thereby, the Name-of-the-
Father crucially determines the content of the infant’s S1, and
will thus help him investigate his origin in the Other, i.e., his
S2 (constitution of infantile sexual theories, and of the primal
scene fantasy). It thus becomes manifest that the function of the
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cut will paradigmatically rely on the paternal metaphor, and that
castration is therefore to be understood as the Oedipal version
of the cut: this metaphor will enable the subject to question the
Other’s desire with respect to him by establishing and binding the
gap between S1 and S2 through metaphorical and metonymical
equivalences, thereby grounding the discourse concerning the
origin of the infant in the desire of a parental couple (This does
not entail that the infant would access the Oedipal conflicts at
the time of the fort-da or other absence/presence-staging plays—
roughly around 18 months—, but that the infant’s experience of
the fort-da as an introduction to an Oedipal structure will largely
depend on the Oedipal structuration of the Other’s psyche).
Hence when the Maternal Other’s psyche presents the infant
with the paternal metaphor, the effect of the cut (the separation of
infant as object a from the mother) is, so to speak, compensated
for by the emergence of another bond between infant and Other:
by being acknowledged by the latter as a result of the encounter
between her desire and the Name-of-the-Father, the infant
becomes phallicized. That is, he is desirable as a representative
of her encounter with the Name-of-the-Father, and not only as
an object of her own desire. From this moment on, separation
also means conjunction: the infant hereafter exists as a subject
embedded in a symbolic lineage, and no longer as the sole object
of the mother’s desire—this phallicization is thus the symbolic
gain of the Oedipal version of the cut, to which castration refers.
Correspondingly, the Other’s lack of acknowledgment of
the Name-of-the-Father (and the consecutive lack of paternal
metaphor in the discourse transmitted to the infant) will lead
the mother to make him her sole object of desire. He becomes
a non-phallicized object a, which does not depend on the desire
of a couple—be it the psychical couple of the mother’s Oedipus
complex. In this configuration, the infant does not receive the
Oedipal discourse-mediated representations which could enable
him to access the function of the cut, and thereby separate himself
psychically from themother: her absence isn’t understood against
the background of an Oedipal triangulation, but as a definitive
loss, experienced by the infant as a fragmentation of his own
body (characteristic of psychotic anxiety). This type of psychical
organization is characteristic of psychosis: the subject as object
a doesn’t experience himself as separated from the Other’s body.
Lacan does not mean that a maternal Other who does not present
his infant with a the Name-of-the-Father is psychotic, since many
clinical configurations can prevent her from presenting a Name-
of-the-Father to the infant (depressive breakdown, temporary
depersonalization, effects of early mother-infant interactions in
the context of neuronal or bodily conditions, etc.). But the
subjective coordinates in which the infant is thus introduced are
psychotic-like, since the S1 through which the Other refers to him
isn’t paired with an S2 representing an Oedipal discourse about
his origin in the desire of a couple, giving him a specific, distinct
position by separating him from an almighty maternal Other.
How can an infant be introduced to the function of the cut
when he hasn’t initially been presented with the paradigmatic
symbolic condition of the cut—namely, the mother-transmitted
paternal metaphor? Before examining how Maud Mannoni
provided a theoretically and clinically original response to this
question (Part 3), we will examine some of the subjective effects
of the lack of anOedipal S2, in order to better understand both (1)
what a subject not heretofore exposed to the paternal metaphor
needs to access the function of the cut, and (2) what such a cut
would amount to.
The lack of Oedipal S2 can refer to a variety of specific
positions attributed to the subject as object a by the Other.
The first part of Maud Mannoni’s seminal contribution lies,
in the 1950s and 1960s, in the clinical exploration of one of
these subjective positions: namely, the one underlying what was
then called mental retardation, or deficiency (we will use this
terminology in spite of its connotations, as it was of common use
at that time). Lacan, who was her analyst and encouraged her to
publish her first book on the subject, underlined as early as in
the Seminar 11 that the great merit of her work was to shed light
on the “psychotic dimension” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 238) of mental
retardation. This dimension comes from the “reduction” of the
child to “being nomore than the support of her desire in the most
obscure term” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 237, mod. tr.): in the absence
of paternal metaphor, the retarded infant, child, or adolescent is
often caught up, as Mannoni phrased it, in the maternal fantasy.
We will now develop this point.
THE 1950S AND 1960S: FROM THE
RETARDED CHILD TO THE MATERNAL
FANTASY
Before expanding on the role of the maternal fantasy, we will
briefly recall the context of Mannoni’s encounter with Lacan.
He wanted her book to be the first in his newly inaugurated
collection “Le Champ Freudien” (The Freudian Field) because
it was showing, in the clinical domain of mental retardation—
heretofore quite neglected by psychoanalysts—the relevance of
the Lacanian function of the cut, by focusing on the effects of the
lack of an Oedipal cut (i.e., castration) on the constitution of the
subject.
Mannoni’s Encounter with Lacan: The
Psychotic Dimension of Mental
Retardation
Lacan noticed Mannoni’s work in the 1950s, by attending
conferences and reading papers mostly focused on psychoses,
about which Françoise Dolto (Lacan’s other famous child analyst
pupil) hadn’t done much work—focused as she was on the
vicissitudes of Oedipal configurations. He immediately suggested
that Mannoni undertake a cure with him; in parallel, an
uninterrupted clinical exchange began: “he would give me all of
his Seminars and I was ‘transformed’ by what he wrote” (Didier-
Weill, 2001, p. 174); “it was my clinical work he was interested
in. . . he would keep asking about it to know more” (Didier-Weill,
2001, p. 172).
In this first period of their interactions, he encouraged her
to share her clinical work on the unconscious family stakes of
mental retardation and psychosis: “with his support, I wrote in
one goThe Retarded child and theMother: a Psychoanalytic study”
(Mannoni, 1988, p. 42), published in 1964. Lacan chose this book
to open his newly established collection, “The Freudian Field” (Le
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Seuil editors); it would soon be completed by The First Meeting
with the Psychoanalyst (1965).
Looking back at what she wanted to show, she wrote:
“The child creates the psychotic response along with someone
else; the more he will feel his environment approves of the
seriousness of his ‘condition’, the more he will try and ‘adjust’ to
the character in which he chose to alienate himself. Raised in the
middle of an adult discourse focused solely on his case, the ‘ill
child’ has no other solution but to disappear as a subject in order
to fully become the illness with which he is equated” (Mannoni,
1970, p. 40).
Starting from the clinical hypothesis according to which “the
child’s unconscious is often to be sought after in the parent’s
unconscious” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 77), she notices that, in the
psychotherapeutic care of so-called retarded children, psychiatric
diagnosis can act as a screen with respect to the contribution
of the “psychotic dimension” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 238) of the
mothering parent’s unconscious to the child’s retardation. In
other words, this diagnosis can be used as a family defense—
with the other parent’s frequent tacit consent—to ward off the
question of whether the desire of the Other is aimed at a paternal
figure, and replace it with a dual mother-infant relationship:
the unconscious legitimization by the diagnosis prevents the
implementation of the function of the cut and its separating
effect. In this context, the child is cornered into adopting the
subjective coordinates he is thus being offered, by endorsing this
S1 which reduces him to the status of dependency characteristic
of mental retardation. The diagnosis qua S1 saturates the
coordinates of the child’s subjectivization possibilities: he remains
alienated within a psychotic-like system of coordinates devoid of
any symbolic cut which would enable the mother to view him as
a separated being, by relating him to the Name-of-the-Father.
“When the symptom [of retardation, in the psychiatric sense of
the word] has become the subject’s onlymeans of communication,
he holds onto it. It is his language, and he wants it to be
acknowledged as such” (Mannoni, 1998, p. 94).
This exchange with Lacan sheds light on Mannoni’s
characterization of her work in the 1950s and 1960s: “retardation
and psychosis are alike” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 84). This intuition
can be traced back to the clinical sensitivity derived from
Mannoni’s childhood experiences: her family reacted to the
bewilderment and sense of loss she experienced upon leaving her
beloved nurse in Sri Lanka (where her father was the consul of
Belgium) by calling her “the retard” (cf. Razon, 2012). Her own
subsequent personal trajectory, and her encounter with Lacan,
would lead her to elaborate a therapeutic perspective to escape
alienating family dynamics: helping retarded children to distance
themselves from the position in which they are kept by their
environment requires to investigate the psychotic dimension of
the parental unconscious, characterized by a lack of cut.
But elaborating a therapeutic perspective doesn’t mean that
she sought to establish a parental or maternal causality (and
thereby, responsibility) at the root of mental retardation—be it in
her theorizing or in her clinical work. She tried to shed light on
the dimensions of the family’s psychical dynamics which prevent
the child from developing as well as he can, and which can be
influenced through appropriate therapeutic work focused on the
establishment of a cut. She always refused to view the parents as
guilty of their child’s condition, as one of us (AV) has witnessed
on a constant basis during 15 years of work alongside her.
Correspondingly, she did not neglect the importance of
organic causality in accounting for the child’s condition: speaking
of a young patient, she writes that her retardation “seemed to have
an undeniable organic basis” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 50). She thus
remained faithful to Freud’s legacy: in the Preface of the Three
Essays, he draws on the notion of complemental series to stress
that the biological dimension of the symptom should always
be questioned, alongside the psychical. Therefore, Mannoni’s
view can be seen as belonging to what is nowadays called a
multi-factorial approach to mental disability (cf. Golse, 2013).
Mannoni, in pointing out the psychotic dimension of the
family unconscious, simply wished to claim that such an
organic causality does not preclude a psychotherapy based on
psychoanalytic principles—and that ignoring the unconscious
processes emerging in a family upon encountering a child who
resembles them so little will prevent his phallicization and
thereby prevent the establishment of the cut.
The Lack of Cut: The Retarded Child,
Caught Up in the Maternal Fantasy
Mannoni starts from the clinical observation according to which
the psychologically handicapped child generally encounters
a family configuration laden with a “psychotic dimension”
(Lacan, 1998a, p. 238), i.e., lacking a Name-of-the-Father: “the
handicapped child is rarely welcomed in a genuinely triangular
situation” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 32)—that is, acknowledged by the
mother as a representative of the father. Therefore, “the lack of a
paternal signifier reduces the child to the status of object, without
any hope of becoming a subject” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 52): if the
mother does not view her child as representing his father (lack of
Oedipal S2), he becomes a de-phallicized object a, not separated
by the cut from the maternal Other’s body.
The situation is partly related to the effect of the parents’
encounter with the psychical handicap of the child. Of course,
the extent of the parents’ Oedipal organization—and specifically
the mother’s—plays an important role in the development of the
handicapped child; but the effect of his handicap (as early as in
ultrasound scans, etc.—cf. Potier, 2009) considerably weakens
this organization, and increases the risk of de-phallicization. (The
exponential rise of genetic and genomic sequencing nowadays
makes this type of clinical configurations an everyday situation:
the effects of de-phallicization need to be prevented, in particular,
during the announcement consultation consecutive to genetic
testing—cf. Potier et al., 2016). In other words, according to
Mannoni, an important parental de-phallicization of the child,
consecutive to the lack of cut, often occurs even when parents
have a neurotic structure (cf. Vanier, 2012, p. 42–43). In these
cases, the impact of the handicap on the parental bond is so
deep that the mother doesn’t relate the child to her desire for the
father. It is this de-phallicization dynamics which Lacan aims to
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single out by using the expression “psychotic dimension” (Lacan,
1998a, p. 238): it does not refer to the specific psychical structure
of the mother (or the parents), but to the type of de-phallicized
configuration which frequently emerges in the context of a lack
of cut characteristic of psychical handicap.
Raymonde, 14 years old, meets Mannoni because of a
profound mental retardation and lack of motor coordination,
with a “seemingly undeniable organic basis” (Mannoni, 1981, p.
50 sq., as well as all quotes in this paragraph). She rapidly shows
a total lack of active resistance or aggressive behavior: everyone
is “nice.” All other siblings have a significant academic delay in
the absence of mental retardation—and the father is an academic.
Her mother is extremely rigid and anxious: she cannot stand
the children’s liveliness, which frightens her; all of them have
personality disorders. Raymonde’s mental retardation is a defense
against her mother’s rigid phobia: “she responds to her mother’s
demand to not cause any trouble by acting like a nice frightened
girl, willing to be forgotten.” The mother explains her severity
in potty training by saying “I don’t like it when I smell bad”—
anamnestic discussions clearly showed that, during pregnancy,
she felt as though Raymonde “was part of her own body,” just
like “one of her own organs.” This lack of the function of the
cut comes from the situation surrounding her pregnancy: the
father threatened to leave her in case the child was nonviable: this
anticipated lack of acknowledgment from the father, inducing
a massive de-phallicization, was assorted (for both parents)
with a family structure where each parent’s mother sought to
exclude their child’s partner. Therefore, their own psychical
triangulations were already weakened: the father let the mother
leave him aside, while she as well had little psychical space for
him. This family constellation thus prevented Raymonde from
accessing any kind of triangulation. Psychotherapy gradually led
to unearth an important persecutory dimension (with spirits
invading her body), echoing her mother’s hypochondria and her
experiences of bodily invasion. Working through these fantasies
helped her regain a grip on her mental functioning and her
body, which in turn led her to social and professional insertion
(she became a gardener working with children). On the other
hand, the gradual autonomization enabled by this psychoanalytic
process, led Raymonde’s mother to a massive disorganization and
delusional confusion (Mannoni, 1981) because of her inability
elaborate her object a’s absence.
In these cases, the desire upon which the child depends is
strictly the mother’s, “in its most obscure term” (Lacan, 1998a,
p. 237): the child is led to adopt the position conferred to him
by the maternal fantasy, whatever the latter’s precise nature—
while he can wonder what he represents as an object a for the
Other, he does experience the Other’s desire as de-phallicized.
This is what Mannoni refer to when she writes that in these
cases, “as soon as it was conceived, the subject already plays
a very specific role in the mother’s fantasy; his fate is already
sealed; he will be this desireless object whose sole function will
be to fill in the maternal emptiness” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 84).
This sentence plays on the word “conception”: when the child
was physically conceived, he didn’t have this status (his handicap
was unknown to the parents); but later parental unconscious
formations show that, after discovery of the handicap, his
conception was fantasmatically re-written into a completely de-
phallicized narrative, qualifying him as a non-phallicized object
a excluded from the couple’s desire. “Unbeknownst to him, the
child is so to speak ‘caught up’ in the mother’s desire. (. . . ) The
child’s illness will conceal the mother’s” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 87).
Being caught upmeans that it is themother’s difficulty to consider
separation (this is the “illness”) which often leads her to present
her child’s illness as the motive of an apparently legitimate care,
thereby putting him in the position of an extension of her own
body and thus precluding the cut from taking place.
Hereafter, this maternal “illness” (difficulty to consider
separation) will lead her to equate separation with losing one’s
own being: the function of mental retardation “is to hide not only
[the child’s] lack of being, but what is felt as the mother’s lack of
being” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 170). A mother tells Mannoni: “since
my child left, I feel an emptiness in myself, I don’t know what to
do with myself, I’m completely at a loss” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 101).
For the mother, opening this closed mother-child circuit means
self-annihilation: “any claim to autonomy on the part of the child
is immediately experienced by the mother as the disappearance
of this necessary support of her fantasy” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 86).
Correspondingly, the unconscious of the retarded child echoes
the mother’s emptiness anxiety: “Mother’s existence depends
on me alone” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 105). This reminds us of
the disorganizing effects of Raymonde’s autonomization on her
mother.
The fantasy refers to the coordinates of the relation to the
object, and the object refers to a part of the Other’s body, of which
the subject must separate himself in order to come to existence.
Therefore the term “emptiness” used by this mother can help
specify the maternal fantasy wherein the retarded child is caught
up: it is an archaic, cannibalistic oral fantasy, where the child-
object is being devoured by the mother. Since the child is in a
position of non-phallicized object, and is thus not protected from
this maternal fantasy by a paternal cut, he experiences this fantasy
directly in his body: he is afraid that the Other will snatch and
devour him.
“Retarded and psychotic children respond to the threat of the
Other with their body. Their body is directly subjected to panic:
they lack the symbolic dimension which would help them situate
themselves with respect to the Other’s desire without risking to be
snatched by him” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 198).
The cannibalistic fantasy of devouration had initially been
described by Karl Abraham (1916) in the context of the cure of
an adult patient; he mostly insisted on the fact that it expresses
the infant’s oral erotic drive. In the passage above, Mannoni—
after Lacan (and Melanie Klein, who was partly trained by
Abraham)—insists on the role of the Other in the structure of
the fantasy, for two reasons. Firstly, oral drive is, to a large extent,
experienced as coming from the Other because of the projective
nature of archaic fantasies. And second, the presence of an infant
does trigger cannibalistic fantasies in the Other: to some extent,
a phallicized infant is protected from the excessive staging or
transmission of such fantasies by the presence of the paternal
metaphor in the mother’s psyche—but in a de-phallicized context
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such as that ofmental retardation, where the infant is experienced
as part of her body, he is much less protected from them.
Mannoni points out, on the basis of such clinical material,
that this fantasy is prevalent in these children because of the lack
of what Lacan conceptualized as paternal cut. Our hypothesis
is that, in thus spelling out that this fantasy is at work in the
unconscious of mentally retarded children, Mannoni paved the
way for Lacan’s characterization of infantile symptoms in the late
1960s.
The First “Note on the Child” (1986):
Equating Lack of Cut with Alienation to
Maternal Fantasy
In 1964, in Seminar XI, Lacan gives, as the first example of
lack of cut, the “psychotic dimension” pointed out by Mannoni
in the unconscious of the retarded child caught up in the
maternal fantasy. In 1969, when writing the two “Notes on the
Child” (given to Jenny Aubry and published for the first time in
Aubry, 1983), Lacan draws on Mannoni to generalize her results.
From now on, he will describe the effect of a lack of cut in
the maternal unconscious (the “psychotic dimension”) with the
terms Mannoni used to spell out the family dynamics at work in
the background of mental retardation. From now on, the child
as object of the maternal fantasy will refer to a type of child
symptom, of which mental retardation becomes a specific case.
In the first “Note on the child,” Lacan distinguishes two
types of child symptoms, in the psychoanalytic sense of the
term—that is, two types of difficulties the child encounters in
order to become a subject. In the first case, the symptom can
represent the truth of the parental couple, i.e., the encounter of
their two Oedipus complexes. Drawing on the unconscious of
both parents, it is the most complex case; but it is more open
to psychoanalytical work as it relies on a cut—the Name-of-
the-Father is present in the mother’s unconscious, which thus
phallicizes the child. A typical example is Hans’ horse-phobia,
analyzed by Freud and later by Lacan (1998b): through this
phobia, he was working through and gradually integrating the
difference of sexes.
In the second case, this symptom is not mediated by
the paternal function, i.e., by the Name-of-the-Father: just as
with Raymonde’s defensive use of her mental retardation, the
symptom “stems from the subjectivity of the mother” (Lacan,
1986, p. 13–14), in which case the child is concerned “directly
as the correlative of a fantasy” (id.). The therapeutic goal then
becomes to help the child separate from this dual relationship
with the body of the maternal Other [Nowadays, we would most
likely use Lacan’s indications of two types of symptoms as a
spectrum, with being caught up in the maternal fantasy on one
end, and representing the truth of the parental couple on the
other; or alternatively, as two interacting axes which should both
be taken into account. Symptoms such as mental retardation
should actually be dealt with drawing on both axes; clinical work
with children with milder forms of mental retardation in the
context of microdeletion 22q11.2 has made one of us (OP) very
sensitive to the de-phallicisation caused by such symptoms. That
is, the parental couple, and the subsequent phallicization of the
child, can be partly put aside by the mother out of frustration at
not having given an ideal phallicized child to her Oedipal father;
which can profoundly impact the child’s symptoms, in reaction
to this disavowal of the importance of the couple].
Typical of this second case are psychosomatic disorders and
psychical configurations such as mental retardation—which,
for Mannoni, is essentially identical to child psychosis in its
structure. Psychosomatic disorders share with mental retardation
(and, more generally, psychosis) a lack of paternal metaphor, i.e.,
both belong to the “psychotic dimension” entailed in being the
direct correlative of a maternal fantasy. This doesn’t mean that
mental retardation is a psychosomatic disorder, but that initially
and prior to psychoanalytic work, psychosomatic symptoms are
devoid of symbolic meaning: they are characterized by their lack
of subjective signification and cannot be related metaphorically
to the Oedipal narrative (Lacan, 1998a); as such, they are distinct
from hysteric symptoms where bodily affections have an Oedipal
signification.
One cannot but be struck to find in Lacan’s words (“directly
as the correlative of a fantasy”) the exact characterization of the
child’s being the object of the maternal fantasy because of a lack
of cut which Mannoni, partly nourished by her interactions with
Lacan, had found in mental retardation when she wrote “the lack
of a paternal signifier reduces the child to the status of an object,
without any hope of becoming a subject” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 58).
Thus generalizing Mannoni’s formulation then allows Lacan
to spell out what is entailed in becoming the object of the sole
maternal fantasy, andmore specifically its de-phallicized object a:
insofar as the child isn’t separated from the mother by the Name-
of-the-Father, he “realizes the presence of what Jacques Lacan
designates as the object a in the fantasy” (Lacan, 1986, p. 13–
14)—that is, he appears to themother as the surrogate to anything
she could lack, i.e., she could have lost from the body of her own
maternal Other. From this perspective, the mother’s subjective
structure, determined by a specific “mode of lack” (neurotic,
perverse or psychotic), is secondary—the child will nonetheless
be put in the position to “saturate” it (Lacan, 1986, p. 13–14), and
thereby to conceal from her the truth of her own symptom. In
this conception, Lacan takes into account the family dynamics
pointed by Mannoni in the case of mental retardation: the child’s
symptom is the screen of the maternal symptom. Later, during
the RSI seminar (1974-1975, unpublished), Lacan will refer to
the mother’s relation to the child saturating her lack with the
expression “non-phallic jouissance.”
How can these indications, born from the exchanges between
Lacan and Mannoni, be put to work in order to make up for a
lack of introduction to the cut by the maternal Other through the
paternal metaphor—whether it has led to structures lacking this
metaphor (schizophrenic, autistic, etc.) or to severely neurotic
ones which somehow made up for this lack? And additionally,
what would be a type of cut different from castration, which could
be aimed at by psychoanalytic work with non-neurotic patients?
The first theoretico-clinical question was at the core
of Mannoni’s revolutionary institutional project: in the
late 1960s, she founded Bonneuil’s Experimental School.
Embodying the theoretico-clinical organization of the splintered
institution, this School also gave clinical elements toward
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answering the second question, by helping those of its non-
neurotic hosts develop specific types of cuts differing from
castration.
BONNEUIL’S SPLINTERED INSTITUTION:
ASSUMING THE CUT ON THE SIDE OF
THE OTHER
The Splintered Institution: Assuming the
Cut by Acknowledging Projects as S2
When the mothering Other’s unconscious hasn’t exposed the
child to the Name-of-the-Father, but has instead subjected him
to her sole fantasy, the Other’s comings and goings in the fort-
da cannot be understood by the child as manifesting a desire
for someone else. Confronted with a maternal unconscious
seeking to saturate her lack by reducing the child to the status
of non-phallic object a, the child experiences separation as
potential destruction of the Other – by fragmenting, exploding
or emptying her body (cf. the≪ emptiness≫ feeling mentioned
to Mannoni). Correspondingly, the infant identifies with this
experience and fears his own explosion once separated from the
other.
Clinical work with children not previously introduced to the
cut through the paternal metaphor will thus have to make them
feel that it is actually possible to separate from the maternal
Other without destroying her—and thus, without risking their
own life, for they are not part of her body. Insofar as their
type of transference is—at least initially—dual (staging a face-
to-face struggle with an almighty Other), Mannoni suggested
an institutional therapeutic setting in order to provide, in
material reality, a constant and permanent containment for their
anxieties. But in order to prevent the institution (with its constant
presence) from becoming the transferential replica of an almighty
Other about to devour her child-object in a dual relationship, and
instead to enable children to access the cut, she put forward a new
type of therapeutic institution: the splintered institution, which
assumes the cut and thereby makes separation possible on the
part of the child.
“An institution is like a person feeding off of those who depend on
her. It practically assumes an almighty position: it behaves likes
the mother of a psychotic child, from whom the subject cannot
separate without risking to explode. A different institution would,
much like a scale, assume the cut and thereby make it possible for
the subject to situate herself through his own speech—and to thus
separate himself, cut himself off of the institution (. . . ). The cut
becomes possible, exactly as with a mother and her child. The cut
is a symbolic phenomenon, which allows the subject to emerge
and be acknowledged as such by someone else” (Mannoni, 1976,
p. 53).
To prevent the establishment of a psychotic transference with
respect to the institution—which would equate separation with
mutual destruction—due to a lack of cut in the child’s psyche,
the strategy would be to take up any wish of the children for a
project outside the institution (trip, activity, etc.), and consider
it as an attempt at establishing a cut. “Assuming the cut,” as
Mannoni put it, means that any expression of such a project-
wish is to be “acknowledged” by the institution staff as a potential
S2, i.e., as a symbolic representation of the child as bearing
a different identity (taking-part-in-such-and-such-project) and
thereby as implementing the function of the cut in their psyche,
thus allowing them to withstand separation from the Other’s
body. By offering them the figure of a non-devouring maternal
Other, who can bear separation by deliberately cutting herself
from them in response to their project-wish, the institution re-
enacts the fort-dawith a different outcome: physical separation in
the course of the project doesn’t amount to mutual destruction,
as it is rather the implementation of the cut—i.e., the result of the
symbolic acknowledgment by the Other of a new identity for the
child, different from that of de-phallicized object a. Taking up the
child’s wish enables the institution to present him with a different
desire of the Other with respect to him, and to represent himself
as absent from him.
Mannoni proposes to call such an institution a “splintered
institution” (“institution éclatée,” in French—cf. e.g. Mannoni,
1973, p. 77): “splinter” explicitly refers to the psychotic fantasy
(characteristic of what Lacan called the “psychotic dimension”)
which identifies loss of a bodily part with explosion and
annihilation. By coining this expression, Mannoni wanted to
stress that it should be the task of the institution itself to take
up and overcome the Other’s annihilation anxiety associated
with loss of a bodily part, which children want to prevent by
remaining attached to their status of his de-phallicized objects
a, by responding positively to their expressed project-wishes
(symbolic acknowledgment of the cut) and showing them that
it can withstand their outcome (physical separation).
Mannoni’s project of a splintered institution, which would
“assume the cut,” quickly became the motto of the Experimental
School situated in Bonneuil-sur-Marne (just outside of Paris),
founded in 1969 by Maud Mannoni and Robert Lefort, both
students of Lacan’s, with a couple of educators, Rose-Marie
and Yves Guérin. The School is a place where children and
adolescents live and take classes adjusted to their capacities; it also
is a night shelter. Today, it is a daycare hospital and therapeutic
night foster home. Schooling is in small groups, and goes along
with creative activities supervised by educators; children do their
part in the maintenance and daily chores.
The School rapidly became what Mannoni theorized as the
splintered institution by considering the children’s speech as
wishes: far from being a technique, its organization revolves
around the fundamental psychoanalytic tenet to start from what
the subject says—that is, to always consider the person as a
subject, and what they say as a manifestation of their subjectivity
(see the section Conclusion below). The goal being to help
children bear separation, it is a negative therapy of sorts, the goal
of which is to constrain as little as possible. For example, in the
early 1970s, an educator suggested to one of the adolescents, upon
seeing his gift in bike repair, that he create a repair studio within
the institution. The response was that he’d much rather work
in a real bike repair shop (potential S2), outside the institution.
The adolescent’s refusal, embedded within his transference on the
educator, made it possible for him, first, to enact the rejection
of an unconscious almighty Other. By taking up the educator’s
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acknowledgment of his skills, he could then voice a true potential
S2, to which the institution had to respond by allowing him
to exist under this new identity; this gave a new meaning to
this presence in the institution, as a moment embedded within
his particular project. By acknowledging this new representation
of himself, the institution helped him implement the psychical
function of the cut and thus envision himself as physically
separated from the Other: the fort-da could be undergone
without anxiety of mutual annihilation.
“The Fort-Da play, this oscillation between a here and a there,
is introduced in Bonneuil every time a child’s stay involves
an alternation with moments spent somewhere else” (Mannoni,
1976, p. 73).
In this light, projects such as going abroad are particularly
interesting experiences: the immersion in a foreign language
deepens the inscription in a new potential S2, and allows for
another representation of the desire of the Other.
With respect to families, the institution’s whole clinical
challenge then became to prevent the closure dynamics which
can appear in response to the implementation of the cut in
the child’s psyche, because of the repetition compulsion which
prevents them from letting the child escape his alienation
to the Other’s almighty fantasy and thus access a potential
new S2. Mannoni has the following exchange with the mother
of a patient who cannot but try and thwart Bonneuil’s
dynamics:
“Julien’s mother [JM]: Brittany does wonders for Julien.
Maud Mannoni [MM]: Yes, but it is of crucial importance that
you do not settle here, or else we’ll have to find him another place
to escape the family. . .
JM: You think so ? I wanted to move here with his twin brother.
MM: We’ve been lucky enough to find a place Julien likes, where
he can enact his rejection of both his family and Bonneuil. It is
his own place, where his mother and brother are absent. This
is of the utmost symbolic importance; you’re about to rob him
of this.
JM: The host family had even agreed to accept his twin brother. . .
MM: You are inducing a potential failure, here. You know
too well that, when he’s with you, the situation escalates very
quickly.
JM: After fifteen minutes, he starts insulting me, while he’s normal
and composed with everyone else.
MM: And yet, it is this very hell that you seek to re-create.
JM: No, but why would he be normal with others and not with
me?
MM: Why hunt him down to the place where he feels at peace,
without his family?
JM: It’s not on purpose that I knock everything down. I just can’t
help it” (Mannoni, 1976, p. 225).
Mannoni firmly tries to hold the symbolic function of the
cut (by stressing that the project is Julien’s own), in order
to protect both mother and child from the sado-masochistic
dual relationship which re-emerges when they are together.
Mannoni expands on this symbolic function by stressing that
the movement is to be understood as a variation of frames
(a direct reference to the transferential setting), i.e., as a
symbolic oscillation.
“To offer another place is to build an alternative to the logics of
rejection, to escape the deadlock of the inside-outside opposition
with respect to the family or the institution, by favoring a
movement between different places. By playing with different
frames, we re-introduce a movement within the inside-outside
opposition, and the subject can gradually reflect upon what he
wants to become” (Mannoni, 1986, p. 106).
Distanced from the S1 of his illness which feeds the fantasy
of a devouring Other on which the child depends, the S2
acknowledged by the institution represents a discourse which can
make up for the initial lack of paternal metaphor and implement
a cut, thus leading the child or adolescent to withstand physical
separation.
Varieties of Cut
The goal of the splintered institution is thus to make up
for the initial lack of paternal metaphor, and subsequently of
castration—the type of cut consecutive to this metaphor. But
this doesn’t mean that castration is the only type of cut that this
type of institution sets out to enable by acknowledging children’s
projects. A potential S2, being implemented as a function of the
cut through institutional support will not necessarily amount to
an Oedipal narrative; to that effect, the subject would need to
be in the coordinates of a mostly neurotic structuration. This
narrative is but one type of S2 enabling the cut by representing
the subject qua the object that the Other lacks, i.e., is separated
from—and therefore desires. It is one way to symbolically
account for the subject’s physical separation from the Other—
by drawing on triangulation, i.e., the presence of someone else
as object of desire. As mentioned earlier, castration accounts for
this specific type of cut because it binds the subject to the desire
of the couple constituted by the Other and the bearer of the
Name-of-the-Father.
In the splintered institution, the type of cut will depend
on the psychical structure of each subject: an attempt as
symbolically representing separation can use other means, such
as delusion—a highly symbolic production. One need only
think of Schreber’s delusional narrative (Freud, 1958), structured
around the fantasy of becoming God’s wife (S2), the object that
the He needs to become complete. The cut from the Other that
Schreber gradually elaborates is not symbolic castration, but it is
nonetheless an attempt at building an alternative to the fantasy of
being annihilated by an almighty Other, through becoming the
phallicized object that He needs (and thus cannot annihilate).
To give an example of alternate type of cut encountered at
Bonneuil (collected and synthesized by AV, a close collaborator
of Mannoni’s), work with autistic children revolved around
helping them realize that their project, acknowledged as S2 by the
team, involved physical separation—which, in autism, amounts
to death by annihilation, and is thus to be avoided at all costs. In
other words, the focus of the function of the cut to be enabled by
the institution was the acknowledgment of physical separation
as such; it is the earliest type of cut being staged in the fort-da,
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prior to any narrative accounting for it. Taking up their wishes
to go outside for various projects was successful in psychically
implementing the cut when, upon coming back to Bonneuil from
the countryside, they suddenly cried upon realizing that they had
left behind their “family.” Representing themselves as separated
from them, that is as having been lost by them, could be used
as a shifting point to be drawn upon in the gradual working
through of physical separation at stake in the fort-da—which is
quite different from the neurotic cut qua symbolic castration,
mostly revolving around elaborating Oedipal issues.
CONCLUSION
We tried to show the fruitfulness of Lacan’s concept of cut by
addressing it from the perspective of the psychical configurations
where it hasn’t been implemented (with the child being put
in the position of a de-phallicized object a). Maud Mannoni
has explored these configurations extensively: therefore our goal
was, in part 2 supra, to show how she has characterized some
of them, which then helped Lacan define them in a systematic
fashion. Finally, we wanted to lay out how Mannoni delineated a
theoretico-clinical setting aimed at making up for a lack of cut, as
defined by Lacan, and enabling it when subjectively possible (part
3 supra).
Mannoni’s original use of this concept of cut in the
splintered institution has been extended in an original fashion
by one of us (AV) in the context of a hospital work with
psychotic mothers and their infant; this led him to the idea
of a “supposition of subject” (Vanier, 1989). The gist of it
is that, in the presence of a psychotic type of mothering,
the neonate’s psychical development (and indeed, his effective
survival) will compensate the mother’s tendency to consider
him as part of her body, by assuming the function of the
cut and acknowledging him as a subject from the start—
that is, as someone with a potential to be embedded in
various S2.
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Lacan’s original approach to language expands the reaches of psychoanalysis. Not
limited to a set of technical instructions that guide “treatments of the soul,” lacanian
psychoanalysis can be seen as a theoretical toolbox whose utility is multidisciplinary.
This paper contends that, by establishing a connection between (i) the idea that subjects
are produced by language and bear the mark of the unconscious; and (ii) an approach to
the production of symptoms that acknowledges the importance of their sense, lacanian
theories enlighten discussions on the theme of vulnerability. We claim that Lacan’s
description of psychoanalysis as an apparatus that respects the person and (foremost)
their symptoms generates evidence of the existence of a kind of recognition that takes
into account the vulnerability of a given subject without assigning them to a fixed position
of victim. This perspective enriches contemporary debates on the relationship between
identity and vulnerability.
Keywords: language, vulnerability, symptom, recognition, clinical practice
INTRODUCTION
By referring to contemporary French psychoanalysts interested in the theme of symptoms, the
present work examines how psychoanalytical theories on the relationship between language
and subjectivity allow for a broader understanding of the concept of vulnerability. A lacanian
perspective on respect and its importance to the development of psychoanalytical treatment stems
from this discussion on vulnerability.
LANGUAGE AND REALITY
In Clarice Lispector’s The passion according to G.H., at the end of an introspective quest that
culminates in a Kafkaesque encounter with a cockroach, the main character finally understands
what language is: “Reality is the raw material, language is the way I go in search of it—and the
way I do not find it” (Lispector, 1964/1988). G.H. is a Brazilian middle-class woman who sets
out to simply clean a room in her house but finds herself exploring the very origins of human
communication. In doing so, she seems to comprehend language as that which allows one to seize
the raw material that comes from an external reality (as opposed to psychic reality, in Freud’s
definition). In other words, G.H is able to experience the discontinuity between the available
sensory information (the sense data) and what is captured and organized by our psychic apparatus.
G.H’s experience allows her to understand that this capture cannot happen without language.
As human beings, our very subjectivity is defined by language. As Emile Benveniste puts it, a
separation between man on one side and the use of language on the other is not possible: even
though we are inclined to imagine a primordial time when a man discovered another one and
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between the two of them language was worked out little by little,
this is not what happened:
“We can never get back to man separated from language and
we shall never see him inventing it. We shall never get back to
man reduced to himself and exercising his wits to conceive of
the existence of another. It is a speaking man whom we find
in the world, a man speaking to another man, and language
provides the very definition of man” (Benveniste, 1963/1967).
Benveniste insists on the idea that language is much more than
an instrument that allows men and women to communicate. The
main characteristics that defines language—its immaterial nature,
its symbolic functioning, its articulated arrangement and the fact
that it has content—set it apart from any instrument created by
man: “to speak of an instrument is to put man and nature in
opposition. The pick, the arrow, and the wheel are not in nature.
They are fabrications. Language is in the nature of man, and he
did not fabricate it” (Benveniste, 1963/1967).
This understanding of language as a given that simultaneously
precedes and produces the subject proposed by Benveniste is also
a main point in Lacan’s description of human beings as subjects
of language that are subjects to language. Throughout his work,
Lacan will develop the notion of a subject who is able to talk
because he/she is talked—that is, because he/she is inscribed in
language as a preexisting structure. This is a fundamental shift in
the understanding of the relationship between human beings and
language: once seen as the actor responsible for the performing
of acts of speech, the subject becomes, in lacanian theory, the
product of such acts.
In “Position of the Unconscious” (1960), Lacan develops
this idea of a subject subordinated to language through the
affirmation that “the effect of language is to introduce the cause
into the subject” (Lacan, 1960/2006). For Lacan, the subject is
not what he imagines himself to be. We produce an image—
an imaginary or specular illusion—of ourselves that protects
us against the chaotic movement of our drives. This organized
image, known as ego, differs from the subject: the lacanian subject
is the subject of the unconscious, and is produced by the signifiers
of language. The effect of language over the subject thus means
that “he ([the subject] is not the cause of himself; he bears within
himself the worm of the cause that splits him. For his cause is
the signifier, without which there would be no subject in the real.
But this subject is what the signifier represents, and the latter
cannot represent anything except to another signifier: to which
the subject who listens is thus reduced” (Lacan, 1960/2006).
The signifier allows the subject to occupy a place among all
other beings, but does not encompass the totality of what a
subject is. The subject is what the signifier represents; as the
famous aphorism goes, the signifier is characterized by the fact
that it represents a subject to another signifier (and to another,
and to another, in an endless signifying chain, as Lacan will
describe it).
THE MEANING OF SYMPTOMS
This understanding of the role played by language in the very
constitution of a subject has important implications for the
clinical work derived from lacanian theory. One of them is the
appreciation of the importance of symptoms to the analytical
cure. In his first Seminar, Lacan posits that the symptom initially
appears to us as “a trace which will continue not to be understood
(qui restera toujours incomprise) until the analysis has got quite a
long way and we have discovered its meaning (son sens)” 1954.
This means that, in psychoanalytical theory, the symptom is not
simply seen as a manifestation associated to a disease. It is not the
indication of a disturbance in the (healthy) condition of a person.
Rather, it should be understood as a formation of the unconscious
that the analyst should not strive to quickly extinguish since it was
carefully (albeit unconsciously) produced by the subject—not
unlikely a work of art.
We think of Freud’s comparison of symptoms to cultural
outputs, and to outputs produced by artists. In 1917, for instance,
he mentions the importance of distinguishing the symptoms
from the disease of his neurotic patients, and reminds us “that
doing away with the symptoms is not necessarily curing the
disease. Of course, the only tangible thing left over after the
removal of the symptoms is the capacity to build new symptoms”
(Freud, 1890/1942). This creative capacity may translate into the
artist’s ability of “turning away from reality” and transferring
interests and libido to the elaboration of imaginary wishes. It also
works as evidence that symptoms are not to be simply eradicated,
but rather taken as an indication that there is work to be done. It
is in this sense that Lacan describes the symptom as a trace in his
early works: as a mark left by the presence of something that once
was at a given place, like footsteps that reveal that someone has
stood at a given spot.
What interests us regarding this way of looking at the
symptom is the consequences to our approach of the
psychoanalytical treatment. What does it mean, to treat
someone, without getting rid of the symptom but focusing on its
meaning instead?
French psychoanalyst Sidi Askofaré examines this matter on
an article about what he sees as “the revolution of symptom”
(Askofaré, 2005)—that is, as the action (by the symptom) of going
round in an orbit. The symptom is found at the very beginning
of a treatment as the reason why one seeks consultation with
an analyst. It is also there at the very end of the analysis, albeit
transformed. The trajectory it describes is not one of mere
repetition nor of an eternal recurrence of events, but rather a
revolution that conjoins a return to and a metamorphosis of
events. In the unpublished Seminar from 1976, L’insu que sait
de l’une-bévue s’aile à mourre, Lacan wonders if, in the end, it
would be possible to understand psychoanalysis as synonym to
identifying with one’s symptom. Not understanding the meaning
of the symptom or having it revealed by the analyst, but,
as Askofaré puts it, taking ownership of the meaning of this
symptom: “what is expected from the act of the analyst is that it
brings the analysant to take ownership of (assumer) the meaning
(sexual, phallic, or castration) of his symptoms.”
Askofaré insists on the fact that this ability to assume or
undertake the meaning of a symptom radically differs from the
mere understanding or treatment of said symptom. In analysis,
what happens to a subject is closer to an ethical experience
that Lacan associates with the idea of respect. We believe
that this specific understanding of respect broadens the use
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of psychoanalytical theory and contributes for contemporary
discussions on vulnerability and politics.
RESPECT, RECOGNITION,
VULNERABILITY
In his very first Seminar, from 1953 to 1954, Lacan studies
Freud’s articles about psychoanalytical technique. In a lesson
concerning the concepts of resistance and defenses, he examines
the criticism regarding Freud’s supposed “authoritarianism” in
relation to his patients—some of Lacan’s students describe
Freud’s handling of the resistance as an act of conquering said
resistances. Consequently, Freud is seen by these students as
someone who is moved by a “strong will for domination.”
But Lacan does not agree with his students’ interpretation
of Freud’s technique. He posits that “if anything constitutes the
originality of the analytic treatment, it is rather to have perceived
at the beginning, right from the start, the problematical relation of
the subject to himself. The real find, the discovery, in the sense I
explained to you at the beginning of the year, is to have conjoined
this relation with the meaning of the symptoms” (Lacan, 1953-
1954/1988). This means that, rather than acting dominantly, the
psychoanalyst works from a position of a certain vulnerability.
Indeed, when Lacan mentions “the problematical relation of
the subject to himself,” he is referring to the Freudian notion of
Nebenmensch, “the fellow human being.” In Freud’s work, the
(helpful) person capable of removing the distress of the child
through a “specific action” also creates—via the same action—
dependency and vulnerability. According to Freud,
“Let us suppose that the object which furnishes the perception
resembles the subject—a fellow human-being (nebenmensch).
If so, the theoretical interest taken in it is also explained by
the fact that such an object was simultaneously the subject’s
first satisfying object and further his first hostile object, as well
as his sole helping power. For this reason it is in relation to a
fellow human-being that a human being learns to recognize”
(Freud, 1895/1966).
In other words, it is by being vulnerable and by being exposed to
the power and the hostility of another fellow human being that
one develops his or her abilities of recognition. A moment of
crisis and a critical environment are indeed the very conditions
to the development of human’s capacity to recognize others.
This has a technical consequence that shall bring us back to
the lacanian definition of the analyst as someone who gives up
knowledge in the same way he/she gives up of his/her ideals.
In fact, Freud described in 1890 a menacing aspect inherent
to all situations where help is involved (Freud, 1895/1966). Since
the forces that work toward helping a subject necessarily impact
the “autocratic nature of the personalities of the subjects,” a
common reaction in patients is to avoid asking for help of any
kind (psychological, medical, or on a social context). The very
idea of being helped elicits defenses. Consequently, the efficacy of
psychoanalytical practice must rely on the fact that it differs from
a psychological aid. It has to avoid what we could describe, from
a lacanian perspective, as the imaginary trap (le piège imaginaire)
of intersubjectivity. Rather, it should adhere to an unconditional
recognition of the symptom of the subject, as well as of the
“problematical relationship of the subject to himself ” that the
symptom imposes.
This unconditional recognition means questioning one’s
relationship to knowledge. The analyst behaves as a nebenmensch,
a fellow human who cannot know what the analysant needs.
One cannot, as an analyst, assume a position where prescribing
attitudes or behaviors is a possibility. Rather, one must give
up one’s knowledge regarding his/her patients and the illusion
of power that comes with it. By doing so, we rend ourselves
more vulnerable. But we also move closer to the meaning of the
symptoms.
We understand that this is the only way to keep psychoanalysis
from either being dissolved into some sort of sentimental
psychologisation that fails to take into account the submission
to language described by Lacan; or into a medical way of
thinking that tries to answer to normative ideals regarding
treatments. One could describe this position concerning
psychoanalysis as a certain style, neither intimate, nor
extimate (as Lacan puts it), but proximate. As a practice,
psychoanalysis remains vulnerable, situated between two spots,
fragile.
In other words, the originality of the analytic treatment is to
oppose something very simple to both an inquisitive style of the
analysis of resistances and the mere eradication of symptoms:
respect for the human being and for his or her symptoms. Lacan
insists that:
“It is the subject’s refusal of this meaning [of the symptom]
that poses a problem for him. This meaning must not be
revealed to him, it must be assumed by him. In this respect,
psychoanalysis is a technique which respects the person—in
the sense in which we understand it today, having realized
that it had its price—not only respects it, but cannot function
without respecting it” (Lacan, 1953-1954/1988).
From this perspective, respect means an idea of care for the other
or for oneself that unties itself from a monolithic representation
of who this other or this self should be. The lacanian
understanding of respect allows for an idea of recognition that
relies on a more variable (or less fixed) conception of the self.
This point of view seems to relate to the issue of the
relationship between identity and vulnerability, as stated on the
work of contemporary philosophers such as Judith Butler. In
Precarious Life, Butler describes how “each of us is constituted
politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our
bodies—as a site of desire and physical vulnerability.” In other
words, the author claims that, from a political perspective, being
recognized as a subject implies a feeling of identity that is
fundamentally related to an experience of vulnerability:
≪ loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially
constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those
attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of
that exposure≫ (Butler, 2004 p. 20).
Throughout her work, Butler has described how the act of being
called a name paradoxically limits a subject and allows himself
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or herself to exist. When one receives a name—woman, man,
transgender, Brazilian, heterosexual, gay, etc.—, one receives the
possibility to exist socially at the same time that he or she is
supposed to abide to the characteristics that allow for such a
naming. Different characteristics lead to different designations
and, consequently, to different degrees of vulnerability.
≪ one speaks, and one speaks for another, to another, and
yet there is no way to collapse the distinction between the
Other and oneself.Whenwe say≪we≫, we do nothingmore
than designate this very problematic. We do not solve it. And
perharps it is, and it ought to be, insoluble. This disposition
of ourselves outside ourselves seems to follow from bodily life,
from its vulnerability and its exposure≫ (Butler, 2004 p. 25).
The trouble with (any) identity, according to Judith Butler,
lies in its variability and its diversity—≪ I am a woman.
Which woman ?≫. But this very trouble, this difficulty, is what
allows us to understand how recognition cannot rely on an
opaque, fixed, or monolithic representation of a subject.
CONCLUSION
These theoretical developments invite us to rethink what is at
stake in the relationship between recognition and vulnerability.
French psychoanalyst Jean Allouch argues that the psychoanalyst
establishes a relationship to “variety as such”(le divers comme tel)
which implies refraining from assigning a subject to a predefined
clinical entity—or to a predefined name. In Allouch’s words,
this means that “oriented by variety, the psychoanalyst is bound
to welcome anyone, and to do so by restraining from any
identificatory action or thought” (Allouch, 2014). This means
assuming a delicate position where one is perpetually thinking
the subject without references to a knowledge of preexisting
categories. And this ability to recognize variety without reducing
it to rigid categories stems from this respectful attitude toward
language, in the sense suggested by Lacan. Such an attitude
is essential to the successful conduction of psychoanalytical
treatments, and it may also enlighten discussions on vulnerability
rising from other fields.
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In Logique du Fantasme, Lacan argues that the compulsion to repeat does not obey
the same discharge logic as homeostatic processes. Repetition installs a realm that is
categorically different from the one related to homeostatic pleasure seeking, a properly
subjective one, one in which the mark “stands for,” “takes the place of,” what we have
ventured to call “an event,” and what only in the movement of return, in what Lacan calls
a “thinking of repetition,” confirms and ever reconfirms this point of no return, which is
also a qualitative cut and a structural loss. The kind of “standing for” Lacan intends
here with the concept of repetition is certainly not something like an image or a faithful
description. No, what Lacan wishes to stress is that this mark is situated at another level,
at another place, it is “entstellt,” and as such, it is punctually impinging upon the bodily
dynamics without rendering the event, without having an external meta-point of view,
but cutting across registers according to a logics that is not the homeostatic memory
logics. This paper elaborates on this distinction on the basis of a confrontation with what
Freud says about the pleasure principle and its beyond in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
and also takes inspiration from Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. We argue that
Lacan’s theory of enjoyment takes up and generalizes what Freud was after in Beyond
the Pleasure Principle with the Wiederholungszwang, and pushes Freud’s thoughts to a
more articulated point: to the point where a subject is considered to speak only when
it has allowed the other, through discourse, to have impacted and cut into his bodily
pleasure dynamics.
Keywords: Freud, Lacan, repetition compulsion, jouissance, fort-da, beyond the pleasure principle,
representation, dopamine
INTRODUCTION
It is well into his life as a practicing psychoanalyst that Freud wished to come to a firmer theoretical
grounding of the clinical observation that people do not necessarily want to get rid of their suffering
or their symptoms. Against therapeutic efforts of all kinds, people time and again repeat, even
cannot not but repeat, what makes them suffer. This is what Freud means by Wiederholungszwang,
the compulsion to repeat, situated, so he says, beyond the pleasure principle. In the text with
the same name, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1955), he explores the theoretical
underpinnings of this clinical phenomenon. The idea he defends here is that the principle of
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repetition, and not the pleasure principle, is the most basic
module of mental life, grounded in the drives. Freud is bold in
his clinical affirmation – yes, the basic module of mental life is
the compulsion to repeat, and not the pleasure principle1 – but
he clearly does struggle to articulate the Wiederholungszwang in
relation to the pleasure principle.
In Logique du Fantasme, Lacan (1966–1967/2017) invites us
to consider that Beyond the Pleasure Principle constitutes a
“conceptual intrusion” in Freud’s work. He insists: “Do we really
measure what is at stake here?” To him, the Wiederholungszwang,
articulated in terms of jouissance, enjoyment, constitutes a
genuine break with the pleasure principle, a contradiction even
with what Freud would have thought until then to be the module
of the functioning of the mental system, namely homeostasis,
that holds that living substances always seek the state of minor
tension. To Lacan, there is no doubt about the fact that the
pleasure principle reissues homeostasis for mental life: the mental
system, in as far as it is ruled by the pleasure principle, “echoes,”
“repeats,” “redoubles” organic, homeostatic requirements.2
In this paper, we propose to clarify what is at stake in
Lacan’s diagnosis of a “conceptual intrusion” in Freud’s text.
We argue that Lacan’s theory of the signifier and of enjoyment
basically takes up and generalizes what Freud was after in Beyond
the Pleasure Principle with the Wiederholungszwang, and that,
notwithstanding the overt differences in style – Freud being more
versed into biological metaphors and concepts, Lacan more into
logical and topological formalizations – it is not the case that
Lacan’s theory of the signifier with its focus on formalization
is far removed from the apparently more bodily concerns of
Freud. On the contrary, Lacan pushes Freud consequently to
the point where the act of speaking itself is shown to involve
an ineliminable place of the speaking other, while also having
a subversive impact on what constitutes the homeostatic bodily
pleasure dynamics.
This paper has two parts. In the first part, we explain what
Lacan means with the idea that we are thinking with the object.
This is important to come to clarity about his account of
the signifier as participating in the dynamics of pleasure and
1See, for instance, the end of II, where Freud speaks of tendencies beyond
the pleasure principle, “more primitive than it and independent of it” (Freud,
1920/1955, p. 17), or at the end of III, where he states that the compulsion to
repeat is “more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure
principle which it over-rides” (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 23). We note the unhappy
translation of triebhafter into more instinctual – the translation of Trieb by drive
would have been more accurate. Luckily, this is remediated in the new translation
from the upcoming Revised Standard Edition, edited by Mark Solms. A critical and
annotated version of Beyond the Pleasure Principle has meanwhile been published
in Psychoanalysis and History (Freud, 1920/2015).
2“Quand Freud introduit pour la première fois, dans son Jenseits à lui, l’Au-
delà du principe du plaisir, le concept de répétition comme du forçage, Zwang,
répétition, Wiederholung – cette répétition est forcée: Wiederholungszwang –
quand il l’introduit pour donner son état définitif au statut du sujet de l’inconscient,
mesure-t-on bien la portée de cette intrusion conceptuelle? Si elle s’appelle ‘au-delà
du principe du plaisir,’ c’est précisément en ceci qu’elle rompt avec ce qui, jusque-là,
lui donnait le module de la fonction psychique, à savoir cette homéostase qui fait
écho à celle que nécessite la substance de l’organisme, qui la redouble et la répète
et qui est celle que, dans l’appareil nerveux isolé comme tel, il définit par la loi
de la moindre tension. Ce qu’introduit la Wiederholungszwang est nettement en
contradiction avec cette loi primitive, celle qui s’était énoncée dans le principe du
plaisir” (Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, séance XI, p. 134).
repetition. To this end, we draw on Freud’s clinically interpreted
anecdote of fort-da, and on Lacan’s re-interpretation of it in
his seminars The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis
(Lacan, 1963–1964/1973) and La Logique du Fantasme (Lacan,
1966–1967/2017). In the second part, we clarify and critically
discuss how the use of signifiers introduces a radical cut
organized around the limit points of the pleasure principle.
Here, we depart from the distinction Freud introduces in his
Project for a Scientific Psychology between understanding and
judging, having it correspond, respectively, with the realm of
representational, grasping bodily movements and the functioning
of the mark, seen as a precursor and initiator of the properly
subjective realm, with, between both, a relation of fundamental
contingency or arbitrariness that serves as the ground for the
compulsion to repeat.
TO THINK WITH THE OBJECT: FREUD
AND LACAN INTERPRETING THE
CHILDREN’S GAME “fort-da”
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud re-discusses the fort-da
children’s game3 to make it clear that the compulsion to repeat is
not just to be equated with the repetition of painful events. Both
the compulsion to repeat and the repetitive children’s games are
related to the dynamics of excitations and their discharge, that is,
to the pleasure dynamics. But they are so in a different way.
As early as Freud (1895/1966), proposes in his Project for a
Scientific Psychology that homeostasis, the process that seeks the
state of minor tension, is the default mode of mental functioning.
This means that the mental system seeks in the first place to get
rid of tension, that is, it is after the restauration of a previous
state of less tension. Freud acknowledges of course that there is
no mental functioning on that basis alone, because the mental
apparatus also needs to be able to retain tension for a sufficient
timespan, and it needs to be able to do this in organized ways,
otherwise there would be no way of acting effectively in the
surrounding world.4 The reality principle is what captures this
requirement of retaining tension in order to adequately act and
maintain oneself in the world. Both the pleasure principle and
the reality principle, however, are eventually seeking a decrease
in tension.5
3cf. Freud (1900/1953, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 461) and Freud (1920/1955,
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, II, pp. 14–17). The game concerns a young child
(Freud’s grandson) that used to play with his toys in such a way that he makes
them disappear out of his sight, pronouncing then the long sound o-o-o. One
day, while lying in his cradle, the child plays with his a bobbin, throwing it over
the edge, pronouncing o-o-o again, and then, pulling the bobbin back in his little
bed, triumphantly greets it with a-a-a. The two sounds are interpreted by Freud as
expressing respectively fort and da, away and back.
4That corresponds to the function of the ego. The ego cannot function but as
a set of ‘permanently activated neurons,’ i.e., neurons that can retain excitation
“Thus the ego is to be defined as the totality of the ψ cathexes, at a given time, in
which a permanent component is distinguished from a changing one” (cf. Freud,
1895/1966, Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 323).
5That is why they can be said to be both operating in function of the death drive,
as Freud explicitly admits in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1955), VII,
pp. 62 ff. In “The economic problem of masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962), however,
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The question is, of course, how much tension the mental
system will or should be capable of retaining, and why or
how it will do so. This matter is at the core of the Freudian
distinction between the pleasure principle and the compulsion
to repeat. In discussing the fort-da game, Freud stresses that the
child, by staging the presence and the disappearance of his toys,
compensates for the anxiety and the pain that the absence of the
mother is provoking in him. The game repeats the supposedly
painful event, which suggests that there is no immediate relief
of tension involved. Freud, however, does not hesitate to say
that the indemnification at stake involves a direct benefit. It
concerns a different kind of pleasure though, one stemming
from another source (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 17). The difference, so
Freud explains, has to do with the fact that the child succeeds in
being less passively subjected to what he experiences, has found
ways to actively master, that is, to bind excitations through the
throwing away and pulling back of his bobbin and the repetitive
“o-a,” fort-da. In this way, discharge is enabled, while a distance
is created with drive satisfaction. The use of “o-a” – that Lacan
refers to as signs, marks – is what makes the mastering drive
independent of whether the memory was itself pleasurable or
not (Ibidem, pp. 16–17).6 However, even if the child’s mental
Freud equates death drive with the Nirwanaprinciple, the pleasure principle and
the reality principle as its modified form, with the representatives of libido.
6Several comments are in order here. Firstly, there is one clear passage in Jenseits in
which Freud speaks of the importance of the trait (the Zug) in relation to repetition:
“This ‘perpetual recurrence of the same thing’ causes us no astonishment when it
relates to active behavior on the part of the person concerned and when we can
discern in him an essential character-trait (Characterzug) which always remains
the same and which is compelled to find expression in a repetition of the same
experiences.” We are much more impressed by cases in which the subject appears
to have a passive experience, over which he has no influence, but in which he
meets with a repetition of the same fatality (Freud, 1920/1955, Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, II, p. 22, italics original). While, in the context of the discussion of fort-
da, Freud stresses in the first place “the use of the object” and talks of pleasure
stemming ‘from another source,’ Lacan explicitly interprets the “o-a” as signs or
marks, in line with the passage we mentioned [for instance in Logique du Fantasme
(Lacan, 1966–1967/2017), XI, p. 136 (italics original)], where he writes: “(. . .)
identité significante du ‘plus’ ou du ‘moins’ comme signe de ce qui doit être répété
[character-trait (. . .) which is compelled to find expression in a repetition],” and
also in The Four Fundamental Concepts (Lacan, 1963–1964/1973), V, p. 54, where
he discusses automaton and tuchè: “(. . .) l’insistance des signes à quoi nous nous
voyons commandés par le principe du Plaisir.” That Lacan speaks of signs might
be confusing, in as far as the sign here is purely formal and is defined in terms
of oppositions. As such, it is what can be understood by the functioning of the
signifier. Clearly, what Lacan intends is something different from more traditional
(philosophical) accounts of the sign where it refers to something for someone
(Peirce), or from cognitive views according to which the sign is what identifies
stimuli on external grounds. With Lacan, following Freud, a sign or a mark is
constituted by parameters or characteristics holding from within the subjective
realm itself. As we explain further in this paper, Lacan speaks here of signs in
reference to the Einzige Zug, which is the symbolic mark, the first signifier, that
indicates that something was lost and cannot but be repeatedly searched for. By
initiating that movement of repetition at the level of the signifiers, the little human
being grafts himself upon the other, and inscribes himself in what Lacan calls le
champ de l’Autre, the field of the Other (cf. Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, XVII, pp.
224–225/p. 136). Even if the distinction between the first and the second signifier,
the Einzige Zug (the “sign”) and the “proper” signifier can only be made from
within the realm of “significance,” the realm of the functioning of the signifier,
it is nevertheless relevant to logically distinguish that first moment, the one in
which something merely indicates that something was lost without being part of
a differential system of signifiers. Of course, this is a mythical moment, set apart
logically. Unless explicitly specified, we shall from here on speak of signifiers in
order to avoid confusion between the philosophical use of the concept of sign
and the psychoanalytical one. Secondly, to suggest that “another level” is initiated
functioning is independent of the initial objects of satisfaction,
even if the use of signifiers installs the pleasure dynamics at
another level, at another place, there is in Freud’s viewpoint
on mental life still an “echoing,” “repeating,” “redoubling,” as
Lacan states, of organic, homeostatic requirements. The module
of mental life is homeostasis, that is, the pleasure principle.
Lacan’s (1963–1964/1973, p. 60) comments on the fort-da
experiment in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis
are revealing for the questions that concern us here. Lacan is
not siding with Freud’s clinically based distinction between the
repetition at stake in the children’s game – still situated under
the heading of the pleasure principle, albeit distinguished from
mere drive satisfaction – and the “real” repetition he wishes
to consider as lying beyond the pleasure principle, i.e., the
compulsion to repeat. On the contrary, he considers the fort-
da game as an instantiation of what constitutes mental life at
heart, ruled, that is, by repetition, and, therefore, not ruled
by a pleasure principle that echoes homeostasis. In this sense,
repetition, also coined as enjoyment by Lacan, is in his view
not “natural,” not obeying to what instincts or needs command
in terms of pleasurable discharge.7 To Lacan, what counts in
repetition, and what to him is illustrated in the fort-da game,
is the attachment to that which stays the same, namely, the
signifiers, “o-a,” fort-da, endlessly repeated.8 That the repetitive
use of “o-a” takes place in an apparently signifying relation to
a multiplicity of toys, in a variety of situations, is not what
counts in the first place – it rather risks to distract us from its
genuine significance. As a matter of fact, to consider the fort-da
as a stamp of some or other event – the absence of the mother,
for one, as Freud suggests – is too quickly complicit with a
semantic-representational account and thereby misses the real
point.9 According to Lacan, following here Wallon, the child is
when dealing with signifiers, or, with Freud, to talk of pleasure as stemming
from “another source,” is in agreement with the Freudian idea that memory
and consciousness are two different and mutually exclusive systems: opening the
possibility of using signifiers is opening the possibility of memory and immediately
closes off their presence in consciousness. Thirdly, it is worth noting in passing that
Freud speaks in the context of the use of signifiers, as in theater plays, of enjoyment,
Genuβ (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 17) – the subject enjoys the commemoration of
painful events in the play – a thing that will be of importance in the Lacanian
viewpoint on enjoyment.
7The use of terms such as “natural” is never unproblematic. In this context, we take
it that Lacan intends natural as opposed to cultural. We do not want to open the
philosophical discussion on nature/nurture here, but we do want to stress that the
opposition is perhaps less straightforward than Lacan seems to suggest. We will
argue further on that even if the compulsion to repeat is seen to be categorically
distinguished from the pleasure principle grounded in a homeostatic dynamics,
this does not mean that there are no biological constraints to be taken into account.
As a matter of fact, what we intend to show is that the compulsion to repeat, even
if it does not follow homeostatic principles, does have a logic that can be said to be
biologically anchored and is clearly linked to precise biological constraints (Bazan
and Detandt, 2013).
8This is perfectly in line Freud’s “perpetual recurrence of the same thing,” stated in
Jenseits, albeit not in the passage where we find fort-da. See footnote 6 for the full
quote.
9The term representation (as well as meaning, content, . . .) is extremely tricky.
It is not the place here to unfold its various (mainly philosophical) traps and
potentialities, but in relation to Lacan, it can be said that the representational
realm mostly goes hand in hand with meaning, content, semantics, all of the
imaginary order, against which he warns time and again. This is not per se the
most adequate or the most interesting option though. We explain further on an
alternative viewpoint on representation, one that is more radically embedded in
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vigilant for what it experiences as a lack exactly next to him,
in his vicinity, not where the mother left the room and where
he could expect her to come back. In other words, the child
does not constitute its mental life on the basis of, for instance,
a “representation” referring to the mother leaving the room,
expecting that she will come back at some point through the
same door.10 It is in the vicinity where the lack makes itself
directly felt that the play with the bobbin and the utterance of
“o-a” take place. As the bobbin, the “o-a” is actually the little
thing that is detachable from him while being still retained, the
little thing on the basis of which the infant explores and expands
his universe in a movement of self-mutilation – throwing the
thing, part of his own movements, away, and thereby bridging
the abyss created by the absence of what was in his vicinity a
moment before “It is with his object that the child jumps over the
borders of his territory changed in wells and that he begins the
incantation” (Lacan, 1963–1964/1973, p. 60, our translation).11
The little subject of the fort-da, successfully finding discharge
through the act of repetitively pronouncing “o-a,” is in the
repetitive movements he initiates with his bobbin and covers
with “o-a”.
So, in sum, Freud grounds the pleasure principle in the
possibility of discharge, and quite logically considers the child’s
game as a successful kind of discharge. What to him lies beyond
the pleasure principle, has to do with those occasions where
discharge appears to be problematic or radically impossible,
such as in traumatic neuroses or in the phenomena of
negative transference. To Lacan, however, this clinically observed
distinction risks to miss the essential point, namely that in the
the dynamics of the body, and that understands representations as motor forms
that correspond to the central imagery that arises from action intentions that
did not completely lead to discharge (see Jeannerod, 1994, p. 201; Bazan, 2007,
pp. 125–126). The point we wish to make in relation to the above passage, is that
in repetition, it is not the content that counts, but the form. As Lacan indicates, the
child jumps toward the “o-a” in a movement of bridging what appeared as a lack
in his vicinity. To interpret this “o-a” as a “representation” referring to the mother
leaving the room, expected to come back through the door, adds too much and
too quickly elements of content. What Lacan wishes to indicate, clearly in line with
Freud – who also, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, notes that the child is not in
panic at the moment the mother leaves the room – is that it concerns a throw and
pull-movement, i.e., a movement of the acting subject, doubled, over-written by a
phoneme sequence, “o-a,” a signifier which is first and foremost a motor form. For
more details (see Bazan and Van de Vijver, in preparation).
10Here, is an example of how tricky the term representation can be. It is here
used between inverted commas to highlight its traditional philosophical sense, i.e.,
something that stands for something for someone: the child fears that the mother,
whom he saw leaving through the door, will perhaps not come back. Following
our viewpoint on representation, and following also Lacan and Wallon in the
interpretation of the case, we would say that the activated motor-pattern of the eyes
while the mother left the room constitutes the representational structure, formal
in nature, and that it is exactly that pattern that is repeated in the play with the
bobbin and the accompanying “o-a”: the movement of throwing the bobbin away
and pulling it back repeats the movement of something being at one point in the
vicinity and at another point leaving a void in its absence.
11In line with Aristotle, Lacan will add here that man not only thinks with his
object, he is, as a subject, where the object is put into practice This probably refers
to Aristotle’s (1984) idea that the mind is “none of the things existing in actuality
before thinking” (De Anima iii 4, 429a24). In other words, thinking is nothing in
actuality in abstraction of the form that thinks. Or still, our thinking is only with
our objects of thought, that is, the forms. And that is precisely what is at stake here,
and what we explain further on: “o-a” are formal objects that correspond to, or
“stand for” actions tied together into motor packages that, in their opposite nature,
organize what can be called subjective life.
signifying procedures whereby the child, or any speaking being
for that matter, deals with absence and presence, there is a
structural loss, a structural impossibility that inescapably emerges
with the use of signifiers, with the use of “o-a.” This structural
loss is not disconnected from the issue of discharge, and thus of
pleasure, but does initiate another domain, obeying a different
logics, a logics ruled by repetition. In order to make this clear, we
have to explain how the use of the first signifier is connected to the
pleasure dynamics, or rather, how it cuts with that dynamics and
how it gives rise to the functioning of a new domain. To that end,
we need to reconstruct and articulate in more detail how the child
is caught into his movements, and how he finds an orientation on
that basis.
THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE AND
BEYOND
Understanding and Judging
We know that pleasure is seen by Freud as discharge of tension;
it is a temporary, floating, and partial suspension of displeasure.12
Tension – displeasure, if not trauma – constitutes the background
against which pleasure has to be thought. We also know that
as long as we live, there is, structurally, the encounter with
unpleasantly high levels of tension (Freud, 1895/1963, 1895/1966;
Lacan, 1963–1964/1981). Within this setting, the first air entering
the respiratory system, the first milk entering the digestive
system, can likely be called traumatic experiences. What exactly
is at stake in these experiences?
What Freud writes in his Project for a scientific psychology is
relevant here. Freud makes a distinction between understanding
and judging, that he grounds in the idea that the complex of
what surrounds the child, the fellow human being in the first
place, falls apart into two components, one which “makes an
impression by its constant structure and stays together as a Thing,
while the other can be understood by the activity of memory –
that is, can be traced back to information from [the subject’s]
own body” (Freud, 1895/1966, p. 331, italics original). So, to
understand, is to find relief in and through the proper bodily
movements, that is, to succeed in grasping something (com-
prehensio), so that, by one’s own means or not, an effective
handle is found on the basis of which discharge becomes possible.
To judge, on the other hand, refers to something that resists
understanding, a thing that for that reason “stays together as
a Thing” and impresses by its constant structure, and that is
to be covered and bridged by other means, with what Freud
refers to as traits or marks (Züge). To Freud, that is what
judgment does: it corresponds to the impossibility of finding
adequate movements that would lead to a grasp of the complex
(understanding), and constitutes a cut with it by approaching the
12Freudian pleasure, then, is not an affect in the common sense meaning of
the word (namely, a hedonic or agreeable feeling). Freudian pleasure is relief,
not delight. Therefore, it is not concerned with valence as affects are. Without
going into details, we are inclined to see affect, in the common sense, as far less
determining and orienting for behavior than the drive system and as not organized
around the adequacy of the act (for more details, see Bazan and Detandt, 2013,
2015; Bazan et al., 2016; Detandt, 2016).
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complex through a trait, a mark. A judgment is thereby “entstellt”
with regard to understanding, it installs another realm, another
domain.13
We propose to apply this schema to the dialectics between
pleasure and displeasure and to what lies beyond. The potentiality
of this move is twofold: on the one hand, it contributes to
anchoring the functioning of the mark into the dynamics of
pleasure and displeasure, approaching it, so to speak, “from
below,” and, on the other hand, it allows to ground the (f)act
of speaking in the obstacles and the impossibilities the human
being encounters specifically in and through the motor patterns
and their potentiality to lead to discharge. Let us return to our
examples, the entering of milk in particular.
The Thing, the Mark, and Primary
Judgment
What happens in feeding, is that the child, most commonly, finds
by itself the voluntary sucking movements that will contribute
to the feeding.14 The act is what is first, with its motivational
point – from where, why, for what reason it is undertaken – left
unfathomable from within the system that undertakes it.15 As a
consequence of the sucking movement, milk enters the system.
That is, for the system, a surprise. That the movement of sucking,
undertaken, so to speak, “out of nowhere,” would lead to milk
entering, was not foreseen and could not be foreseen. The first
milk that enters the system comes as a surprise, and cannot
but come as a surprise; it constitutes an event: the milk is an
external, a priori hostile element entering the system. However
proximate the entering of milk with the sucking movements is,
both are, for the system concerned, disconnected, in the sense
that there is nothing in the act of sucking that is connected
with milk: their relation is contingent. Also the fact that the
sucking brings a certain relief simply related to the sucking itself,
is initially disconnected from the milk and does not diminish
the surprising effect of the latter. The event of milk entering the
system for the first time is inscribed as a mark, but it is not
understood – the milk “stays together as a Thing.” Our hypothesis
is therefore that what is marked is first and foremost the event
itself: the mark is the point, the punctual point expressing
and inscribing the bodily surprise.16 The mark corresponds, in
13For a more extensive Lacanian discussion of the Thing, la Chose (see Lacan,
1959–1960/1986; Lew, 2014).
14Our schema is also applicable to what happens in breathing, but it is different
in the sense that the child, most commonly, finds by itself, through voluntary
breathing movements, the adequate act that creates a relief of tension. In
breathing – in contrast, e.g., with feeding – there is no constitutive need to for
a contribution of the other, nor is there a difference in timing between finding
the grasping movement (the breathing movement) on the one hand, and the
satisfaction of the drive. We chose for the example of feeding, because it allows us
to more straightforwardly articulate the different moments we wish to distinguish
here.
15This structurally missed step and the ways to retroactively recover it, whereby it
is identified as the cause of our acting, is, actually, the ground for the hypothesis of
the unconscious.
16This event is, so we think, beyond the mechanical part of it, the explosion of
the sugar receptors in the mouth massively and suddenly highly activated. As we
have discussed elsewhere, a physiological marker is proposed for this surprise in
the form of a release of dopamine at the level of the nucleus accumbens, i.e.,
the dopamine peak indicating unexpected reward (Bazan and Detandt, 2013) but
our view, to what Freud called the “Triebrepräsentanz,”17 that
is, the point where the subject allowed for the fact of “being
taken by surprise” and that opens the possibility of returning to
that point. We consider this “being taken by the event in the
form of a mark” as the first step in the process of subjective
positioning, the first or primary judgment, corresponding to what
Freud calls “Bejahung,” or what with Lacan becomes “Bejahung
pure, primitive” (Lacan, 1955–1956/1981, p. 95) or “Bejahung
primaire” (Lacan, 1966, p. 387). It does involve the position
of the subject, albeit in a very preliminary and inviting sense:
the fact that the trait was inscribed as a mark of the event,
witnesses to a subjective choice – the little human let himself be
surprised by the milk entering, it could as well have chosen not
to drink. It therefore opens subjectivation as a task, an agenda.18
However, it is important to note that this logical time of being
struck by surprise, is not exclusive to human beings, but, as
we will explain further on, has to be supposed in vertebrates in
general too.
What happens then with the undertaken movement that has
made the entering of milk possible, and what about the relief to
which it eventually contributed, or not? What role does it play
in this “preliminary subjectivation”? Clearly, this movement, or
cluster of movements, is of no help in understanding the event,
but, being proximate, it gets linked to it, contingently but no
less firmly. It is this link, inherently contingent but factually
proximate, that, in our view, lies the ground for the further
articulation of subjectivity, and of which Lacan will say that it is
the ground for repetition.
What we propose here is that the adjacent movement,
being only contingently linked to the ungraspable Thing of
which the subject is factually experiencing the effects of
surprise, this adjacent movement indicates and covers, “stands
for,” the ungraspable Thing. Freud himself is speaking of
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, a term that caused a huge confusion
among psychoanalysts and scholars.19 Freud sometimes identifies
the Triebrepräsentanz with the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, and
there is something understandable at this. We would be inclined
to say that the first adjacent movement, contingently sticking
to the mark, so to speak, also already belongs to another
also the dopamine release corresponding with disrupting, aversive and traumatic
events (Bazan and Detandt, 2015), taken together as dopamine release ‘marking’
the unexpected event, independent of its valence (Bazan et al., 2016), and leading
to a physiological registration known as ‘incentive sensitization.’
17There can be a hesitation between Triebrepräsentanz and Triebrepräsentant, the
first referring to the function of taking-the-place-of (“tenant-lieu”), the second
to the taking-the-place-of itself. We wish to stress in the first place the notion
of Repräsentanz. We shall see further on the delicate status of this point. For an
extensive discussion of this concept (see Tort, 1966/2016), and for a subtle and
pertinent “mise au point,” primarily in relation to the functional interpretation of
the Repräsentanz (see Lew, 1983).
18It would be possible and relevant to further elaborate on this issue in terms of
alienation, as Lacan himself does all along in Logique du Fantasme. The subject (of
the unconscious) is in “the part that is lost”; it is the subject of “je ne pense pas,”
and that part is what shows itself “by surprise.” In relation to surprise, Lacan refers
to Theodor Reik as the sole analyst having stressed its importance in relation to the
unconscious (Reik, 1935/1976; cf. Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, VII, p. 92, Logique du
Fantasme).
19It was for instance translated as “représentant représentatif ” (Laplanche and
Pontalis) or by Lacan as “tenant lieu de la représentation” (see Tort, 1966/2016;
Lew, 1983, for a discussion).
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realm, namely the realm of movements that can become
representational. The adjacent movement thus carries both sides:
it refers to the Repräsentanz, with the mark taking the place
of the Thing and having the potentiality to elicit Vorstellungen,
representations – these two different logical moments reflect
Freud’s inaugural distinction between judgment at the one hand
and comprehension at the other.
Beyond that first “sticky moment” where the Repräsentanz
remains a pure potentiality – which is, actually, a logical
moment, not a genetically identifiable moment20 – a call for other
types of movements is launched, intentionally directed grasping
movements this time, that are effectuated as a return to what
escaped comprehension. Indeed, the first sucking is a sucking to
discharge the sucking tension, but if it is followed by the event
of the milk coming in21, and if it is thus given the weight of
the mark, the subject can choose to have the next sucking as an
intentionally directed movement, to grasp – i.e., to get – the milk.
In this way, the Repräsentanz is what elicits representational –
i.e., mental – activity. This subjective representational work is a
work of understanding, of com-prehension, or at least, it is an
attempt to understand, to grasp. This work is constituted on the
basis of the marked adjacent movements – marks that are, as
we have argued, the marks of a non-understanding, of a limit
to understanding, that is, a limit to the possibility of grasping
something, a limit to making that something (the milk entering
as a surprise) into an object.
Very much in line with this, Lacan will consider the mark
as the first signifier, S1, corresponding to Freud’s unitary trait,
the “Einzige Zug,” the symbolic mark that constitutes an event
by indicating a cut with the level of what is being marked
(Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, p. 135). The S1 enables the primary
judgment that has the form of an affirmation (Bejahung): it
marks that there was an event that struck the body. However,
to Lacan, the S1 has to be called symbolic already: in order to
be called a mark at all, it intrinsically demands to be deployed
and ever re-deployed through the articulation of representations
that engage with other signifiers.22 If the mark would not have
elicited the subject to a return, it would not be an Einzige
Zug, an S1. S2 then stands for the chain of signifiers that aim
at a return to the first signifier in an attempt to grasp or
understand the initial moment of surprise, and in this sense
corresponds to the representational activity which Freud refers
to as the com-prehensio. Lacan speaks here of a “thinking
20It is certainly not a genetically identifiable moment, as it is a moment of
historization, indicating the registration of the contingency of a subject’s history
in the form of a marked event. We do however think (as indicated in footnote 16)
that there is a physiological correlate to this marking, in the form of a dopamine
release, probably a dopamine spike. Note that if biological correlates can be situated
at precise moments, their mental realization is dynamic, hence the use of the term
‘logical moment’ instead of ‘chronological moment’ (see also Bazan and Detandt,
2017).
21See footnote 16.
22Here, we easily jump from representations to signifiers. However, we propose
that both are logically equivalent. Indeed, a representation (see footnote 7) is
thought as a motor activation rest of an action intention that could not be
discharged in actual motor activation; a signifier, then, is merely the application of
this logic to the act of speaking, i.e., to articulatory phoneme motor patterns. Both
representations in general, and signifiers specifically, are thus motor potentialities,
i.e., forms, without any determined content or meaning.
of return,” a “thinking of repetition” (Lacan, 1966–1967/2017,
p. 135).23 The articulation of this representational realm, its
structuring, is properly symbolic, constituted of representations,
but it is, meanwhile, very much anchored in the body, determined
by what is, along a subjective history, being “accepted and
inscribed” as a mark and what is contingently adjacent to it
as an undertaken movement. In other words, what initiates
the repetition of these actions is not the possible reward or
relief they might bring about. What causes repetition is the fact
that the action is being linked to the event, the event being
constituted by surprise. Note that the marking, with an adjacent
movement being contingently linked up with it, is independent
from whether the event was painful (first air coming into the
lungs) or rewarding (first milk entering the mouth cavity). In
other words, the fact that milk enters the digestive system and
eventually brings relief is secondary to the effect of the event
as such – and it is the latter, not the former, that induces the
repetition.24
What has to be further elaborated, therefore, is what this
movement of “thinking of return” exactly involves, how it is
marking specifically the human being as a speaking being,
with representations becoming genuinely signifiers, and what,
if anything, constitutes, in this context, the difference with the
compulsion to repeat. In order to further unfold this, we need
to turn to the status of the object, its relation to the possibility
and the meaning of discharge, as well as to the role of the fellow
human being in this fabric of pleasure and enjoyment.
The Signifier Inscribed in a Basic
Non-attunement of Actions and Needs:
The Role of the Other
Let us return once more to the question of what happens in the
deployment of directed actions by the subject, knowing that it
must have been historically struck by the event, accompanied
by the experience of the adjacent movement contingently linked
to it. We know that all vertebrates capable of action have to
cope with an initial non-attunement of actions and needs. The
reason for this is structural. Vertebrates are characterized by a
double body: an inner, invertebrate sack-like body with all the
big vegetative systems (respiration, digestion, excretion, etc.) and
a “newly invented” outer body constituted by a skeleton and
striated muscles (see Bazan, 2007). While needs arise in the inner,
23See here Lacan’s discussion of the children’s play with “o-a.” To Lacan, from the
moment the child uses “o” (S1), we cannot but add to it the differential “a” (S2),
revealing the moment of S1 in isolation as a mythical, logical moment. He calls
therefore the S1 symbolic, and states that there is from thereon no grounding to be
looked for in the similarities or differences between objects such as toys, bobbins,
mothers, to identify what a mark is. Nothing of this sort is hidden in the plays of
Freud’s grandson that would justify the use of “o-a,” as nothing of this sort would
justify the marked surprise effect in the child. According to Lacan, a unitary trait
identifies something – in our interpretation, an event – but it is only through the
repetition, in the differential play with other signifiers, that an event genuinely
becomes a subjective event.
24The first events in life frequently lead to the repetition of actions crucial for our
survival, but our intuition is that this is at the bottom of it a matter of chance, not
of teleology. E.g., a pigeon that made a wing movement before receiving a grain
(Skinner, 1948), will from then on also repeat that wing movement because it had
been registered as what had to be repeated, even if it had nothing to do with its
survival chance (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uPmeWiFTIw).
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invertebrate body, the specific actions for the satisfaction of these
needs are outer body actions. The structural non-attunement
between actions and needs resides in the fact that it is not a
priori clear what outer body action could constitute a response
to what the inner body needs. Even if this gap is less prominent
in most vertebrates as compared to humans (e.g., little horses get
on their feet and move toward the mother nipple in the span of
hours after birth), the idea is nevertheless that, even in animals,
this instinct-encouraged movement has to be sanctioned by a
mark (a dopamine-release) to be registered as a movement with
a high potential for repetition, and that therefore, independently
of instincts, the body registers the history of (contingent) events.
Once a specific action has been linked to an event, what drives
to repeat this action, is disconnected from the drive satisfaction
itself. Indeed, the relief caused by the satisfaction of an internal
body need is only contingently connected to what the external
body succeeded to develop as an action. The relief, as the tension
itself, is a serendipitous addendum, a by-product, important for
survival, but not determinative for what drives repetitive behavior.
No matter what the outcome, the child will not stop the endless
repetition, the sucking, or, as Freud stressed, the endless uttering
of “o-o-o” and then “a-a-a.” From the moment the child accepted
and marked the event, it is driven by the repetition compulsion
to grasp. So, it is from within the repetition compulsion that relief
of tension becomes possible – it is not the relief of tension that is the
ground for repetition.
It is often said, from within a psychoanalytical setting, that
what drives the human being is not the satisfaction of needs.
We agree with this. In line with what we elaborated in relation
to higher vertebrates, however, we consider that the structural
non-attunement of needs and actions holds in the same way for
human beings, and that it is intrinsically related to the way in
which vertebrate bodies are constituted. This allows us now to
address the question of the specificity of the human being, as a
speaking being, from a slightly different angle. It is true, indeed, as
Freud already highlighted in his Project for a Scientific Psychology,
that the human child is born in a configuration of helplessness,
which implies that the fellow human being plays a role that
is structurally of the utmost importance in the constitution of
his subjective world. Let us return to our example of the milk.
Up until this point we have brought the scenario as if what is
crucially at stake for the child is the sucking. However, due to
his helplessness, the repetitive action of the sucking is, per force,
supplemented by other actions, e.g., crying, vocalizations, that
contingently, but crucially, contribute to realize the conditions
within which relief becomes possible. Again, what drives the child
to act and repeat its actions is not the possibility of relief in
itself, it is the attempt to grasp what initially escaped, namely
the surprising event. And in this grasping attempt, the other, as
a speaking being, is once more an ineliminable factor. Indeed,
a bunch of contingent movements, situated primarily in the
realm of vocalizations, that, by surprise, out of nowhere, made a
difference (i.e., brought the mother, the milk, relief), doubles, in a
far more whimsical fashion, the logically first contingency of the
sucking movement. Indeed, a mother, with far more fierceness
than, e.g., milk, resists objectification, stays together as a Thing.
More correctly, it is to the extent that the other “stays together as
a Thing” and resists understanding, that the child is launched,
here again, for an endless ‘thinking of return,’ a re-elaboration
of his first vocalizations, in an attempt to grasp after all that
which entered his system as a surprising event and with regard to
which it did not succeed in articulating the appropriate adequate
actions.
We therefore agree with Lacan when he states that the child
thinks with his object, which means that he subjectivizes through
the handlings with his object. We also agree with him (cf. his
reading of “o-a”), that the use of signifiers, and the linguistic,
signifying practices at large have to be understood along the same
lines: a signifier is handled as an object, the object perhaps, on
the basis of which the child explores and expands his subjective
universe. We have explained in the previous part how these
handlings are articulated in terms of a failure in grasping the
Thing, how the marks in a sense “take over,” or at least initiate
a new realm of being, the realm properly constituted by signifiers
(which is the Other, in Lacan’s terms). We remind here that the
signifier is a form, a motor-pattern, only contingently linked to
what brings discharge – indeed, it marks precisely what was not
understood and could not be brought back to memories of the
proper body.
Repetition or enjoyment, a “thinking of return,” as Lacan
calls it, is therefore, for the human being, intrinsically bound
up with the nature of the signifier. The child, in the same
movement of adopting the signifier that is offered to him as a
formal potentiality by the other, inscribes himself in a universe
of vocalizations where it is structurally impossible to grasp the
Thing. It is from there on condemned to run after the Thing,
to commemorate what can be called, perhaps, a moment of
exquisite subjectivity – the structurally escaping moment of
having been struck by surprise. By structurally missing this point
because of the fact that the Thing is situated at another level
and cannot be brought back to bodily understanding, the subject
endlessly, repetitively, runs after “the facts”: it repeats the marks
in themselves, and strives for understanding after all, attempts
to make the Thing into an object, to bring it back to proper
and directed body movements that bring discharge. Both realms,
however much intertwined they are, are disconnected realms,
only contingently bound up. As we saw with the “fort-da” game,
the child produces the first signifiers “out of nowhere,” or at
least, these signifiers cannot be grounded in the distinctions
between his toys, between the mother or the father being absent
or present. There is no way back from signifiers to meanings25:
the relation between form and content is neither innately, nor
naturalistically grounded. As we saw with the first mark, the
Einzige Zug: signifiers emerge at the point where a “naturalistic”
grounding – an adequate grasping of the object, leading to
discharge – reaches a limit. Or perhaps more correctly: the use
of the signifier indicates that a limit was reached, indicates that
the bodily movements were inadequate.
What both Freud and Lacan note in relation to this repetitive
dynamics, a thing that follows logically here, but needs to be
25This is an ironic reference to Russell’s (1905) “On Denoting,” where he says, albeit
from a different angle, but with, in our view, the same stakes at play, that there is
no backward road from denotations to meanings.
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stressed time and again, is that the action does not at all need to
be adequate to be repeated. This is quite generally what clinical
experience confirms: it may be certified that praying or singing
does not stop the earthquake – it is nevertheless repeated. The
child’s repetitive “o-a” does not impact on the leaving and the
return of the mother, but it is joyfully and victoriously repeated
nevertheless. We have defended elsewhere (Bazan et al., 2016)
that even if the act is not adequate in grasping the thing, it still is
better than sideration or bewilderment; it is the execution in itself
that brings relief. Freud will say it is relief “from another source”;
Lacan will consider that it radically concerns another domain, the
domain of signifiers to which the child finds entrance. And in
this domain, the other, the Other, occupies an ineliminable place:
without the other/the Other, there would be no “significance,”
no functioning of the signifiers. It is a space where contingency,
or rather, arbitrariness between form and content reigns: the
exchanges between the child and the other, in as far as they are
based in signifier exchanges, are firstly formal exchanges, content
being realized in the historical interweaving between those forms,
the adjacent bodily movements and the web of directed and
intentional actions deployed in their wake.
The Object as a Coherent Motor
Package and the Experience of
Satisfaction
What is there to say then about the object? We would be inclined
to consider an object as a coherent motor package, a bounded
set of grasp movements that opens the possibility of discharge.
We already said that the Repräsentanz26 “stands for” the event: it
might be considered as a crystallization of movement parameters
into a solidary whole. It is different from what philosophers
are traditionally inclined to call an object, though, as it is a
contingent whole of movements arbitrarily cut out of a sequence
and has no intentional directedness. However, as argued, the
motor pattern has the potentiality to launch for a return under
the form of directed actions. These actions produce what we
would call in the proper sense “mental” representations of what
first intruded the system and stayed together as a Thing. It are
then these “mental representations” that, when executed, can
lead to discharge, however partial and temporary that is, and
which can, in our view, be genuinely called objects. In other
words, the mental, representational inscription amounts to an
objectification. As this is likely to be the most delicate point of our
argumentation, we dare to insist. Firstly, what we call an object or
a representation is first and foremost a motor pattern, a motor
intention, as Jeannerod calls it (Jeannerod, 1994; Bazan, 2007):
it is the motor form within which something can be grasped.
To address the question of the object, is therefore in the first
place to ask for the formal arrangement of the space of possible
motor patterns. What serves as a filling up in that space – content,
meaning, . . . – is secondary, and does not inform about the
arrangement of the space itself. In other words, questions about
26The difference between Repräsentanz and Repräsentant can once more be
brought forward here: however frozen or crystallized the motor pattern is
(Repräsentant) it is nevertheless a motor-pattern, hence formal, potentially ready
to receive different contents, and thus it is also functional in nature (Repräsentanz).
representations corresponding more or less adequately to some
or other object out there, are missing the point. A representation
is an object, is a motor pattern, and the articulation of the space of
motor patterns, being a constraining space, is at the meantime the
enabling condition for what counts as an object: the constraint is
the possibility.27
This account of the object enables us to address (i) the
typically Lacanian idea of the object as bound up with a structural
loss – the fact of launching comprehending grasp movements is
indicative of, rests on, a step being missed, as we have shown,
the step corresponding to a non-understanding, covered by
the mark – with the object a that theoretically indicates this
ever missed object, (ii) the issue of objective reality, that here
refers to successful grasping movements, i.e., movements leading
to discharge. Clearly, the issue of discharge is crucial in the
constitution of the object. As a matter of fact, only that which
can give rise to discharge has a chance to lead to objectification.
Along these lines, Lacan states that it is impossible to understand
what an object is without the dimension of satisfaction, a thing
that, to him, largely escaped the philosophical tradition.28 There
is, however, a potential confusion in the way in which Lacan uses
the term satisfaction, at least in as far as we take it to refer to
the satisfaction of needs. We have indeed argued that there is
a contingent, arbitrary relation between what brings satisfaction
of needs and what is constituted as an object through motor-
patterns. We have also argued that object-constitution happens
on grounds radically cut from what brings satisfaction of needs.
We are indeed speaking of another level, of pleasure “from
another source” as Freud states, of objects of enjoyment, as Lacan
calls it. In other words, objects of pleasure are not situated at the
level of the satisfaction of needs29! We propose therefore to reserve
the term satisfaction for the level of needs, to talk of objects
of pleasure when we are aiming at the object constitution that
is related to what brings relief, diminution of tension, and of
27The resemblance with Kantian epistemology is straightforward. Kant’s dictum
that “the Thing in itself is not knowable” serves as the starting point for his
epistemology: from the moment we talk about objects and objectivity, we talk about
what there is “for us,” in our words, what is within the range of the graspable
through our motor patterns. Another way of saying the same thing, from within
the formalistic tradition in philosophy (Frege in the first place) is that the grasping
space is a functional space – in line with Kant’s philosophy that articulates the
functionalism of Reason. It is from within the functional space that the place
is prepared, delineated, circumvented, of what can come to satisfy the function.
That place within a functional space, that is the object. In our words: that motor
pattern ready to grasp something, that is the object. The formal discussion that is
relevant in this regard, is the one on the relation between intension (that defines
the function) and extension (that satisfies the function). Lacan works with these
distinctions frequently, not in the least in his Seminar XII, Problèmes Cruciaux pour
la Psychanalyse (Lacan, 1964–1965/2003).
28There is no way, dixit Lacan, to conceive of an object without the dimension
of satisfaction. With regard to the homeostatic, organic account, he says: “Rien,
dans tout cela, qui pousse à la recherche, à la saisie, à la constitution d’un objet. Le
problème de l’objet comme tel est laissé intact par toute cette conception organique
d’un appareil homéostatique. Il est très étonnant qu’on n’en ait pas jusqu’ici
marqué la faille. Freud ici, assurément, a le mérite de marquer, que la recherche
de l’objet est quelque chose qui n’est concevable qu’à introduire la dimension de la
satisfaction” (Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, p. 156).
29It is even questionable whether we can speak of objects of satisfaction; the term
“experience of satisfaction” seems more adequate, even if it also demands to be
further unfolded, certainly in light of the meaning of the term “experience” in the
philosophical tradition.
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enjoyment to indicate the impossibility of relief that the subject
is desperately holding on to.
It is in relation to this that the exchanges with the fellow
human being have to be investigated. Of course, the fellow human
being is essential for what is to be called the constitution of objects
of pleasure. In providing for the essential means of discharge –
carrying out the specific acts – the other structurally intervenes
in the temporality of excitation and discharge of the child, co-
determines the identification of what counts as an object of
pleasure, and in this way also co-determines what lies beyond in
terms of enjoyment. That this has its implications for what counts
as an experience of satisfaction is evident, but the important
thing to note is that it is not the satisfaction that determines
the constitution of the objects of pleasure or of enjoyment.
Rather, the satisfaction of the need, in this new scheme, is
over-written or replaced by the possibility of discharge through
grasping movements leading to objectification, a possibility that
was opened up as a return to the marked event covering that
which stayed together as a Thing. The space of satisfaction of
needs is thereby subverted into a space whereby the subject is
endlessly and repetitively demanding to be recognized at another
“level,” the one of subjectivity, expecting from the other to tell him
the answer, that is, to bring (to be), for him, the object of relief.
CONCLUSION
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud seeks to describe and
articulate the functioning of the psychic apparatus in situ, that
is, anchored in the ways in which human beings sense, move
and act. In discussing the issue of Wiederholungszwang, Freud,
here perhaps more than anywhere else, starts from the clinical
observation of quantities of excitation of which it is not easy, not
possible even, for the subject to get rid. That is where to him
the disjunction between pleasure and repetition finds entrance:
at the point that cannot be silenced through understanding, the
point where pleasure, the possibility of decreasing tension, has
come to a limit, the point that in its insistence searches other ways
out. Freud’s overt biological phrasing is certainly not a matter of
looking to ground the psychical in the biological; it is a matter of
cutting the psychical at the correct joints. And this cutting cannot
but start from the embarrassment in relation to the body, that is,
from the moments and the points where something does not obey
the logics of pleasure and lies beyond it as a compulsion to repeat.
In line with this viewpoint, and taking up Lacan’s revisiting of
it in terms of enjoyment, we have argued (i) that the insistence
with which subjects repeat is to be grafted upon the structural
disconnectedness between what articulates behavior and what
satisfies needs, (ii) that this structural disconnectedness, this non-
attunement, is to be linked to the bodily make up of vertebrates
at large, with the basic distinction between an internal body as a
source of excitation and an external body as a motoric means of
responding to this excitation in an attempt to diminish it, (iii) that
it is relevant to introduce here the Freudian distinction between
understanding and judging, and to identify understanding with
the articulated motor-patterns of the external body that aim at
grasping (com-prehending), and the judging with a dynamics
of the mark, in which it is indicated (marked) that something
stays together as a Thing exactly to the extent that it is not
understood, not grasped through adequate motor-patterns, (iv)
that mental representations (signifiers), understood as phonemic
motor packages, are inscribed into this bodily dynamics of
non-attunement, which means that they are particular motor-
forms attempting to grasp that from which they are initially and
structurally disconnected (the Thing), (v) that this distinction
between understanding and judging, combined with the idea
that signifiers or mental representations are motor-patterns,
provides us with a basis to identify processes of repetition
(Wiederholungszwang) in terms of repeated attempts situated at
the level of the marks, structurally disconnected from what is
satisfying at the level of needs, (vi) that the initial helplessness of
the infant, together with the subtlety of language, with its (small
and flexibly recombinable) phonemic motor-packages offered by
the other/the Other, is the means through which the categorical
difference between humans and other vertebrates can be made
clinically relevant, and finally, (vii) that the representational
grasping movement corresponds to objectification, whereby the
object expresses the formal readiness of the representational
space, a readiness that can be, in secondary instance, filled up in
various ways, but that, due to the initial non-attunement in which
it is grounded, is structurally missing the Thing that it initially
marked, leading to an endless compulsion to repeat, without
which? There would be no humanity, no culture, no subjective
life.
In sum, we have argued for the inscription of the dynamics
of signifiers in the structural non-attunement that already exists
between actions and needs in mammals, leading to the repetition
of actions independently from their being useful or not. Our
purpose thereby was not at all to diminish the specificity of
the human condition as a speaking condition. On the contrary,
our purpose was thereby to show that we are tempted, time
and again, to interpret human behavior too quickly as guided
by intentional, consciously guided principles and mechanisms.
Signifier repetition is the basic human condition, not intentional
behavior! That is what Lacan stresses over and again, linked to the
nature and the functioning of the signifier. In this way, Lacan’s
viewpoint operates, more explicitly than Freud’s, a categorical
shift from the idea that man is or should be guided by what
brings satisfaction to his needs, to the idea that man is driven to
repeat what was structurally missed. In speaking of a “conceptual
intrusion” in relation to the compulsion to repeat, Lacan focuses
on what constitutes the mental as a specific kind of object. In
this, he wishes to “ensure,” “faire valoir” Freud (Lacan, 1966–
1967/2017, XIII, p. 280) in what he was eventually after – the
subject of the unconscious – and that is exactly the mental
apparatus with as a module the compulsion to repeat.
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This article explores two clinical phenomena—pornography and conspiracy
thinking—that are highly relevant today and can be observed specifically among
adolescent boys in the early stages of post-puberty: conspiracy thinking and the viewing
of pornographic videos. It shows that the Lacanian concepts of the Real (of puberty)
and the sexual non-rapport help us understand the psychopathological aspects of these
two phenomena. Watching pornographic material becomes equivalent to a conspiracy
theory about the sexual non-rapport; both in fact deny the effect of what puberty
introduces as radically new.
Keywords: conspiracy thought, pornography, the adolescent boy, adolescence, the Real of puberty, the other
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INTRODUCTION
In our clinical experience, the two phenomena, which we are going to handle—pornography and
conspiracy thinking1—can mostly be observed among post-pubertal boys. The already high and
apparently growing occurrence of these manifestations seems troubling and often gives rise to
highly controversial views2. What does this tell us? How do we understand these phenomena and
deal with them? And should we indeed be worried or should we dismiss them as banal, given how
widespread they currently are?
Our hypothesis is that these two phenomena, observed at teenagers not presenting known
psychological disorders, are in fact interlinked through an underlying mechanism, which has to
do with the dread of the other of the Other sex3. However, to arrive at this conclusion, we must first
make a few preliminary remarks.
1A conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes an unwarranted conspiracy, generally one
involving an illegal or harmful act carried out by government or other powerful actors. Conspiracy theories often produce
hypotheses that contradict the prevailing understanding of history or simple facts. The term is a derogatory one (Ayto, 1999).
According to the political scientist Barkun, conspiracy theories rely on the view that the universe is governed by design, and
embody three principles: nothing happens by accident, nothing is as it seems, and everything is connected (Barkun, 2003).
Another common feature is that conspiracy theories evolve to incorporate whatever evidence exists against them, so that they
become, as Barkun writes, a closed system that is unfalsifiable, and therefore “a matter of faith rather than proof” (Barkun,
2003, 2011).
2A new work brings a point of view different from ours as for the adolescence and the pornography. It is complementary in
the fact that he proposes the festive point of view of the use of the porn (Bidaud, 2017).
3The judicious article of Janin (2015) addresses this issue from a complementary angle, namely shame, hatred and
pornography, whereby the first two terms can be related to the rapport of the Other sex.
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BACKGROUND
We can begin with the fact that these phenomena are observed
mainly among boys. Hence, there is a gender division. We know
that Freud saw the period of infantile sexuality as radically
different for girls versus boys, and even located their Oedipal
entrance and exit points as mirror images of one another.
However, what happens to this difference in puberty?
For the boy, the end of the Oedipal period is marked by
castration, which is experienced as a possibility when the reality
principle of the existence of two sexes sets in, i.e., a reality that
contradicts the infantile sexual theories that had previously kept
it at bay. Anatomically, we are (born as) girls or boys, rather than
becoming either sex (Beauvoir, 1949). This realization makes
the imaginary register of the infantile sexual theories obsolete
and replaces it with a logical order guaranteed by the father
as the bearer of the organ that gives meaning to what makes
difference in language (the Symbolic and the Real). It is through
the articulation of the reality of the difference of the sexes to the
lack in Other that the function of the phallus (the signifier of the
lack in the Other one) find its validation in language.
For the little boy, the end of the Oedipus complex is therefore
characterized by a change in the reference framework. This is why
Freud speaks about the boy’s dissolution of the Oedipus complex
(Freud, 1924) rather than simply its repression. In this new
world, everyone has their place as either a man or a woman—and
everyone is asked to position themselves clearly.
However, the little girl does not follow the same path. When
she sees the difference between the sexes, she does not prevaricate
and decides that she does not have a penis (Freud, 1925). Prior to
extending this destiny to all other girls, including her mother—
and hence realizing how things are—during the pre-Oedipal
stage the girl is in exactly the same position as the boy, as
emphasized by Freud: they share the same sexual object (the
mother) and the same erogenous zone (the clitoris—equated
with the penis). The shift from the mother to the father as the
sexual object is therefore produced via castration, introducing the
Oedipal complex, which represents the first difference with the
boy’s trajectory4 (the girl does not keep the mother as her sexual
object). From the father, she expects to receive the penis she does
not have (like her mother), and which she converts, through a
symbolic “equation” (Freud, 1925), into having a child from him.
This means that the girl enters the Oedipal stage precisely
through the castration complex—i.e., by taking the reality of
sexual difference into account—contrary to the boy, to whom
the same realization provides a way of exiting and dissolving the
Oedipus complex. For the girl, not only is there no defined exit
from the Oedipus complex (she is not concerned by the threat
of castration, see Freud), but also, importantly, her new logical
position is that of seducing the father, who is a man, in order to
unconsciously fulfill her wish of having a child with him.
4We should stress, as Freud also does, that the girl’s trajectory through the pre-
Oedipal stage and then through puberty can only be tracked via the differences
from the boy’s position. Freud writes: “In conformity with its peculiar nature,
psycho-analysis does not try to describe what a woman is—that would be a task it
could scarcely perform—but sets about enquiring how she comes into being, how
a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual disposition.” (Freud, 1933).
This position of seduction, which the little girl acquires already
as a child, has to be related to what Freud says in Narcissism: An
Introduction, when he describes the “fundamental differences”
between the male and female approach to love, in his text
obviously speaking about the situation post-puberty. He writes:
A comparison of the male and female sexes then shows that
there are fundamental differences between them in respect of
their type of object-choice, although these differences are of
course not universal. Complete object-love of the attachment
type is, properly speaking, characteristic of the male. [. . . ] A
different course is followed in the type of female most frequently
met with, which is probably the purest and truest one. With the
onset of puberty, the maturing of the female sexual organs, which
up till then have been in a condition of latency, seems to bring
about an intensification of the original narcissism, and this is
unfavorable to the development of a true object-choice with its
accompanying sexual overvaluation.” (Freud, 1914)
Thus, the difference between the girl’s and the boy’s position,
already observed by Freud during the infantile period, reappears
again after puberty. The boy’s object choice is anaclitic with an
overvaluation of the sexual object and can in fact turn into a
paralyzing infatuation, akin to the courtly love of the Middle
Ages, where the “object is elevated to the dignity of the Thing,”
as Lacan puts it (Lacan, 2013). As for the girl, she sides with
the Thing, presenting herself as inaccessible, taking a narcissistic
position of seduction. She turns herself into an object impossible
to grasp and thus provokes the boy’s predatory greed. The
arrival of a child, as Freud stresses, can later give her access to
attachment-type love, similar to the choice made by the boy.
We understand that the girl’s narcissistic position of seduction
is a continuation of what she had already experienced toward the
first man of her life, the father of early childhood—which is the
opposite of what we see in the boy. For him, the new situation
of puberty appears as a radical discontinuity. It corresponds to
what we have described, in another work, as the emergence of the
Feminine (Ouvry, 2001)—Feminine with a capital F, to mark its
impossible inscription in what existed before its arrival, i.e., the
infantile.
This emergence of the Other sex (again, for the same reasons,
with a capital O), which did not exist in the infantile period [see
Freud’s discussion of the displacement, prior to puberty, of the
erogenous zone from the clitoris to the vagina (Freud, 1933)]
constitutes the second difference between the girl’s and the boy’s
trajectories. This appearance is an effect of the Real, the “Real of
puberty” (Ouvry, 1999), in other words an experience that cannot
be inscribed in the infantile phallic organization, in language; it
is a discovery of something radically new and unprecedented:
The Feminine. This is what Lacan tries to express through his
famous aphorism: “There is no sexual relationship”5. In other
words, there is no relationship between the sexes in the structure
5This aligns with Freud’s lecture on Femininity (see Note 4). In the same text, he
also stresses that there is no specifically feminine libido, which is another way of
putting of what he has said previously, namely that nothing in language could
express what a woman is, and thus we have no means to describe a feminine
trajectory or feminine libido. His words are later echoed by Lacan’s formulations
(the Woman does not exist, or no signifier exists for a woman’s sex)—or rather, to be
precise, Lacan’s commentary renders Freud’s argument more legible.
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of language, because there is only one signifier for both sexes:
“There is no signifier of the Woman’s sex.”
The boy’s new position is therefore very far from where he
stood before puberty. The world has been transformed, and
before he can adjust this new reality to a figuration that is socially
feasible (i.e., the other of the Other sex), there is a certain delay6.
Time is needed to take on the social rules of relating to the other
outside the incestuous framework of Oedipus (of the infantile).
This intermediary period is also where we situate the phenomena
of porn consumption and conspiracy thinking.
But before we discuss these phenomena, we would like to look
at the logical consequences of what we have just said, specifically
in relation to the girl’s situation and trying to understand the
higher prevalence of this behavior among boys.
For the girl, the emergence of the Real of puberty in fact
happens at a later moment, when she discovers the Other
jouissance of which she is the potential bearer. This discovery
is made the first time she feels this jouissance during sex.
The importance of this moment seems to be confirmed by a
significant clinical fact, namely that certain young men can suffer
a psychotic break when they first make a woman orgasm, due
to the change in the woman’s status. Until this moment, during
the infantile period, it was the father who knew something about
sexuality. And now it is the girl who finds herself the bearer of
this knowledge, via her Other jouissance (effect of the Real of
puberty). In psychosis, where the Name-of-the-Father has not
been symbolized (foreclosure), the boy’s summoning of the father
of the infantile at this very moment necessarily has consequences.
Contrary to the neurotic, where the effect is a certain deposition
of the father (a fall of the great Other and the appearance of the
S(A)), for the psychotic it is instead the hole of the Real that is
suddenly revealed, setting off a cascade of effects that culminate
in a delusional state (Lacan, 2006).
DISCUSSION
We have thus defined the two stages that characterize the first
period post-puberty: for the boy, it is situated between the
immediate experience of the Real of puberty and its “dressing up”
by the other of the Other sex, which necessarily happens at a later
stage; for the girl, it runs from the first physiological changes of
puberty to the discovery of the Other jouissance, when she first
has sex. When we visualize these two positions, we see that they
are, just like for Freud during the infantile period, mirror images
of one another: the woman’s immediate and the man’s delayed
position of seduction; the experience of the Real of puberty,
which is immediate for the boy and delayed for the girl.
Pornography and conspiracy thinking correspond to
this intermediary phase7, specifically among boys. Both
6Cf. Choudhury et al. (2006) “Changes in social behavior are driven by both social
and biological factors. During adolescence, it is likely that peer interactions and
societal influences as well as genetically determined hormonal milieu influence
social behavior. However, since the recent discovery that the brain matures
considerably during adolescence, evidence has emerged pointing to the role of
neural maturation in the development of social cognition during adolescence.”
7Cf. Marty F., La violence comme expression du mal-être à l’adolescence,
Adolescence 2009/4 (n◦ 70), 1007–1017.
manifestations are de facto reactions to the Real of puberty, in
terms of both its truth effect and the absence of knowledge linked
to it (there is no signifier for the woman’s sex). They can be
related to each other using the following equation: pornography
is to the sexual relationship what conspiracy thinking is to
truth, or, pornography is the conspiracy theory of the sexual
non-rapport8. What do we mean by this?
The effect of the Real of puberty bores a hole in the infantile
knowledge guaranteed by the father. This is Lacan’s there is no
sexual relationship we are already familiar with. And it is indeed
knowledge that conspiracy thinking wants to question9: “They
are hiding something from us”, the argument goes, and these
secrets belong to the domain of truth, in this case the truth of
not knowing. However, what is the truth that puberty suddenly
reveals, if not precisely the truth linked to jouissance—which,
by definition escapes knowledge? Conspiracy thought is evidence
of the adolescent’s inevitable dilemma: “Should I accept the new
situation of puberty, at the cost of revealing the non-knowledge
that the Oedipal fiction helped conceal? Can I really leave the
world of childhood so easily?”
On the other hand, pornographic images revive, as a kind of
resurgence of the infantile, the knowledge about sexuality that
was there to be had, the knowledge of the Oedipal promise, which
is guaranteed by the father—the imaginary father of the infantile
period, the father of the infantile phallic stage. In this case, this
knowledge [savoir] is obtained by “seeing it [ça voir]”—in other
words, by seeing the sexual relationship as if it indeed existed,
as if there really was something to see, even though it radically
escapes representation, again and again10. In today’s society, this
strategy is greatly facilitated by the internet, which offers a whole
new range of viewing possibilities11.
The idea that knowledge should somehow be preserved (that
the infantile theory should be “saved,” like data on a disk) echoes
the approach of the conspiracy thinker, his quest for a true
knowledge that would give meaning to the official discourses,
be they journalistic, historical and/or academic. These same
discourses are in fact trying to circumvent the idea of a total
8Rob Brotherton, Suspicious Minds, Bloomsbury Sigma, 2017-01-03, 304
pages, ISBN-10: 1472915631, quoted by Lynne alcolm, http://www.abc.net.au/
radionational/programs/allinthemind/the-psychology-of-conspiracy-theories/
7177962,17 February 2016: “This is something that we all suffer from, not just in
the context of conspiracy theories, but we all want to feel like we have control over
our circumstances and that we understand what’s going on around us. When that
feeling of control is stripped away for whatever reason... then we look for other
sources of control, what is called compensatory control.”
9Cf. Sander van der Linden (London School of Economics and Political Science,
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment),
What a hoax, Scientific American Mind 41, September/October 2013
(Mind.ScientificAmerican.com): “A strong distrust of authority would be
one such overarching ideological lens. In a belief system in which authorities are
fundamentally untrustworthy, alternative—even outlandish and contradictory—
explanations for troubling events can seem plausible, as long as they are consistent
with a skepticism toward the powers that be.”
10Like those who engage in watching pornography and always repeat the same
scene—desperately fleeting, desperately empty.
11There is of course nothing new about this phenomenon: just think of Antoine
Doisnell in 400 Blows (Truffaut, 1959), when he and his friend are looking at
the photographs in mail-order catalogues, where scantily-clad women become the
subject of laughs, looks, research and frustration.
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knowledge, precisely by surfing on the non-knowledge they have
embraced. They can dress up the current events or history or any
other knowledge through a discourse of semblances, a semblant
of truth that, as they know, by nature escapes them. In this way,
they express what the other of the Other sex has come to conceal
for them, namely the effect of the Real of puberty that we have
discussed, which remains inaccessible to knowledge.
And this is what conspiracy thinking refuses and rejects,
calling instead for a total knowledge that would be the truth.
This “underground” knowledge could unmask the truth of the
semblant, i.e., what psychoanalytic theory identifies as castration.
I will use a clinical vignette to illustrate my argument. It
concerns a teenager with an interest in conspiracy theories,
whose a family configuration where the mystic father blocker by
a phallic mother has deprived him, since his childhood, from
access to the symbolic phallic function, thus preventing him
from discovering the Other jouissance of puberty. By resorting
to watching porn videos, he is able to maintain an infantile
auto-erotic sexuality through masturbation, while women in fact
remain a source of dread.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
With “seeing it” [ça voir] and knowledge [savoir], we have
two valences of the same principle: applied to sexuality
(pornography) and to truth (conspiracy theories). Both attest to
the same refusal of the emergence of the Other jouissance, the
same attempt to avoid non-knowledge, non-sense, non-truth (the
truth is a lying truth, Lacan said)—an attitude that in fact assumes
a destitution of being12, of the being of truth that is the father of
the infantile period.
Both these valences must be transitory, marking simply a
stage in the complicated passage of the boy—and of some girls,
who assume the masculine sexual position. Only clinical analysis
can identify situations where there is a true risk of pathological
fixation. At a time of hardening attitudes and growing fears
(which after the attacks of 2015 are of course legitimate), we must
remain even more rigorous in our clinical approach, which alone
can help us contain our emotions and not become overwhelmed
by them, a risk that easily leads to premature warnings and false
alarms.
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Concept of the Relation
Subject—Other
David Schrans*
Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Ghent University,
Ghent, Belgium
In this conceptual analysis we discuss the sociological influences on Lacan’s
conceptualization of the relation between the subject and the other. In his writings
predating World War II Lacan defines this relation in terms of identification. However, from
1953 onward he defines it in terms of the subject of speech and the Symbolic Other. It is a
popular notion to characterize this change in terms of a radical breach, influenced by the
reading of Lévi-Strauss. However, through a close reading of both Lacan’s early writings
and their Durkheimian influences we will demonstrate that what has changed, is Lacan’s
conceptualization of the relation between the individual and the collective. This change
was gradual rather than sudden. Moreover, it can be situated within the theoretical
evolution of the contiguous fields of sociology, anthropology and psychoanalysis. Thus
we reject the idea of a breach within his own thought and with what came before
him. We will establish our point through a summary of how the relation between the
individual and the collective was theorized before Lacan. Durkheim conceptualized
this relation as dual: the individual and the collective are radically separated. Mauss
attempted to unify the field of anthropology through the holistic concept of the total
man. In Lévi-Straus’s formalization the individual becomes a function within a structured,
Symbolic system. Finally, a reading of Lacan’s publications concerning the notion of the
logic of the collective will testify to his attempts at formulating a notion of the subject that
asserts itself against this collective while at the same time retaining its nature of a logical
function. This is the conundrum that Lacan will confront time and again throughout his
teachings. Lévi-Strauss merely provided him with the methodological tools of structural
anthropology that helped him refine the interrogations that he had already begun.
Keywords: Lacan, individual, collective, Durkheim, Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, subjective assertion, family complexes
INTRODUCTION
A popular notion among Lacanian scholars is the occurrence of a radical shift from a Lacan
preoccupied with the Imaginary order to a Lacan focused on the Symbolic. Where the former is
centered around his theory on the mirror stage (Lacan, 2006 [1949]), the latter has come about
through his reading of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (Zafiropoulos, 2001; Zafiropulos,
2010 [2003]) and is inaugurated by his presentation entitled The function and field of speech and
language in psychoanalysis in 1953 (Lacan, 2006 [1953b]).
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In this paper we reject the notion of a radical shift from the
Imaginary to the Symbolic. What is more, we defend the idea that
Lacan’s evolving conceptual framework can be situated within a
broader intellectual history of anthropological and sociological
thought concerning the relation between the individual and the
collective. Hence, we neither accept a breach within his own
thought, nor with what came before him.
The relation between the individual and the collective
has occupied psychoanalysis since Freud’s writings on group
psychology (Freud, 1955 [1921]) and has been carried on by
psychoanalysts such as Bion and Rickman, both of whom have
influenced Lacan (2001 [1947]). However, it has also been
one of the tenets of sociology and anthropology. The notion
of individuality and the influence of the collective is central
in Durkheim’s work, which ended in an impasse where both
were radically separated. Marcel Mauss attempted to resolve
this impasse with his notion of the total man and Lévi-Strauss
formalized this notion and its implications. In this paper we will
focus on the period between Lacan’s writings on the family, where
this relation is based on identification and heavily influenced by
Durkheim, and his writings on the Symbolic, where it is based on
language and heavily influenced by Mauss and Lévi Strauss.
DURKHEIM AND LACAN ON THE FAMILY
As both Freud (1955 [1921]) and Lacan (2001 [1938]) noted,
the foundations for man’s social life, and thus his relation to the
collective, are laid down in the family. Zafiropoulos (2001) states
that Lacan was influenced by Durkheim in his writings on the
family. We will therefore subject Durkheim’s teachings on the
family to a close reading and compare it with Lacan’s paper on
the family complexes. Finally, we will confront our reading with
Zafiropoulos’ interpretation, which states that Lacan eventually
diverted from Durkheim through a new interpretation of the
notion of the father inspired by Lévi-Strauss.
Durkheim on the Contraction of the Family
Durkheim stated that the family is a social institution subject to a
cultural evolution, with the conjugal family as its final conclusion.
It is not merely a biological affair, but has moral and judicial
implications which are protected by the collective in which the
family is embedded. The evolution of the institution of the family
is determined by what Durkheim (1975 [1892]) calls the law of
contraction: throughout history the number of relatives which
constitute a family has progressively diminished. The historical
starting point of the family is the clan. In this social structure
a totem or alleged forefather is responsible for the creation of
society and forms the center of family life. Members of a clan
were both relatives and fellow citizens (Lamanna, 2002). In these
societies there was no notion of an individual and the different
members of the group were hardly distinguished from one
another. Only when the clan ceased to be nomadic and started
to attach value to the territory on which it lived, did family and
clan become two separate entities. A broad, amorphous family
system became distinguished from a political and territorial clan
organization (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). Families with a patrilineal
or matrilineal structure originated within the clan (Durkheim,
1975 [1892]). A further contraction was realized by the agnatic
families, which were smaller and more egalitarian than the
totem based families. These families were centered around shared
possessions, rather than religion and could be either patrilineal or
matrilineal.
This differs from the Roman, patriarchal families, which
were strictly patrilineal and governed by the principle of patria
potestas. The father represented the group and his authority over
its members and possessions was absolute. This contrasts with
the German paternal family where paternal dominance was less
strict. The son could emancipate himself and leave the family on
his own accord.
The conjugal family is the family structure discerned by
Durkheim in French society of his day. It is a further contraction
of the paternal rather than of the patriarchal family as the
latter was too strict to allow for any further contraction. The
only permanent elements within this system are husband and
wife, although secondary zones of kinship (i.e., relatives up to
the sixth degree), as remnants of the previous structures, still
existed. A child is dependent on its father until it is married. As
Zafiropoulos (2001) correctly points out, with the contraction
of the family the disciplinary rights of the father have greatly
diminished. However, the interference of the state has increased.
In France as of 1889 the father can even be set out of this paternal
rights by the state. According to Durkheim, state intervention
was a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the conjugal
family. Whereas kinship relations in societies constituted by
patriarchal families could only be broken off under the authority
of the father, in the case of those based on the conjugal family the
state must provide its approval in cases of divorce or adoption.
Durkheim warns us however that with the contraction of the
family, individuality and the pursuit of purely individual goals
have increased. When the individual “looks for his purpose
within himself, he falls into a state of moral misery which leads
him to suicide” (Durkheim, 1975 [1892], p. 236). Yet, according
to Lamanna (2002) Durkheim is not necessarily pessimistic
where it concerns the increase of individuality and the decrease
of paternal authority. The former gave rise to individual freedom
and the latter consolidated the ties between the members of
society through state intervention.
Lacan on the Family Complexes
According to Zafiropoulos (2001) Lacan was heavily influenced
by Durkheim’s writings on the family when he wrote his own
contribution on the family complexes (Lacan, 2001 [1938]).
Lacan states that the process of subjective development is
structured by three fundamental complexes which center around
three imagoes: the weaning complex with the imago of the
mother, the complex of intrusion with the imago of the rival
and the Oedipus complex with the imago of the father. The
structuring of these complexes takes place within the family as
a historically determined institution. However, in our modern,
Western families (for which Lacan uses the term “conjugal
families”) the father has become progressively absent due to
the “contraction of the institution of the family” (Lacan, 2001
[1938], p. 27). As a consequence the Oedipus complex inWestern
society has started to falter, which explains the burgeoning
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of modern forms of psychopathology such as the character
neuroses.
The first complex the human infant encounters, the weaning
complex, is “themost primitive complex in psychic development”
and “forms the basis of the most archaic and stable sentiments
uniting the individual and the family” (Lacan, 2001 [1938], p. 30,
trans. Cormac Gallagher). This complex originates from the
separation of the infant from the womb, which, for man, is always
a premature separation. The repercussion of its prematurity is
the universally shared call of the young human for the social
group, and in the first place the family, which is in fact a call for
some sort of social function which meets the needs emanating
from this vital insufficiency of the first years. The first form this
social connection with the outside world takes on is the imago
of the mother as a sublimation of the mother, a bringing into
form and recognizing her as an answer to the vital insufficiency.
It is the first connection to the other the infant makes. It is also
the connection upon which all the consecutive connections with
the other will be made. A successful transition of the weaning
complex is therefore paramount to social development.
As important as the imago of the mother is, it is marked
by a strange ambivalence. The longing for the maternal imago
can become a longing for the state before birth, and as such
instigate the death drive. Because of this ambivalence the lure of
death, of a return to the tranquil, inanimate state of life before
birth, remains present in the ambiguous form of the imago of
the mother. The complex of intrusion offers a solution to these
summons of death through a confrontation with the double,
archetypally represented in the form of the brother. This complex
roused by the first realization of the presence of a sibling, and
of the feelings of jealousy concerning the mother this provokes.
Lacan cautions us that we must not confuse human jealousy
with biological rivalry. For at its most fundamental, jealousy
presupposes mental identification. Lacan considers identification
as primary, the aggressiveness it provokes as secondary. Lacan’s
description of the complex of intrusion is an early form of his
theory on the mirror stage (Lacan, 2006 [1949]). He states that
through the recognition of its own image in themirror the human
infant regains the unity it once experienced in utero.
At the same time the body is experienced as unity, the world,
which was equally perceived as fragmented, is organized by
reflecting the forms of the body. Consequently, Lacan declares
the mirror image to be a good symbol for the reality as it is
experienced at that moment in human development. The world
in this phase is a narcissistic world in which the image of the
double is central and there is no place for others (as truly “other”).
Indeed, the experience of the other as a mirror image does not
help the subject to break through the affective isolation caused by
its prematurity. However, as the formation of the ego through
identification with an external image occurs, the drama of
jealousy and sibling rivalry is being played out. Identificationwith
the unweaned sibling provokes aggressiveness because it triggers
the maternal imago and thus the desire for death. This is why
Lacan states that aggressiveness is secondary to identification:
the identification with the other awakens the primary masochism
(i.e., the death drive) of the weaning complex. However, this
primary masochism can be overcome if it is transformed into
sadism in the form of rivalry. Through identification the infant
can fix one of the poles of primary masochism and turn it
into aggressiveness toward the unweaned sibling. “Thus the
non-violence of the primordial form of suicide engenders the
violence of the imaginary murder of the sibling” (Lacan, 2001
[1938], p. 40, trans. Cormac Gallagher). Consequently the other
is recognized as truly other. This is why Lacan states that jealousy
is the archetype of all social sentiments. However, the complex
of intrusion can also end in an imaginary impasse where the ego
and the alter-ego are not distinguished. This can lead to serious
forms of psychopathology (e.g., paranoia).
Finally, the Oedipus complex installs two fundamental,
psychological instances: repression and the Ego-ideal. Contrary
to Freudian doctrine, which recognizes the father as the primary
agent of castration, Lacan states that the original cause for
repression stems from the lure of death present in the imago
of the mother. The sexual desires of the Oedipus complex re-
activate the desire for the mother and thus the ancient death
drive which is thereupon repressed. The father, as the one who
opposes this desire for the mother, figures only as a secondary
source for repression. As such, repression paves the way for yet
another form of identification with the rival, but this time as an
Ego-ideal: “the ideal of virility in the boy, and in the girl the ideal
of virginity” (Lacan, 2001 [1938], p. 56, trans. Cormac Galagher).
However, Lacan remarks that not every society accords the same
place to the father and its successful development depends largely
on the extent to which both the repressive and the sublimatory
functions are united in the imago of the father. In the Trobriand
of Melanesia, for example, the repressive function is attributed
to the maternal uncle, the sublimatory function to the biological
father. The effect is a relative absence of neurosis and a great
rigidity on the level of cultural productions. In our Western
society “the father [...] is always lacking in some way or another,
whether he be absent or humiliated, divided or a sham” (Lacan,
2001 [1938], p. 61, trans. Cormac Galagher) and the reason for
this Lacan finds in “the same social progress thatmakes the family
evolve toward the conjugal form [and] increasingly submits it to
individual variations” (Lacan, 2001 [1938], p. 74, trans. Cormac
Galagher). When this happens the dialectic of sublimation is
negated and libidinal energy exhausted, which eventually leads
to character neurosis.
Zafiropoulos (2001) states that Lacan’s views betray a
Durkheimian influence because he links the degradation of
the Oedipus complex to the contraction of the family. The
author claims that Lacan is strictly non-Freudian as long as
he is influenced by Durkheim. In Totem and Taboo Freud
(1953 [1912]) stated that human society commenced with the
murder of the primal father. As such, the degraded, dead
father is at the foundation of every human society and not a
historical contingency. Only with the discovery of structural
anthropology through the writings of Lévi-Strauss would Lacan
be able to recognize the structurally lacking father function
and commence his return to Freud. Although we acknowledge
the presence of Durkheimian influences in Lacan’s text from
1938, we find Zafiropoulos’ arguments on his transition from
Durkheimian/non-Freudian to structuralist/Freudian to leave a
lot to be desired. First, although he cites Lévi-Strauss’ work as
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being responsible for this sudden change in Lacan’s thinking
Zafiropoulos never actually demonstrates how this work led to
an interpretation of the father as structurally lacking. When
discussing this change, his main reference is French writer Paul
Claudel and his play Le père humilié. Second, we have seen
that with the contraction of the family there has been a shift
in authority from the father to the state. Even if Durkheim
writes about the degradation of the father, he takes into account
other forms of authority and law. When discussing Durkheim’s
views on the relation between the individual and the collective,
we will see that this shift can be explained by an evolution
in this relation. And last but certainly not least, we have
difficulty accepting that such a slow and arduous process as the
evolution of one’s thinking, Lacan’s in this case, is marked by
sudden revolutions. During an analysis something can befall the
patient and create a new insight—but every analyst knows that
revolutions are very rare in the consulting room. There is always
the process of working through to take into account. Therefore,
it is more interesting to look at the historical development
that links Durkheim to Lacan through Lévi-Strauss, because
the latter wouldn’t have been possible without Durkheim. In
what follows, we will present the reader with the evolution of
the conceptualization of the relation between the subject and
the Other (in sociological terms: between the individual and
the collective) from Durkheim to Lacan. This point of view
will better allow us to link the gradual evolution of Lacan’s
thinking to the developments in sociology and anthropology that
preceded him.
DURKHEIM AND THE OPPOSITION
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
In The Division of Labor in Society Durkheim (1984 [1893])
describes two forms of relation between the individual and
the collective: mechanical solidarity, a relation based on
similarity, and organic solidarity, a relation based on difference.
Between these two forms he describes an evolution. Primitive
societies are primarily based on mechanical solidarity. The
members of these societies are hardly differentiated. This form
of solidarity is represented in “the totality of beliefs and
sentiments common to the average members of a society”
which then “forms a determinate system with a life of its
own” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 39). This system is the
collective or common consciousness, which cannot be located
within a single physical substratum but is present in its
entirety in every member of society. Nevertheless, it exists
independent from these individuals: “Individuals pass on, but it
abides” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). It does not change from one
generation to the other, but links the different generations to
each other. The origin of the collective unconscious lies in the
confrontation of shared feelings and representations. Central to
Durkheim’s theory on the collective consciousness is the notion
of vitality. Consciousness, whether it be individual or collective,
derives its force, its vitality, from strong representations. The
confrontation of shared representations within a society gives
these collective representations a greater vitality, which largely
surpasses the vitality of individual representations. This way of
conceptualizing consciousness has several consequences. First,
Durkheim concludes a split within the human mind between
an individual and a collective consciousness where the latter
appears as “an echo resounding within ourselves of a force
that is alien, one moreover superior to that which we are
ourselves” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 56). Second, because
of its greater vitality the collective consciousness appears as a
moral force. It is also the strongest form of authority. When
a certain representation or act goes against these collective
representations, against the moral order and greatest authority,
this provokes a heavy emotional response from the group.
Therefore, Durkheim states that penal law is the most common
expression of the collective consciousness. Last, it also implies
that this authority is not a social function, which receives a
relative importance according to the society in which it occurs,
but represents the society as a whole. For example, in the Roman,
patriarchal families the father did not incarnate a specific social
function but represented the group and its moral ascendancy as
such.
Whereas mechanical solidarity is based on similarity, organic
solidarity is based on difference and specialization. More
specifically, it is based on what Durkheim calls the “division of
labor.” As a society grows larger and more complex the functions
the different members fulfill become more diversified. This in
turn increases the degree of individuality within that society.
This radically changes the relation between the members because
now they all depend upon one another (like the organs that
constitute a body), whereas in societies based on mechanical
solidarity there was virtually no differentiation and everymember
could easily be replaced by any other. According to Durkheim
the standard expression of this form of solidarity is not penal law,
but contractual law. The relation between the members of these
societies are consolidated through contract. However, this does
not mean that such societies are merely based on free exchange
where relations are fleeting and exist only for the duration of
the contract. The state regulates and harmonizes the different
(professional, domestic, etc.) relations between the individuals by
offering a legal framework within which contracts can be made.
Moreover, the state is as dependent on the different members of
society as they are on it and on each other. Society no longer treats
its members as things over which it has rights, but as cooperating
members on which it depends and with regards to whom it
has certain obligations. Thus Durkheim explains the degraded
authority of the father, on which Lacan based his theories on
the Oedipus complex in 1938, through a change in the nature
of the relation between the individual and the collective. In the
patriarchal societies of yore, members were hardly differentiated
and the father represented the group as a superhuman authority.
In modern societies based on the division of labor this authority
shifts to the state as a governing instance which is as dependent
on the individuals as they are on the collective. That is why
Durkheim states that “each time that we find ourselves faced
with a mechanism of government endowed with great authority
we must seek the reason not in the particular situation of those
governing, but in the nature of the societies that they govern”
(Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 143–144).
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Even though he discerns an evolution toward individuality,
Durkheim continues to stress the importance of the collective
representations and their effect on the individual. In a paper
written with his nephew, Marcel Mauss (Durkheim and Mauss,
1903), he describes the impact of social morphology (i.e., the
composition and structure of a society) on the classification
systems used by the members of a given society. Whether it is
a primitive classification of plants based on an animistic belief,
or a scientific classification based on genetics, man categorizes
the world that surrounds him in representational systems that
have a certain structure and hierarchy. Durkheim states that
these systems of classification are shaped by a process influenced
by all sorts of external elements, the most fundamental of
which is the social organization of a society. Therefore, many
of the primitive classification systems reflect the morphology
of the society from which they originate. However, once these
representational systems have gained their independence from
the social structures from whence they sprung, they function
according to their own logic.
In conclusion we can state that Durkheim’s collective
consciousness contains its own collective representations, has
its own vitality and functions according to its own laws. What
is more, Durkheim (1924 [1898]) maintains a strict separation
between the collective and the individual. The collective
conscious exists both as an independent entity and resides in
its entirety in every individual, albeit in an unconscious form.
He deduces this from the fact that the collective representations
appear to come from outside the individual and impose
themselves in a coercive manner, under the form of moral
obligations.
Karsenti (1997) states that Durkheim’s conceptualization
brings sociology in an awkward position. He has materialized the
collective (chosification), made it into a collective consciousness
that is unconscious on an individual level. As such, sociology
can only study the social in the light of this irreducible dualism,
where the collective has a certain ascendancy over the individual.
This is due to the fact that for Durkheim a representation
can only exist if it represents something to somebody. In order
to allow for the idea of an unconscious representation he
has to dissociate the notion of representation and individual
consciousness. Subsequently, he postulates the existence of a
collective consciousness that exists alongside the individual
consciousness, because only then the collective representations
can be unconscious for us individuals but not as such. It is
only afterwards that these collective representations appear,
not as the product of some impersonal subject, but as the
effect of their insertion on the level of the limited, individual
consciousness. Thus the notion of representation lead Durkheim
into an impasse where the individual and the collective are strictly
dissociated.
MAUSS AND THE TOTAL MAN
Mauss will furnish sociology with a new object: the total man
(l’homme total). In a shift from sociology to anthropology, which
studies man in all his aspects (social, individual, biological, etc.),
he will rectify Durkheim’s decentering of the individual and
reunite the individual and the collective. The social forms but
a single aspect of this total man. Maus’s is no longer a dualistic
approach, but one that focuses on the complex and dialectical
relation between the individual and the collective in an effort
to expose its underlying rules and structures, rather than its
representations. Mauss defends the notion of a gradual difference
between individual and collective. Individual representations can
permeate the collective and vice versa. Every individual possesses
a fragment of the totality of collective representations, which are
moreover marked by the singularity of the individual.
He finds one of the most convincing examples of these
transitions between collective and individual in the physical and
psychological effects on the individual of the collective suggestion
of death. Mauss (1950 [1926]) describes how in certain primitive
cultures in Australia and New-Zealand individuals die because of
magical or moral causes suggested by collectively shared beliefs.
The individual dies not because of some physical disorder or any
personal conviction or deed, but because of the way in which the
collective manifests itself on an individual level—or, which comes
down to the same inMauss’ view, the way in which the individual
positions itself within the collective. Subjective consciousness and
the will to live pale in comparison to the collective necessity to
die. However, this is not, as it would be in a Durkheimian logic,
because the collective representations act on the individual as
an external cause, but because the individual assumes a given
position within the social structure of the tribe. Hence, this state
often coincides with a breach of community. Through magic or
the committing of a crime the individual breaks off with those
forces which had up until then supported it. For example, the
Wakelbura who eats prohibited game will become sick, consume
himself and eventually die while gasping out the sounds of the
animal in question1.
According to Mauss the destructive effect of this collective
suggestion takes place on the joint between man’s social and
biological nature, albeit minimally mediated by his individual
consciousness. Karsenti (1997) states that this is only possible
if one supposes that the collective resides within the individual,
alongside the individual will to live. Mauss explains this
phenomenon with the assumption that psychological, physical
and social forces coincide in the individual, and rejects the idea
of a strict dissociation between the collective and the individual.
As such, this phenomenon is structured along these three axes:
(1) an individually experienced conviction to die responds to (2)
a collectively shared suggestion to die, upon which (3) a physical
event follows.
Contrary to Durkheim, who took the collective
representations to be the primary object of sociology, Mauss
wants to study the total individual through anthropology. He
defends a return to man in his most concrete form. This is
1Lévi-Strauss (1963 [1949]), in his paper on “The Effectiveness of Symbols,” gives
an interesting pendant of this phenomenon. He explains how a shaman cures a
woman experiencing difficulties during labor by connecting her symptoms with
the collectively shared mythology, which has an effect on these physical symptoms.
This paper has heavily influenced Lacan in his interpretation of the Symbolic Order
(Zafiropulos, 2010 [2003]).
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a psychological and biological individual who appropriates a
fragment of the collective in a process called socialization. Man
is totally individual and totally collective. Moreover, both orders
are subject to the same logic and the same laws. This totality
can equally be found in language. Sociology and anthropology
would benefit from adapting the methods of linguistics, because
they form a science that studies a phenomenon that is both
physiological, psychological and social. Lévi-Strauss will be the
one who takes up the challenge and applies the methods of
linguistics to social structures.
LÉVI-STRAUSS AND THE SYMBOLIC
FUNCTION
For our discussion of Lévi-Strauss’ elaboration of Mauss’
symbolic framework, we will rely heavily of his Introduction to the
work of Marcel Mauss (Lévi-Strauss, 1987 [1950]). In this succinct
analysis of the latter’s body of work, Lévi-Strauss addresses the
question of the subjective implication of the anthropologist in
his observations of other societies, which we consider to be a
specific formulation of the question with regard to the relation
between the individual and the collective. Mauss’ concept of the
total man implies that the anthropologist, as an observer, is of
the same nature as his object of observation. Not only does he
approach this society as an object of study, he also participates as
a subject in this so-called object. Moreover, he has to externalize
his subjective experience in order to present it in a formalized
manner. This task would be impossible if the subjective and the
objective would not meet at a given point.
Lévi-Strauss is prompted to formulate an answer to this
question by an incongruity he perceives in Mauss’ essay on the
gift (Mauss, 2011 [1925]). In this seminal work, Mauss describes
the principles of the exchange of gifts in different cultures. The
study yields several observed principles, which can be found
among very differing cultures across the globe: the obligation
to give, to receive and to reciprocate. Moreover, many cultures
formulate an explanation for these principles in terms of their
own systems of belief. For example, the Maori of New Zealand
refer to the hau. This is a spiritual essence which follows the gift
wherever it goes and has the tendency to return to its origins.
Therefore, if A offers a gift to B, and B passes this gift on to C, then
C has to reciprocate to A for the hau present in the gift needs to
be returned to its original source. However, Lévi-Strauss points
out that we should never take these indigenous explanations
at face value. A concept such as the hau is an element within
a given symbolic system governing the exchange of gifts and
as such should be scrutinized as to its function within this
system.
He compares the hau and similar concepts with algebraic
notions, which represent an undefined value of meaning but
are themselves completely devoid of meaning. Their function
is to reconcile the gap between signifier and signified. They are
an attempt to restore a previously lost unity. As such, they do
not represent an affective value, as Mauss arguments, but have
a logical function and are to be situated on the same level as
the relation they attempt to construct, which is a symbolic level.
Whether something, an object, belongs to one person or the
other is but a derivative of the original, relational character of
the underlying reality. Indeed, according to Lévi-Strauss and
in line with Mauss’ own holistic approach of the total man,
the underlying reality of these obligations and their uniting
principle of the hau is the totality of the exchange. This totality is
reflected in certain linguistic expressions used by some primitive
cultures where giving and receiving, or borrowing and lending,
are designated by one and the same word. As in any form of
communication, the different terms implied (i.e., sender, receiver,
gift, or message) are but secondary elements which divide an
underlying, unified reality.
Lévi-Strauss stresses the relational character of the symbolic.
Through the use of discrete elements it attempts to differentiate
this previously undifferentiated reality. Terms such as subject and
object, individual and collective, I and other, are differentiated
through the use of the symbolic system. This is especially palpable
in the principles present in the exchange of gifts. However, in
such a system there is hardly any place for an individual separate
from the collective. Indeed, Lévi-Strauss stresses the fact that
in Mauss’ study of the notion of the person (Mauss, 1938) the
individual is relegated to a logical function within the symbolic
system—which can only be collective.
LACAN: THE LOGIC OF THE COLLECTIVE
AND THE ASSERTION OF THE SUBJECT
We have already discussed Lacan’s approach of the relation to
the other in terms of identification, which is ubiquitous in his
paper on the family complexes. However, the events of World
War II have brought the dire effects of identification to Lacan’s
attention (Roudinesco, 1997 [1993]). Moreover, a visit to England
in 1947 acquainted him with the approach of Rickman and Bion
in working with groups of mental patients during the war. Their
views of group therapy were based on a conceptualization of the
group in terms of horizontal identification (Bion and Rickman,
1943)2.
In 1953 Lacan wrote a letter to his ex-analyst, Rudolph
Loewenstein, where he claims he has reached a point where
he feels himself “a man more certain of his duties and his
destiny” who has a growing assurance of what he has to say on
“an experience of which only the last few years have permitted
[him] to recognize the nature” (Lacan, 1976 [1953a], p. 132,
our translation). This also marks the year of his Rome Discourse
(Lacan, 2006 [1953b]), a text in which Lévi-Strauss’ influence
can all but be denied. However, in the years preceding it we
see Lacan as a seeker, attempting not only to conceptualize a
relation between the subject and the other that does not merely
rely on identification, but also to formalize this relation in a
logical system. Traces of his quest can be found in his papers
on the logic of the collective (Lacan, 2001 [1945–1946], 2006
[1945]).
In a rare and rather dense paper Lacan (2001 [1945–
1946]) presents us with a mathematical riddle which reveals
the principle of a logical connection between a group and the
2This contrasts with the Freudian point of view, where the vertical identification
with the leader takes precedence over the horizontal identifications between the
members of the group (Freud, 1955 [1921]).
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individuals that constitute it. We are offered 12 visually identical
coins, amongst which one can be discerned on grounds of its
weight. We do not know whether this coin, the “bad coin,” is
lighter or heavier than the others. Its quality does not concern
us, the only thing that concerns us is the notion of its absolute
difference. Furthermore, we have at our disposal a classic pair of
scales. Our task is to discern the “bad coin” with a maximum
of three separate weighings. We lack the space to expound
the complete solution to this riddle (an excellent translation
of Lacan’s article can be found on-line). We will content
ourselves with a brief summary of Lacan’s proceedings and his
conclusions.
After he has illustrated the solution to the problem as it is
presented, Lacan ups the ante by adding another coin to the
collection. Can we still solve the riddle if we have to discern the
“bad coin” among 13 coins? This can indeed be done, provided
that we use another procedure than the one applied to a collection
of 12 pieces. Moreover, this new procedure permits Lacan to
elaborate a formula that allows one to find the “bad piece” among
a maximum amount of coins with the aid of a minimum amount
of weighings. One merely has to follow three simple principles:
first, one has to isolate a piece that is free of any suspicion; next,
one brings about a discord in the distribution of suspicion (e.g.,
the amount of coins that is suspected to be lighter than the others
is greater than the amount that is suspected to be heavier); finally,
one discriminates between the remaining pieces until one has
found the “bad piece.”
Without the complete solution at one’s disposal this will
undoubtedly sound complicated—and it is. However, the
important thing to retain is the fact that this collection cannot
be defined with the aid of any external criterium. There is
no unifying characteristic other than the uniformity of the
collection. The only way we can discern the “bad coin” is through
a comparison with the other coins. Even when, in the first
step, we isolate a coin that serves as a norm with which to
compare the other coins, this is done through a comparison
with the coins already present. In other words, the absolute
difference that constitutes the individual in this collective can
only be reached through a comparison with the others. Moreover,
this relation between the individual and the collective can be
formalized through a logical formula. As such, Lacan can sustain
the notion of a separation between the individual and the
collective (which was too radical in Durkheim’s case) while at the
same time formalizing this relation as a logical function (which
was Lévi-Strauss’ aim). In a paper that chronologically precedes
this one, but which logically forms its consequence, Lacan
(2006 [1945]) formulates how the subject asserts itself against
the collective.
Lacan presents us with yet another riddle. Three prisoners
are summoned by the warden who promises to grant one his
freedom if he successfully stands a test. He presents them with
five disks: three white and two black. Each prisoner will have a
disc attached to his back such that he himself cannot see the color
of his own disc, but can perfectly observe the disks the other two
are wearing.Moreover, they are not allowed to communicate. The
purpose of the test is to infer what color disc one is wearing based
on logical reason. Thereupon, the warden distributes the white
disks among the prisoners. After staring at each other for some
time, all three prisoners head for the warden. What happened3.
In the ideal solution one prisoner, A, starts from the
hypothesis that he is black. Within this condition another
prisoner, B, could make the same hypothesis and easily come to
the conclusion. If he were indeed black, the third prisoner, C,
would see two black disks and leave at once. However, C does
not move at once. Therefore, B can conclude that he is not black
and leave. Yet, B does not leave either. Thus, A can only conclude
that his initial hypothesis (“I am black”) was false. And because
in reality all three prisoners followed the same path of reasoning,
they all leave once they have reached this conclusion.
Lacan is hard pressed to point out the sophistic nature of this
solution. For if they all leave at the same time, they all must doubt
their initial conclusion which was based on the fact that the others
remained standing still. Therefore, after they have all left, their
doubts will make them all pause. This scenario is reminiscent of
Achilles and the tortoise, and one can wonder whether they will
ever reach the warden. Lacan arguments that they will, and that
they only need two stops to come to an absolute, logical certainty.
For the first halt objectifies B’s conclusion: if C had seen two
black disks, he would never pause. The second stop objectifies A’s
conclusion: if B pauses a second time, that means the first pause
was not conclusive for him (which it would have been had A been
black). Thus, Lacan concludes, these temporal hesitations are a
necessity in order to arrive at a logically sound argument.
The introduction of time in order to arrive at a logical
conclusion does not agree with the spatial nature of classical logic,
which is based on the universality of certain forms. One does
not need time: either one sees the solution or one does not see
it. However, Lacan states that in this logic of the collective three
logical times can be discerned. The first is what he call the instant
of the glance. The riddle would be limited to this time if two black
disks were distributed, its solution summarized in the following
statement: “Being opposite two blacks, one knows that one is
white,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 167). The subject of this statement
is the impersonal “one” of every logical statement. This is also the
subject present in Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity: the “one”
that represents the collective consciousness and is expressed
through penal law. Indeed, according to Durkheim the latter
does not imply that “I do not perform a certain act because it
is punishable,” but rather that “it is punishable, because one does
not perform such acts.” However, this subject is also present in
the reasoning of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss as it can be compared to
notions such as the hau. It merely serves a logical function within
a closed, symbolic system. Yet Lacan has something different in
mind, namely a subject that asserts itself against the collective. In
order to arrive at this assertion, the subject has to encounter the
other.
Indeed, the situation where one prisoner sees two black disks
does not present itself. Therefore, a second time is inaugurated
with the following (intuitive) statement: “Were I a black, the
two whites that I see would waste no time realizing that they
are whites,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 168). In this time, one
3We will only scratch the surface of this text. For a thorough discussion of the
riddle, its solution and implications, see Hoens (in press).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 61475
Schrans Lacan on the Assertion of the Subject and the Logic of the Collective
prisoner (A in our example) makes himself the object of the
gaze of the other two and puts himself in their position. In this
case, time is necessary for the other two to reach a conclusion
because it is based on the fact that the other stands still (which
is interpreted as a hesitation). Lacan calls this the time for
comprehending. The subject of this time is a subject determined
by the reciprocity of the other. The relation between these subject
is of an imaginary nature, meaning that the prisoners mirror each
other (Aucremane, 1985).
The time for comprehending also puts every subject under
a logical pressure. Indeed, how long does this comprehending
take? If A hesitates to come to a conclusion and the other two
precede him, he will never ever be able to reach any sound
conclusion because it can only be based on their standing still.
Therefore, a necessary moment of concluding interrupts the time
for comprehending through the following statement: “I hasten
to declare myself a white, so that these whites, whom I consider
in this way, do not precede me in recognizing themselves for
what they are,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 168). This statement is
the subjective assertion. The time for comprehending leads to a
conclusion, but only if the subject anticipates the certainty of his
conclusion and seizes it in a moment of urgency.
Lacan operates a shift from spatiality to temporality, from
a subject seized by an intersubjective logic to a subject that
asserts itself in an act based on a judgment that lacks sufficient
logical ground. This subject is the personal subject, the one that
pronounces “I” (in French: “je”). It can only exist on the condition
that it has assumed the other forms of subjectivity (i.e., the
impersonal “one” and the reciprocal subject). The assertion of
this subject is different from the subject as a mere function of the
symbolic system—and yet, Lacan states that this subject also has
a logical form and stems from a logical process.
According to Lacan the temporal logic of this riddle can be
applied to group of undefined size, given that there is always one
black disc less than there are prisoners. As in the case with the
13 coins, the group is not constituted by a common trait. The
trait is retroactively defined by the group through the assertion
of the subject. The collective is founded on the reciprocity of
the difference. As such, the collective logic can be expressed
according to the following principles: “(1) A man knows what
is not a man; (2) Men recognize themselves among themselves as
men; (3) I declare myself to be a man for fear of being convinced
by men that I am not a man,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 174). Thus
Lacan formalizes the relation between the individual and the
collective. In this formalization the individual is a subject and
as such a function within a logical process. However, through
the anticipation of its truth it can assert itself against this
collective and escape the reciprocal relation in which it was
captured.
CONCLUSION
Lacan’s views on the relation between the subject and the other
gradually change between 1938 and 1953. Initially this relation is
conceived of as strictly based on the principle of identification.
Such was the case in his paper on the family complexes, where
the process of socialization is described as a series of consecutive
identifications. From 1953 onward Lacan conceptualizes the
Other no longer as an image with which to identify, but as a
symbolic system governed by the laws of language. This new
conceptualization is realized through the tools handed to him
by Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology. In this paper we have
demonstrated that between 1938 and 1953 Lacan attempted to
formulate the individual as a function, the subject, within a logic
of the collective. Thus, although Lévi-Strauss handed him the
methodology, this encounter does not constitute a radical breach
in Lacan’s work—it is merely a refining of the work he had already
started.
Moreover, we have demonstrated that Lacan’s statements on
the logic of the collective can be situated within a broader
frame of reference. Whereas Durkheim ended in a situation
where individual and collective are radically separated, Mauss
and Lévi-Strauss relegated the individual to a mere logical
function within a collective, symbolic system. Lacan on the other
hand conceptualized a subject that can assert itself against the
other while still remaining part of a logical system. This is the
conundrum that Lacan will confront time and again throughout
his teachings and needs to be taken into account when one wishes
to study the further influence of Lévi-Strauss on Lacan. The
subject, a logical function within the Symbolic, speaks and asserts
itself.
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In this article, we will examine some of Lacan’s concepts on the relation between
psychoanalysis and science. The difference that Lacan states between the real for
science, which would be entirely governed by laws, and the real for psychoanalysis –
a ‘real without law’ – risk to lead to an irreducible separation between the two fields.
However, as the article shows, that separation between psychoanalysis and science is
not the position defended by Freud and Lacan. Indeed the latest discoveries in the field
of neurosciences challenge the traditional conception of the real for science, bringing
it closer to the real ‘without law’ that characterizes psychoanalysis. Conceiving the
real for science as a real that is opened to contingencies and not entirely governed
by laws, is the first necessary step for a new alliance between psychoanalysis and
science.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, neurosciences, Lacan, real, second nature, cognitive science
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s some important neuroscientists, such as Gerald Edelman, V. S. Ramachandran,
Antonio Damasio and others, began to express their interest in approaching psychoanalysis
and neurosciences. The studies conducted by these scientists led to the creation of the
Neuropsychoanalysis Association, an international network of non-profit organizations that
support the dialog between neurosciences and psychoanalysis.
Even if those more involved with Lacanian psychoanalysis tended to be more suspicious about
an approximation between psychoanalysis and neuroscience, this scenario has been changing in
the last decade since some Lacanian psychoanalysts and philosophers have done quite fruitful
theoretical dialogs between some experimental findings in the fields of genetics and neurosciences
and some theoretical concepts from Lacanian psychoanalysis (Ansermet and Magistretti, 2004;
Zizek, 2008; Johnston, 2013).
This article seeks to contribute to the debate between Lacanian psychoanalysis and
neurosciences, discussing a specific point of the conceptual underpinnings of Lacanian
theorizations about science. If the difference that Lacan states between the real for science, which
would be entirely governed by laws, and the real for psychoanalysis – a ‘real without law’ – risk to
be seen as the basis for an irreducible separation between the two fields, we tried to show that the
complete separation between psychoanalysis and science was never the position defended by Freud
and Lacan. We argue that the latest discoveries in the field of neurosciences challenge the traditional
conception of the real for science, bringing it closer to the real ‘without law’ that characterizes
psychoanalysis, what makes possible a entirely new kind of dialog between the two fields, since the
idea of the real that arises from contemporary neurosciences is a real that is opened to contingencies
and not entirely governed by laws.
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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NATURAL
SCIENCES
The development of psychoanalytical theory by Freud was often
associated with some concepts or metaphors that he took from
the natural sciences, which exerted a strong influence in his
thinking. Otherwise, Lacan’s inspiration in Levi-Strauss and
Saussure’s structuralism, contributed decisively to give Lacanian
psychoanalysis its own epistemological vocabulary that moved
away from naturalistic influences (Bezerra, 2013). Although
Lacan had been interested in animal behavior and biology in
the early days of his teaching, this interest was in the opposite
direction of the naturalism present in some post-Freudian
psychoanalysts thinking. Differently from the adaptationist
perspective present in the naturalistic inspiration of most post-
Freudian authors, for Lacan human subjectivity is something that
emerges as the effect of the symbolic order, constituting a break
from the immediate plan of nature.
However, if Lacan’s teaching was clearly marked by an anti-
naturalistic perspective, we could not say that he sustains that
psychoanalysis should have an anti-scientific stance. We know
that Freud thought that the worldview (Weltanschauung) of
psychoanalysis should be no other than science’s one. At the end
of the conference The question of a Weltanschauung Freud states
that: “In my opinion, psychoanalysis is incapable of creating
a Weltanschauung of its own. Psychoanalysis does not need
one; it is part of science and can adhere to the scientific
Weltanschauung” (Freud, 1933 p. 89).
In the same direction, Lacan is emphatic in reproving those
who claim that psychoanalysis should stand in a position of
exteriority regarding the scientific field: “We say, contrary to
what was invented on an alleged breaking of Freud with the
scientism of his time, that it was this same scientism (...) which
led Freud, as is shown in his writings, to open the way that
will forever have his name. We say that this way has never
left the ideals of this scientism since it is called like that and
that the mark it brings form it is not contingent, but essential”
(Lacan, 1966/1998, p. 871).
For Lacan, the relationship between psychoanalysis and
science rests on the epistemological discontinuity produced by
the emergence of modern science which promoted a radical
transformation in the modern conception of the subject that
was essential for the emergence of psychoanalysis. The Cartesian
cogito is considered by Lacan a key correlate to the emergence of
modern science, which he characterizes as a moment of rejection
of all traditional knowledge in order to establish a “grounding in
being” for the subject. A subject, emptied of knowledge, devoid
of content and representation, without substantial density, which
only exists in the act: “I think, therefore I am.” This is the subject
of science. And for Lacan this subject is none other than the
subject upon which psychoanalysis itself operates: “That is why
it was important to promote, first and foremost, and as a fact to
be distinguished from the question of whether psychoanalysis is a
science (if your field is scientific), just the fact that its practice
does not imply another subject than the subject of science”
(Lacan, 1966/1998, p. 878).
THE REAL FOR SCIENCE AND THE
REAL FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS
For Lacan, psychoanalysis would not be possible without the
advent of modern science. Following Koyré (1957/2010), Lacan
thinks that science is always based on the assumption that there is
“knowledge in the Real”. The “laws of nature” implies that there
is something like an articulated network of “signifiers” that are
present in the Real, and, at least in the early part of his teaching,
Lacan searched for a rapprochement between psychoanalysis and
the scientific field based on this assumption that characterizes
the foundation of science: that there is knowledge in the Real.
Indeed, at the beginning of his teaching, Lacan seeks an alignment
between psychoanalysis and science via structuralism. According
to Jacques-Alain Miller (Miller, 2002a), Lacan wandered of being
able to suspend the segregation of psychoanalysis by science
trying to translate the tragic aspect of human experience into
the mathematics. That’s why Lacan was so attracted to some
kind of mathematization of psychoanalytic experience. In this
perspective, the unconscious is constituted by signifiers organized
according to the laws of language, which operate independently
of the subject’s consciousness. The subject itself is an effect of the
functioning of these laws. That is why the analyst can rely on the
Freudian free association. It certifies that for psychoanalysis there
is the assumption that there is a certain “knowledge in the Real”.
This is a deterministic assumption of psychoanalysis: speak the
patient whatever she says, the unconscious signifiers will emerge
in her speech, for there are laws of language that determine the
unconscious functioning. In this sense, we could say that there is a
kind of “knowledge in the Real” which is present in the analytical
experience, it’s not just about hermeneutics or narratives
(Miller, 1989).
Towards the end of his teaching, Lacan will gradually replace
the causal language that marked his beginnings to isolate a
break in the chain of determination, stating that the real with
which we deal in the analytic experience is a real that conveys
the absence of law – a “real without law”. It is a real that is
not based on the positive axiom that for Lacan characterizes
science – “there is knowledge in the real” – but a real that rests in
contingency and in the absence of sexual relation (“il n’y a pas de
rapport sexuel”): “Throughout his teaching, ready to confront the
discourse of science on their own ground, he [Lacan] adopted a
causal language. Until he found a break in the causality, a break in
determination, finding, synthesizing – why not say that? – certain
results under the species of: “there is no sexual causality”. He said
“relation”. But he said relation meaning that there is no causality.
There is no law of the relation between the sexes. He thought
that by this way he could oppose to the real for science – which
is a real containing knowledge – to the real of psychoanalysis -
under the species of a real that does not contain a knowledge and
that would convey the knowledge of the unconscious. It would
convey, first of all, especially the absence of law, precisely the hole
in this knowledge. “There is no sexual relation” is the notion of
the absence of law. The sexual law cannot be written. It is then
that the term contingency becomes the master word, rather than
cause” (Miller, 2012).
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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SCIENCE:
THREE LOGICAL MOMENTS
In separating these two conceptions of the real, the real for science
and the real for psychoanalysis, Lacan highlights the specificity
of psychoanalysis, which can then definitely give up the aim of
being recognized as part of the scientific field. On the other hand,
this doesn’t imply that we should believe that psychoanalysis and
science are two completely separated fields, with nothing to say to
each other. According to Miller (2011), we can divide into three
logical moments the relationship between psychoanalysis and
science in Lacan’s teaching. In the beginning, Lacan states that
psychoanalysis depends on science, putting scientific knowledge
as a condition of possibility for the emergence of psychoanalysis.
In a second stage, Lacan moves a little from this perspective,
understanding that psychoanalysis finds its place out of a failure
or incompleteness in the discourse of science. Miller (ibid) notes
that in the Italian Note (Lacan, 1973/2003), Lacan says that the
very functioning of the discourse of science tends to produce an
effect of reaction or protest that Lacan calls “humanist.” This
reaction aims to highlight that the knowledge in the real does
not account for everything and that what is essential in the
humankind is not the scientific objectivity, but rather something
that always escapes from the scientific knowledge. The “humanist
protest” claims for what Lacan qualifies as “docta ignorantia”
(learned ignorance) against the scientific knowledge and, in a
certain way, psychoanalysis finds its place in this humanism
protest since she seeks to reintroduce the dimension of the subject
that the discourse of science tends to suture. Psychoanalysis then
appears as a “waste product” of the discourse of science and
the psychoanalyst is called to challenge the discourse of science
reintroducing the dimension of the subject.
Miller (2011) retakes this proposition of Lacan to show that he
didn’t stop there and to state that the position of psychoanalysis
in relation to science should not stay in this humanist protest
neither refuse the scientific knowledge. Miller points out that,
still in the Italian Note, by introducing the desire to know
that characterizes psychoanalysis, Lacan would point to a third
logical moment in this circuit, in which psychoanalysis is not
situated in the field of humanistic protest against science, but
embodies the return of the science in the field of the learned
ignorance. The desire to know that characterizes the position
of the psychoanalyst, should not be confused with the learned
ignorance, neither with the scientific knowledge. Psychoanalysis
deals, otherwise, with something that is transmitted from
science when the scientific desire enters the humanistic field of
the learned ignorance. The desire to know that characterizes
psychoanalysis thus entails a paradox: it is an effect of science
without being, however, according to the scientific desire. It is an
unprecedented desire to know that has its roots in science, but
should not be confused with the scientific desire either with the
denial of the scientific knowledge. The psychoanalytical stance
is not a scientific one, but this doesn’t imply that it refuses the
knowledge in the real. It’s a position that takes in charge the issues
of “truth” with the means of science.
For Miller, the core of Freud’s ambition is the return of the
question about the truth within the scientific field: “We note
that for the defenders of the scientific discourse, far from being
distinguished from the learned ignorance, [psychoanalysis] is
mistaken for it. Psychoanalysis may seem a reprint of the learned
ignorance, which was as Lacan showed her for a while. On the
other hand, for the learned ignorance partisans, the humanists,
psychoanalysis seems to be attached to the values of science.
This dual position led Lacan to assert that science (he said this
with the best reason in the world, that is, with the example of
Freud) inspired in some dissatisfied with the learned ignorance,
with the humanistic knowledge, the desire to treat the truth in
an unprecedented way. Lacan then speaks of a desire to know,
which is the transformation of the desire of science when it
finds what was excluded and foreclosure: the problem of truth”
(Miller, 2011, p. 414).
FROM THE PSYCHOANALYTIC
PROTEST TO A NEW ALLIANCE WITH
SCIENCE
The discovery of the hysterical symptom by Freud was made
in the context of the scientific discourse, it had incidence
over a real in the scientific sense, a Galilean real, a real that
accommodates knowledge. But Freud introduces something
new there, postulating that there is a sense in the real, that
the symptom has a meaning. For this, Miller (2005) states
that psychoanalysis has emerged as a “corruption of scientific
knowledge,” as for science there is knowledge in the real, but it
doesn’t mean to “say” anything. Postulate that there is sense in the
real implies that it means something, that there is something like
a certain “intentionality” of the symptom which is the condition
of possibility for analytic interpretation: “the meaning in the
real is the support of the symptom in the analytical perspective”
(Miller, 2005, p. 15).
Throughout the twentieth century, it was widely accepted
this conception of the symptom – the analytic symptom. The
symptom was seen as a mental symptom, as an unconscious
symptom, a symptom that has a meaning to be interpreted.
Nowadays, however, the situation has changed. After the
DSM-III and the strong influence of biology in the mainstream
psychiatric discourse (Aguiar, 2004), the symptom has been seen,
in this perspective, as a sign of some disorder of the brain, as
something absolutely meaningless, whose physiological causes
neurosciences would explain.
How to answer to this from a psychoanalytic point of view?
Miller (2005) states that there are three answers today: first,
there are those who wish to adhere to the knowledge in the
real, that is, those who believe that psychoanalytic concepts
could be translated into the language of the neurosciences.
Then there is the opposite position, the psychoanalytic protest
which, according to Miller, is appealing, but in vain. This
protest consists in refusing the knowledge in the real. For Miller,
however, Lacanian’s position can’t be the refusal of the scientific
knowledge. Lacanian psychoanalysts must admit that there is
knowledge in the real, but at the same time, formulate that
there is a hole in this knowledge, that sexuality makes a hole
in the knowledge in the real. In this sense, Miller proposes a
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position that is more compatible with a certain alliance with
science, a “new alliance” with science that takes into account
the real at stake in psychoanalysis: “We can say that here we
find the index that points to what Lacan brings and that doesn’t
consist absolutely in a refusal of the scientific real and of the
knowledge in the real. Because deny the scientific real and refuse
the discourse of science is a road to perdition that opens the way
to all intrigues in the ‘psi’ field. Intrigue is not an injurious term.
Do not refuse that knowledge, admit that there is knowledge in
the real, but at the same time formulate that in this knowledge
there is a hole, that sexuality makes a hole in this knowledge. It is
a transformation of Freud, no doubt. It’s a new alliance between
psychoanalysis and science, if I dare to say, that rests on the
non-relation. The non-relation gives the site of Lacanian practice.
This should be understood as follows: the “sexual non-relation” is
what makes a balance with the statement that says that “there is
knowledge in the real”. It is sexuality that makes an objection to
the omnipotence of the discourse of science” (Miller, 2005, p. 16).
Miller doesn’t say much more about how could be such new
alliance between science and psychoanalysis. This seems to be a
task to be done, with which this article aims to contribute. But
it is important to notice that he writes these lines after pointing
out the shift in the prevailing conception of the symptom in
the contemporary era since the neuroscientific discourse became
hegemonic. So when he speaks about science here, he doesn’t
seem to be talking about physics or mathematics as is more usual
within the Lacanian field, but about the natural sciences and more
specifically the neurosciences.
In another passage of the same text – which is the transcript
of one of Miller’s conferences at the Congress of the World
Association of Psychoanalysis in 2004 – Miller draws the
attention of the psychoanalysts, saying that one should not “insult
the future” and proposes a certain openness to what happens
in the field of neuroscience and cognitive sciences: “Freud’s
metapsychology showed signs of weakness, in the second half of
the twentieth century. And we could say that Lacan proceeded a
logical-linguistic translation of that metapsychology. He himself
acknowledged having to go through this in order to give a breath
of life to psychoanalysis. So it is not absurd, a priori, to try to give
a neurocognitive translation of the metapsychology. We can say
that it will be judged by its results” (Miller, 2005, p. 11).
We propose to take seriously these indications from Miller:
how to think about a new relationship between psychoanalysis
and neuroscience that rest on the non-relation? How to conceive
the relation between psychoanalysis and neuroscience in a way
that doesn’t deny the scientific knowledge, without ever losing
sight of what makes a hole in this knowledge?
Jean-Claude Milner, which is another important reference in
the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially regarding the
relationship between psychoanalysis and science, proposes in
one of his recent books (Milner, 2011), that to think about the
relation of Lacanian psychoanalysis with the science of today, you
may need to move away from Koyré’s classical perspective that
privileges the mathematization of the real. According to Milner,
when Galileo wrote that nature was written in mathematical
letters, the strong word should be “letter” and not mathematics.
Because the essence of the Galilean turn would be, in Milner’s
opinion, the literalization, of which mathematics is just one way
among others.
According to Milner, the position of Lacan with respect to
science was deeply marked by the science of his time, which
was a science dominated by the physics of Newton and Einstein.
Today, however, for Milner that physics is dead, and to approach
the new paradigms of science one would have to consider
genetics and the biological sciences instead. And for Milner, the
current biological science is not mathematized but literalized.
The type of literalization scientists dedicated to the transcription
of the genetic code held, for example, may even involve certain
calculations, but do not constitute a mathematization. According
to Milner, a kind of literalization of the living is emerging
in biological sciences, and take it seriously would compel the
Lacanian position in relation to science to change, especially as
regards the reference to Koyré: “On the back cover that he wrote
to the book Autres Écrits, Jacques-Alain Miller acknowledged
in the decoding of the genome a ‘promise of new marriage of
the signifier with the living’. But overall, I have sometimes the
impression that we don’t take into account the passage of the
years. In 1965, in The science and the truth, Lacan could write
that ‘Koyré is our guide’. Almost half a century has passed,
the epistemology and the history of science have changed, and
repeated offensives against Koyré’s model were done, which the
most decisive ones were not always recognized; as Foucault’s in
The Order of Things. Determinate what remains of Koyré should
be a matter to consider. I didn’t judge opportune to express
myself in detail – neither on what remains or not from Koyré
in general, nor on what in Lacan could be affected by an eventual
obsolescence of Koyré. In L’oeuvre Claire I had put myself where
it was placed by Lacan himself, namely, in a space where the
supreme science is the mathematical physics. I haven’t addressed
the question of biology” (Milner, 2011, p. 19).
In 1984, Prigogine and Stengers (1997) had already pointed
out that the classical model of science, as Koyré interpreted
it, implied a conception of nature as an “automaton nature”,
entirely governed by mechanical laws accessible to human’s
rationality through the laws of mathematics. In fact, much of the
natural phenomena respond to this model, as the dynamics of
celestial bodies and the law of gravity, which obey the laws that
mathematics succeed to identify. But the scientific discoveries of
the twentieth century require a transformation in our conception
of nature that has not been fully assimilated into the culture,
which implies a perception of nature not as something stable,
fully governed by predictable and immutable laws, but as a
nature that is open for transformation: “Modern science was
established as a product of a culture, against certain dominant
conceptions of this culture (Aristotelianism in particular, but
also the magic and alchemy). One could even say that it was
constituted against nature itself because it denied her complexity
and becoming on behalf of an eternal and knowable world
ruled by a small number of simple and immutable laws”
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1997, p. 4).
As stated by these authors for over 30 years, today’s science
is no longer the classical science, and those who continue to
conceive nature as an automaton governed by mechanical and
predictable laws are losing sight of what matters most to the
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science of our time, i.e., not the continuities and stable situations,
but developments, crises and instabilities, which require another
conception of naturalism.
We understand that to conceive of a “new alliance” between
psychoanalysis and science, which rests on the “non-relation,”
i.e., to conceive a relation between psychoanalysis and science
that take into account the “real without law” (Miller, 2002b) that
guides the practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis, one must examine
what is happening in the field of contemporary natural sciences,
particularly in the field neurosciences, so that you can seek in this
field if it’s possible to find some openings for the contingent real
(Miller, 2008) which is proper of psychoanalysis.
NEUROSCIENCES AND THE REAL
WITHOUT LAW
In the book The Dappled World: A Study in the Boundaries
of Science (Cartwright, 1999), the philosopher of science Nancy
Cartwright shows that anyone who looks clearly and honestly
at the current state of science will come across with the fact
that we can no longer accept the often assumed equivalence
between scientific realism and universality of the laws. The author
notes that in the various domains covered by science we are
increasingly faced with the fact that we can’t establish universal
laws: “The kind of knowledge we can defend from our impressive
scientific successes does not point to a unified world from of
a universal order, but to a dappled world of stained objects”
(Cartwright, 1999, p.10).
As Adrian Johnston (Johnston, 2011) argues, it is not
necessary to go down into the world of quantum physics to
give scientific status to the indeterminacy that is characteristic of
human subjectivity. According to Johnston, a veritable avalanche
of current research in genetics and neuroscience reveals that
brains and human bodies are much less determined by pre-
established rules than we previously thought. The biomateriality
of nature establishes a relatively small number of limiting
parameters for the living being. It hardly functions as something
that determines all the details of life. The biologist Francisco
Varela and his collaborators (Varela et al., 1991), for example,
describe the ontogenetic and phylogenetic unfolding of living
beings as satisfactory/sufficient processes that work only to
achieve what is good enough to survive, for long enough to
reproduce. Evolution doesn’t compel the production of what
would be Ideal, allowing the arising of a great diversity at
all levels of interaction with the environment, and may even
permit the persistence of highly dysfunctional gaps in life: “The
second step, then, is to analyze the evolutionary process as
having a solution that is satisfactory rather than optimal: in this
perspective [natural] selection functions as a broad survival filter
that admits any structure that has enough integrity to persist. In
this point of view, the focus of the analysis is no longer directed at
the characteristic features, but rather at the patterns of organisms,
via their life history. Another metaphor recently suggested for
this post-Darwinian conception of the evolutionary process is
evolution as bricolage, the joining of parts and elements into
complex matrices, not because they fulfill some ideal project, but
simply because they are possible. Here the evolutionary problem
is no more like forcing a precise trajectory of the requirements
of ideal aptitude; it is rather how to prune the multiplicity
of viable paths that exist at any point” (Varela et al., 1991,
p. 196).
The French philosopher Catherine Malabou (2008) develop
the philosophical issues that arise with the discovery of
neuroplasticity. For her, this discovery entails that we have to
acknowledge that human brain is organized and reorganized
“dialectically,” continually suffering multiple oscillations between
its “malleable flexibility” and its “resistant fixity.” Catherine
Malabou states that we have not yet fully assimilated the results
of the revolutionary discoveries made by neurosciences in the
last 50 years. In particular, we have not yet assimilated the
importance of the constitutive historicity of the brain, which
is implicated in the discovery of brain plasticity: “Our brain is
plastic, and we do not know it. We are completely ignorant of
this dynamic, this organization, and this structure. We continue
to believe in the “stiffness” of a fully genetic brain” (Malabou,
2008. p. 4). For Malabou, the relatively recent discovery of brain
neuroplasticity should change our conception of the brain as
entirely predetermined by the laws of nature, allowing us to see
the brain as something modifiable, “formable” and formative
at the same time. Malabou identifies three levels in which
cerebral neuroplasticity operates: (1) in the modeling of neural
connections during embryonic and childhood development; (2)
in the modification of the neuronal connections that occur
through the plasticity of the synaptic modulation to lifelong
learning; and (3) the ability to repair after some kind of
injury.
In the book Le cerveau intime (Jeannerod, 2002), Marc
Jeannerod argues that if a synapse belongs to a circuit often used,
it tends to increase in volume, permeability, and effectiveness. On
the contrary, if a synapse is poorly used it tends to become less
effective. According to Jeannerod, it is a biological mechanism
of individuation that makes each brain unique: “The theory of
synaptic efficacy allows us to explain the gradual molding of
a brain under the influence of individual experience, to the
point of it is possible for us in principle to account for the
individual characteristics and particularities of each brain. We are
dealing here with a mechanism of individuation that makes each
brain a single object, despite its adherence to a common model”
(Jeannerod, p.63).
The psychoanalyst François Ansermet and the neuroscientist
Pierre Magistretti also emphasize this aspect of brain plasticity
as a biological indicator of the uniqueness of the brain, which
is shaped by experience. In the book, A chacun son cerveau
(Ansermet and Magistretti, 2004) these authors argue that
the recent discoveries of neurobiology demonstrate that the
plasticity of the neural network allows the inscription of the
lived experience in the brain. The traces are inscribed, associated
and modified throughout life through the mechanisms of brain
plasticity. Plasticity would thus be the mechanism by which each
brain is unique, giving place for a materiality of singularity. They
note, however, that the traits left by the lived experiences can be
lasting or even permanent. Plasticity, according to the authors,
is not synonymous with flexibility or permanent adaptability, it
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also constitutes a certain determinism that gives each individual
a destiny that is his own.
The cognitive scientist Stanovich (2004) describe in the book
Robot’s Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin,
that the evolutionary processes that gave birth to humans
reached such a high degree of complexity, especially neural
complexity, that two interrelated results occurred: first the brain
was modeled in a highly elaborated anatomical differentiation,
from a plurality of constituent elements that are not synchronized
with each other, often leading to intracerebral conflicts, in which
different parts present incompatible functions. Secondly, these
intracerebral conflicts – understood as a materialized result of
the sedimentation of several distinct periods of evolutionary
history in the human central nervous system – make possible
something unique to humans, which Stanovich calls “rebellion”
against nature, insofar that it makes us humans prone to
evolve against genetic and evolutionary determinism. According
to Stanovich’s perspective, the evolution shaped human beings
as vehicles capable of transmitting genetic material, with
incredibly elaborate and flexible intelligence, also involving
a sensitive and receptive plastic brain, so that evolutionary-
genetic deterministic control, in our case, would have been
relatively loosened to the point of producing creatures that
escaped the control of genes in a completely unpredictable
way. From the perspective of genes as “blind” replicators,
the high complexity of the human body/brain system, is
a kind of double-edged sword: while it allows replication
strategies that are broader and more sophisticated than those
of other living beings, the exceptional complexity of humans
gives birth to biological processes that are disruptive to
the natural dictates of evolution as they are transmitted by
genes.
The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 2010), also
assumes a perspective quite similar to Stanovich’s, formulating
that in man, the emergence of consciousness and the creation
of culture are a radical novelty in the history of evolution, for
these often offer imperfect or even “rebellious” responses, many
of which go against the dictates of nature’s own laws: “If nature
can be considered as indifferent, unpredictable, unpredictable,
then human consciousness creates the possibility of question
the ways of nature. The emergence of human consciousness is
associated with evolutionary developments in the brain, behavior,
and mind that ultimately lead to the creation of culture, a radical
novelty in the movement of natural history. The emergence of
neurons, with the emergence of the diversification of behavior
and the paving of the path to the mind, is a momentary event
in the great trajectory. But the appearance of the conscious
brain, capable of self-reflection, is the next great moment.
It is the opening of the way to a rebellious and imperfect
response to the dictates of a careless nature” (Damasio, 2010,
p.287).
As Adrian Johnston argues, the biological sciences need
to be able to detach themselves from the idea of organicity
(in the sense of a complete and harmonic whole) to
conceive the brain in a way that is more compatible with
the richness and complexity of human beings as speaking
beings, as beings carrying within themselves something
more than the organic. For him, to do justice to the
rich and unpredictable kind of subject humans beings
are, life sciences should complement the worldview of
their spontaneous organicism with the notion that there
is something more in the organic than the organic itself
(Johnston, 2013). However, this non-organicity of the human
brain should not be understood simply as equivalent to the
inorganic. Johnston proposes that we call “anorganic” this
non-organicity that is distinct from the inorganic. Unlike
the inorganic, the term anorganic, as Johnston conceives it,
designates the flaws in the organic structure and the dynamics
engendered in and by the non-whole biological systems.
For Johnston, scientific findings as those described above,
show that the biomaterial substance of evolution seems to
reflexively negate its own controls and causal influences, giving
rise to beings whose complex plasticity escapes governance
evolutionary-genetic nature.
CONCLUSION
Since the 1990s psychoanalysis has been constantly criticized
for having moved away from traditional methodologies of
scientific investigation and, more specifically, from the emerging
neuroscientific field. Lacanian psychoanalysis, which is very
influential in the psychoanalytic field nowadays, tend to have
a more critical position regarding the neurosciences, although
some Lacanian psychoanalysts have done very interesting works
in the interface between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.
One important conceptual underpinning for the rarity of
debates with neuroscience in Lacanian psychoanalysis is the
notion that psychoanalysis and sciences deal with different
conceptions of the real. Lacan developed from Koyré the
conception that the real with which science deal is a real entirely
governed by the laws of physics and by the end of his teaching
he states that the real for psychoanalysis is a real that conveys the
absence of laws for sexuality - a "real without law".
We tried to show in this article that a new conception
of the real is emerging from contemporary neurosciences,
making possible new perspectives for the dialog between
Lacanian psychoanalysis and neurosciences. A famous phrase
from Ansermet and Magistretti state: “the individual can be
considered biologically determined to be free, that is, to constitute
an exception to the universal that carries him” (Ansermet
and Magistretti, 2004, p.10). This only can happen because
nature itself is fragile, vulnerable, subject to failures in its
own materiality. This perspective challenges the most common
intuitive view, in which nature is conceived as an omnipotent
monolithic block composed of elements perfectly connected and
controlled by deterministic laws. The more recent discoveries
of life sciences, and neurosciences in particular, makes possible
to conceive the materiality of nature as prone to contingency,
error, and complexity, which is a vision of the real that is closer
to the Lacanian idea that the real is without law, that nature
and brain are less deterministic than science previously thought.
This opens up an ontological and epistemological space for new
debates between Lacanian psychoanalysis and neurosciences.
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When the proposal for an approximation between
psychoanalysis and neurosciences was initially proposed in
the 1990s, some authors saw this approach as a project that
aimed to adapt psychoanalysis to traditional methods of
empirical investigation and sought to integrate psychoanalysis
into science. I tend to agree with Bazan (2011) when she
says that psychoanalysis owes to clinics its fundamentals and
originality, and it is from this position that psychoanalysis can
contribute to the neuroscientific debate about the fundamentals
of consciousness and subjectivity, endowed with its different
but nevertheless elaborated and systematized theory. As Bazan
says this should also constitute a fundamental basis to be
taken seriously. But answering to those who are skeptical about
this approximation and who ask what would be the gain for
psychoanalysis with this kind of approach, Bazan’s response
seems perfect to me: “I do not know. There is no agenda
for what there is to win, nor, for that matter, for what there
is to lose. Rather, it is the game itself, the sole faithfulness
to something that is happening, which should be decisive.
Something is happening, which clearly and loudly summons
psychoanalysis to respond; as said, how to respond, is not
a priori clear, but a non-response would imply a certain loss.”
(Bazan, 2011, p. 3).
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The Clinic of Identifications in the
Different Processes of
Metamorphosis Into Woman
Laure Westphal* and Thierry Lamote*
Department of Psychoanalytical Studies, Center for Research in Psychoanalysis, Medicine and Society (EA-3522), University
of Paris Diderot-Paris-7, Paris, France
This article examines, from a psychoanalytical perspective, the function of identification
in the relationship between the subject of the unconscious and his body, his body image,
and the other. To this effect, the article leans on the clinic of the metamorphosis into a
woman in psychosis, both in the way that it is presented by patients in the context
of treatment, and in the form of testimonies extracted from literature. It demonstrates
how specular identification allows the subject to unify himself, so long as there is an
avoidance of possible deformations of the psychical body, including for example the
delusion of transforming into a woman. It also turns its attention to the second logical
moment of identification, when identification becomes sexed and organizes a certain
relation to the other. A failure in this process sometimes leads the subject to opt for
an identification of a gendered look, so as to stabilize himself. Indeed, transsexualism,
which does not derive from any biological or sociological determination, and which can
be observed in all subjective structures, is a possible way for the psychotic subject to
problematize his relation to the body and to the other by identification with the woman,
now that progress in science and law have enabled this.
Keywords: phallic function, identification, jouissance, push-to-the-woman, psychosis, mirror stage,
transsexualism
INTRODUCTION
This article looks at the function of identification as conceptualized by Lacan in the logical
moments that constitute one’s subjective construction. We will look at the role of self-identification
in the mirror, its stumbling in the delusion of transformation into a woman, and then the
correlative pitfall of sexed identification at the moment of the Oedipus complex. Could it be
possible for a subject, who lacks structuring identifications, to opt for identification with a gendered
look, in order to inscribe himself into the collective?
Our development will be in four phases. First, we will show how identifications reorganize the
subject’s relation to jouissance, in order to establish, secondly, the effects its failure produces on
paranoid delusion. Thirdly, we will see that transsexualism is not the privilege of neurosis, since
certain psychotic subjects adopt it to resolve their psychical impasse. Fourthly, and lastly, we will
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discuss more specifically in which conditions transsexualism
represents, for the psychotic subject, a new way of inscribing
himself subjectively into the collective.
IDENTITY, THE RECOGNITION OF THE
SPECULAR IMAGE, AND THEIR
DISORDERS APPROACHED ON THE
BASIS OF LACANIAN THEORY
During a group therapy session, Ferhat, a teenage patient, told
us about a scene from childhood that remained deeply enigmatic
to him. One day, when he was in the restaurant that his parents
owned, he went to the toilet and fell into a state of stupefaction
when faced with the image reflected in the mirror: “Just in front of
me, in the mirror, I saw something horrible . . . I don’t know what
it was, it didn’t look like anything I know. . .” He immediately
slipped into a sort of somnambulism, left the restaurant, and
walked for hours. What happened to Ferhat? What exactly had
appeared to him in the mirror that day, in place of his specular
image? Let us follow the thread of Lacan’s elaborations touching
on specular recognition.
The recognition of the specular image is, according to Lacan,
crucial not only for the subject’s identification – the acquisition
of his identity – but also for the construction of the “reality” in
which he will move. Henri Wallon was the first to pay attention
to the moment when a child discovers the image of his body
unified in the mirror. Moreover, Wallon shows an immediate
intuition concerning the connection between body image and
language. He says that specular recognition is “the prelude of
the symbolic by which the mind manages to transmute what is
given in sensibility into a universe” (Wallon, 1931). However,
pertinent the link that Wallon intuitively establishes between
image and language, we must note that he states it by inverting its
terms: it is not recognition of the image that allows the symbolic
function to be established, but the opposite. The prior marking
of the child by the symbolic is what creates the condition not
only for any recognition of his specular image, but also for the
love of this body image, namely what Freud called “narcissism.”
Indeed, how does the passage from autoeroticism to narcissism
come about? By what modalities are the transmutation of the
jouissance of the body (invaded by the disorderly chaos of the
partial drives) into self-love (through the attachment of libido
to the image of the body) produced? The mechanism of this
tipping-point often appears very mysterious in psychoanalytical
literature. Freud indicates: “There must be something added to
autoerotism – a new psychical action – in order to bring about
narcissism” (Freud, 1914, 77). But what “psychical action” is at
work here?
In “Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego,” Freud (1921)
distinguishes identification, by which the subject enriches himself
with the properties of the object, from the love bond, which, on
the contrary, causes the subject to empty himself in favor of the
object. Indeed, the subject’s narcissistic libido is drained by the act
of love, whereas in identification, “the object becomes volatile and
disappears in order to feed on the ego.” Here, the object has from
the start “been lost” (Lacan, 1956–1957, 172–173). The relation
to the object is established in accordance with two movements:
one, identification, which is a movement of incorporation; and
second, the love relation, which produces a loss in favor of the
object. But these two modalities of connection to the object are,
if one reads Freud attentively, conditioned by an older double
operation. Such operation, he tells us, is primary, prior to the
appearance of the object: the primordial identification with the
father, which appears in Freud as the phase that precedes the
affective bond with the mother. More precisely (in Freud, the
ambiguity remains), primordial identification with the father and
the bond with the mother would be almost simultaneous: they
would take place in a highly condensed sequence, in a flutter.
Everything happens as though identification with the father (by
which the subject incorporates something of which the father
is the support, namely the symbolic order) was concomitant
with a loss materialized by the love bond with the mother
(because in love, the subject empties himself, loses something,
in favor of the other party). This sequence will be resumed
and rearticulated by Freud some years later in “Negation” (Die
Verneinung).
In ‘Negation’ (Freud, 1925), we find one of the rare Freudian
articulations of primary repression and a description of the
“mythical moment” (Lacan, 1956, 319) of the subject’s emergence,
of the appearance of language, and of the upsurge of “reality.”
Here, Freud postulates – in a phase that dates from before
the distinction between inside and outside, between subjective
and objective – the existence of an original “pleasure ego,”
which introjects (Bejahung) into itself “all that is good,” while
rejecting (Ausstossung) the bad and leaving it on the outside.
The inaugural Freudian intuition, which holds that the subject’s
reality is elaborated in accordance with a process of re-finding
the lost object, encounters a new foundation here: the objects
that constitute the subject’s reality only exist inasmuch as the
primordial object has been lost. In other words, not only does
subjectivity result from a fundamental loss of inside and outside,
but, furthermore, it is around this lost object, whose absence will
be the motor of the subject’s desire, that what we call reality
will be constituted. What does Bejahung consist of? What is
introjected at that moment, through a loss? Bejahung, as Jean-
Claude Maleval has reminded us, is “an admission in the symbolic
sense” (Maleval, 2000, 48): it is the primordial symbolization
with which the symbolic order is established. This concerns the
mythical moment when, through primordial identification with
the father, the subject’s capture in the discourses is produced.
In this moment, the subject, consenting (Bejahung) to inscribe
himself into the order of language, accepts its essential condition,
namely the loss (expulsion, Ausstossung) of an object, which
Lacan will notate as “object a.” This mechanism of primordial
repression, whereby the body is emptied of its jouissance (object
a), while the subject becomes equipped with the symbolic, will
likewise condition the process of specular recognition defended
by Lacan in the “mirror stage” (Lacan, 1949).
We should recall that this “stage” brings the young child into
presence, given his image reflected in the mirror, along with a
third party (father, mother, or another) as witness to the scene.
What happens during this stage? The subject, still an infant,
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recognizes his own image in the mirror. This recognition, Lacan
tells us, must be understood as an identification, “namely, the
transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes
an image” (Lacan, 1949, 76). Until then, the infant only perceived
his body as scattered, disjointed elements (a hand, arm, or foot
that appeared in the visual field and which he might try to grab
as though it were a foreign object). Suddenly, in the mirror,
what were mere fragmentations become a unified image that he
recognizes as his own. At this instant, identification is produced,
creating the foundation of the subject’s identity (the matrix of
any speech act in the first person, “I”) through the articulation
of the three registers of real, imaginary, and symbolic. Indeed,
the subject knots into one unified instance the specular image,
his bodily sensations (the register of the real), and the naming
(symbolic) of the image reflected by the Other observing the
scene. Many consequences arise from this founding moment of
identity. The first is to ground the recognition (of the body image)
and ego upon an error. Indeed, the bodily unity perceived in
this image is falsified by specularity: the image returned by the
mirror is false, inverting the body’s coordinates. Next, we must
conceive how this anchors the ego in the otherness of the mirror:
the ego does not coincide with itself, it stems from the register of
the other (it imposes the detour via the mirror) for the subject,
who finds therein the most ordinary experience of his division.
Furthermore, the body image returned by the mirror locates and
inscribes the locus of the other, where the ego is not only housed,
but also the same others, the subject’s alter-egos (peers). Finally,
the same holds for a disjunction between real and imaginary:
this body that is unified and autonomous, and which is reflected
by the mirror (the imaginary register), doesn’t accord with the
lived experience of body incoordination, of impotence, and of
Hilflosigkeit (the real register), where the infant is found. The
image observed in the mirror is thus inscribed in the form of
a developing fiction, because it anticipates a state to come in
relation to the real state in which the subject is found. Here,
we can see the function of the specular image: the image (i)
veils, covers the real (a). Moreover, this is precisely what Lacan
formalized in the matheme of the body image, i(a), where “i”
represents the image, and “a” the real object, the lost object,
rejected outside the symbolic, whose absence supports the image
and ensures its consistency. Let us briefly summarize the two
phases that condition the recognition of the specular image: first
of all, in the initial phase, primary repression has to be produced,
which allows for language access (Bejahung) by means of loss
(Ausstossung) of the object (a). It is on the grounds of this
initial loss that the mirror stage will be elaborated, the matrix of
recognition (of the body image and reality), which is established
through articulating specular image (i), the real (object a), and
the symbolic (naming by the Other). The whole, as we can
see, falls under the dependence on primary repression, that is,
loss of the primordial object: if the lost object (the object a)
is no longer lacking, if it reappears in the weave of the image,
we will be dealing with a series of clinical phenomena that we
will approach later. For now, we will look at how these two
phases inscribe their effects into the subjectification process,
by virtue of the retroaction phase triggered by the Oedipus
complex.
The Oedipus complex confirms the loss of the primordial
object and opens a resolution to the dead-end in which the subject
is precipitated. We may recall that after a phase of reciprocal
illusion (when the infant could derive comfort from the illusion of
completing the mother, while she could also sustain this illusion
of a harmony between herself and her child) the young child
suspects that something is not right: the mother’s comings and
goings hint toward maternal castration, indicating that she too
lacks, i.e., that she desires and seems to find elsewhere (beyond
the subject) the object to satisfy her desire. The child, exposed to
what initially appeared as something stemming from pure whim,
is then caught in an anxiety-provoking alternative, sketched
out in accordance with the coordinates of his (oral) libidinal
development: either he has the means to fulfill the mother, and in
this case risks being devoured by her; or he lacks these means, and
risks being abandoned, left in the lurch. The father’s intervention,
through what Lacan named the “paternal metaphor” (Lacan,
1958, 463–4; 476; 479), traces the path of a resolution to this
dead-end, which cannot be resolved in the imaginary register
(where the mother/child relation is located). The Name-of-the-
Father is the signifier that allows the mother’s desire to be named
and for the subject to be positioned in a genealogy, that is, at a
place whereby the mother is forbidden. The result of this Oedipal
operation is threefold. On one hand, it inscribes the coordinates
of the symbolic order (which Lacan named the Other, the treasure
of the signifier), which are founded upon the law of language
(the word is the death of the thing: once the object is lost, the
subject only encounters its semblances through the intermediary
of signifiers representing them). On the other hand – we will
return to this in detail – it allows for the production of the phallic
signifier, which symbolizes the loss of the object of jouissance:
the phallus tallows the loss to be metabolized. Without the
phallus, this loss would prove intolerable. Finally, inscribed at
the resolution of the Oedipal process is what Lacan called the
fundamental fantasy, which allows for the positioning of the lost
object (a) in a certain relation to the subject ($): $ ♦ a. The
fundamental fantasy is not a little fiction that the subject recounts
to himself so as to be cut off from reality; on the contrary, not
only will it orient the subject’s desire, but it will also provide
reality with its frame. Indeed, desire is oriented by the quest
for the lost object. We have seen that this is the condition of
the appearance of all the objects that present themselves to the
subject, in other words, all the objects around which what we
call reality is arranged. Should the fundamental fantasy vacillate,
reality itself careens.
Identity in Lacanian theory is, therefore, a three-phase process.
In the first phase, primary repression engages the process
of subjectification, placing its dependence on the loss of the
primordial object; in the second phase, this inaugural loss is
felt again during the mirror stage, when the lost object serves
to support the specular image, covering it by connecting it to
the symbolic; finally, in the third phase, the entire sequence is
stabilized during the Oedipus complex, when the fundamental
fantasy is established, which comes to frame and localize the
object a. Accidents arising during one or more of the phases
of this process will generate a set of phenomena touching on
identity. The cause of the inability to recognize the image of the
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self can be located in cases of early autism (Lefort) or serious
child psychosis (Maleval, 1981). These incidents arise during
primary repression: when Ausstossung (primal expulsion) has not
occurred, the specular image, un-ballasted by the lost object, is
struck with a strangeness that prevents the recognition processes.
How are we to tackle the passing disturbances that affect specular
recognition, like when the young Ferhat saw an object of horror
appearing in the mirror? What happened at that moment, in
the locus of his face, was nothing other than the object a,
without its imaginary covering and devoid of symbolic armature.
In other words, the misadventure recounted by this young
adolescent shows us another consequence of the foreclosure of
the Name-of-the-Father: when the paternal metaphor has not
been produced, the object a, being neither localized nor framed
by the fundamental fantasy, threatens at any moment to reappear
directly in the weave of reality, which it suddenly unravels, leaving
the subject in a state of stupefaction. We will now turn to another
series of disorders, likewise conditioned by the foreclosure of
the Name-of-the-Father: the psychotic subject’s disturbances of
sexed identity. Let us examine this with the case of Schreber,
which will allow us to distinguish disturbances affecting the
coordinates of specular recognition (implying the object a) from
what Lacan names “push-to-the-woman” (where the question of
Other jouissance arises).
DISTURBANCES OF SEXED IDENTITY,
OTHER JOUISSANCE, AND
TRANSSEXUALISM: THE EXAMPLE OF
SCHREBER RE-READ BY LACAN
Daniel-Paul Schreber was a German jurist. In 1884, shortly after
failing in the Reichstag elections, he underwent a psychotic
episode that led him to the rest home of Dr. Fleichsig to be
treated for hypochondria with suicidal ideation. He only spent
a short time there, after which he spent “8 years [. . .], on the
whole quite happy ones, rich also in outward honors” (Schreber,
1903, 46): indeed, in the interval, he had become president of the
Freiberg tribunal (1889), before exercising a mandate following
his election as local representative in the constituency where
he had been defeated in the 1884 elections (Devreese et al.,
1986, 156). Around October 1893, when he was promoted to the
presidency of the Supreme Court of the Dresden district, he had
another psychotic episode, more serious this time, to the point
that after some months, bombarded by multiple hallucinations,
he was relieved of his functions and placed under provisional
tutelage (1895). After a long efflorescent period of his delusion,
he drafted his memoirs to plead his case before a tribunal. He
won his lawsuit in 1902, left the asylum, and published his
Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1903). Some years later, in 1907,
a new psychotic episode returned him to the asylum, where his
state rapidly deteriorated. He died there in 1911. Freud drew
on Schreber’s Memoirs to establish the bases of his theory of
psychosis (Freud, 1910). Lacan made it the guiding thread of
his 1955–1956 Seminar, The Psychoses, before making it the base
of his own theory founded on the notion of “foreclosure of the
Name-of-the-Father” in his text “On a Question Prior to Any
Possible Treatment of Psychosis.”
Following the trail of Freud and Lacan, we will turn our
attention to the second psychotic episode (1893). Schreber
explains that when he was notified of his promotion in June
1893 by the Minister of Legal Affairs – “Dr. Schuring in person”
(Schreber, 1903, 46) – he had dreams foretelling the return of
his illness. One morning, he adds, a “sensation” (rather than a
dream) imposed itself, striking him “as highly peculiar: it was
the idea that it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman
succumbing to intercourse” (Schreber, 1903, 46). He took up
office in the following weeks; but faced with the heavy burden
of work, he says that he quickly “overtaxed [himself] mentally”
(Schreber, 1903, 47). He started to hear crackling noises, before a
fresh “nervous breakdown” occurred, accompanied by troubling
physical symptoms. He writes: “the blood had gone from my
extremities to the heart,” while his mood was “gloomy in the
extreme” (Schreber, 1903, 49). Dr. Fleichsig quickly admitted
him into the care home. Schreber soon fell into catatonic states,
became delusional and confused, with hallucinations. Both Freud
and Lacan looked, in particular, at the initial sensation, which had
arisen on the brink of the phenomena, that of being a woman
succumbing to intercourse. For both, the entire cycle of the
illness – from the virile protest at the start when first faced with
this idea, through to the final reconciliation (Versohnung) with
God, that is, with the father (Freud, 1910), via the delusional
labor itself – finds its cause in this inaugural instant. Indeed, the
entire delusional movement leads Schreber to rearrange reality,
not to make it “more beautiful” (Freud, 1910), but simply to
make it compatible with the initial intuition. According to his
system, the world order had been decomposed, endangering
the whole universe; the only recourse to avoid catastrophe
entails putting himself in a feminine position in relation to
God: once transformed into a woman, he will give birth to
a new humanity, formed of the “Schreber spirit.” Only then
a certain calm appeared, according to his testimony: after the
terrifying experiences of the first phases – composed of invasive
hallucinations, a sense of the world ending, and unspeakable
bodily happenings – a respite emerged, concomitant with the
acceptance of womanly transformation, allowing him to begin
serenely entertaining the various procedures he would undergo
to leave the asylum and put an end to tutelage. At the end of the
delusional process, he maintains his conviction of transforming
into a woman. He says he had observed his specular image
at length: “I venture to assert flatly that anybody who sees
me standing in front of a mirror with the upper part of my
body naked would get the undoubted impression of a female
trunk, especially when the illusion is strengthened by some
feminine adornments” (Schreber, 1903, 248). What can be said
of this movement toward feminization, in the way that Schreber
describes it, and which in some way we feel relates to the specular
image? Is it transsexualism?
In his book Clinique de l’identité (2009), Thibierge notes that
in psychosis, the dimension of recognition or of the image proves
to be fundamentally defective, to a point that, “upholding an
image or a meaning always turns out to be precarious and under
threat. [. . .] This is why, in a psychosis – regardless of the
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apparent solidity of certain delusional edifices, where there is an
attempt to suture this fault– a complete collapse of the subject’s
imaginary coordinates is always liable to occur, that is, a complete
collapse of what we call recognition” (Thibierge, 2009, 23). The
most enlightening example of this fragility of the specular register
is given by the Fregoli delusion, described by Courbon and Fail
(1927). The patient of the original case said that her persecutor,
the actress Robine, embodied multiple personalities, like the
Italian actor Fregoli. She identified her persecutor, in disguise,
in any person she met, and from whom she received “influxes”
of other sensory phenomena. Robine was “always there under the
variety of rags” (Thibierge, 2009, 13). In this syndrome, “the other
party is always the same person,” which indicates a problem where
name and image are not joined: “The name names something
the image fails to cover, to represent, in short, that it doesn’t
allow one to recognize: it is something else” (Thibierge, 2009, 13).
Indeed, the name is no longer articulated to the image, but rather
designates an object, “an x, which is always the same, which in
coming to the fore reveals an inconsistency, even the collapse
of the image and the imaginary in the field of recognition”
(Thibierge, 2009, 13). This object, which shows through behind
the image to the point of unjoining it from the name in order to
become prevalent, is of course the object a, which is always at risk
of appearing again in psychosis (because it is no longer framed
by the fantasy). Let’s specify the three interconnected aspects of
this disintegration in the coordinates of specular recognition.
First, the object a reappears in the foreground, because the
primordial rejection (Ausstossung) specific to primary repression
hasn’t been consolidated during the retroactive phase of the
Oedipus complex, for want of any paternal support. Thereafter,
this prevalence of the object modifies the function of the proper
name, instead of identifying the object in a differential way,
that is, through mere difference from other names (without any
direct link between name and object named). The name here is
conjoined to the object, raising itself to the real that it names.
Consequently, the Image either joins itself to the named object
(allowing it to appear behind each mask), or separates itself
from it during moments of fragmentation (Thibierge, 2009, 20).
Within this framework, we may tackle transsexualism in the case
of the psychotic subject. The psychotic transsexual claims to
have a “feminine” appearance, but this appearance does not fall
within the remit of the usual register of the image, which always
participates loosely in semblance; what the subject targets in this
naming is a being excluded from all divisions and contingencies:
“Femininity is thus the name it gives to an absolutely real
substance that is non-sexed” (Thibierge, 2009, 27). When he asks
for his appearance and civil status to be modified, the psychotic
transsexual targets an absolute identity designated by the name of
the woman, which he has the conviction he embodies “more really
than women” (Thibierge, 2009, 28). Thibierge writes: “Although
he claims he has a feminine image and often makes this claim,
[what the psychotic transsexual aims at] is much rather what
he finds himself identifying in this image, which he regularly
mentions when we question him: the real of a jouissance that
he appeals to and sometimes experiences, a cutaneous jouissance
of the envelope, the matrix, and completeness” (Thibierge,
2009, 28). This variant of the problem was observed in the
Fregoli delusion, where the autotomizing and the foregrounding
of the object a disintegrate the representational function of
the proper name. The name is then joined to the object like
the image, which becomes its simple mask, and is always
identical. In transsexualism, the foregrounding of the object (a
real, which bears a jouissance of the envelope) is joined to
a name (the woman), and compels the subject to modify his
appearance and his civil identity in order to adhere to the real.
In the case of Schreber, are we looking at this process of the
disintegrating coordinates of recognition? We think not: to grasp
what distinguishes the Schreber case from cases of transsexualism
in psychosis, we must relocate it through to the question of
“jouissance.”
The concept of jouissance is central in Lacanian theory, so
much so that it has displaced the question that remained unsolved
for Freud: “What does a woman want?” Lacan asks instead, what
would create feminine jouissance.
Freud organized his theory of libido around the question
of the phallus; why is so much attention focused on the male
organ? Quite simply because “the female genitals [in the child’s
fantasmatic view] never seem to be discovered” (Freud, 1923,
145): sexed division of being is organized around the fact of
having, or not having, a penis. On the man’s side, sexuality
revolves around the organ, the penis, offering an imaginary hold
on the phallic signifier, the signifier of lack, the one bearing
the mark of castration. Male jouissance, which Lacan named
“phallic jouissance,” is entirely subject to the laws of language,
which is, sifted by castration; it is thus limited, circumscribed,
and regulated. Conversely, due to the late discovery of the
female organ, the unconscious lacks a signifier that would
circumscribe women with a definition. Female jouissance is
hence only partially ordered by the phallic signifier, that is, it
only passes partially through castration. Feminine jouissance is
“not all” submitted to masculine jouissance. A woman also has
the possibility of gaining access to “Other jouissance,” a bodily
jouissance both crazy and enigmatic. This Other jouissance is
testified to in particular by mystics: since they are “not all”
constrained in phallic signification, they know, in their privileged
relationship with a consistent Other (God, the Beloved), ecstasies
that give a glimpse of this objectless bodily jouissance by which
the rift in the Other is indicated, that is, the powerlessness of
words to check it. Saint Teresa and Saint John of the Cross left
superb testimonies of these bodily phenomena, ranging from
the most “acute” suffering to summits of ecstasy. Saint Teresa,
regarding the case of a person she says she had known in this
state, writes: “although of short duration, [this state] left the body
absolutely broken; the pulse was so slow it seemed the soul was
on the brink of being surrendered to God, no more nor less. The
body loses its natural heat; but the inner fire that consumes the
soul is so ardent that were it to increase just a little, God would
place it at the height of its desires” (Marie-Eugène de l’Enfant-
Jésus, 1988, 777). Saint John of the Cross also dealt with these
phenomena of “breakings and collapses under spiritual action,”
(Marie-Eugène de l’Enfant-Jésus, 1988, 777), and spoke at length
of “ravishings, ecstasies, dislocations of the bones, that are always
produced when the communications are not purely spiritual”
(Marie-Eugène de l’Enfant-Jésus, 1988, 777). These afflictions
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can be followed, in accordance with regulated procedures and
asceticism, by other forms of divine response. Here is how Saint
Teresa describes this out-of-the-ordinary experience: “a line of
fire so ardent [. . .] I thought I might die. I didn’t know how to
explain it. It is as if an invisible hand had plunged full into the
fire. Ah! What fire and what sweetness at the same time. I burned
with love and felt that 1 min, 1 s more, and I would not have
been able to bear this ardor without dying” (Marie-Eugène de
l’Enfant-Jésus, 1988, 845).
Despite the spectacular aspect of the ecstasies described by
Saint John of the Cross and Saint Teresa, the feminine position
they speak of remains regulated by the Name-of-the-Father, just
like the masculine position: indeed, both positions are situated
in relation to the phallic signifier, a heritage of the paternal
metaphor. Their flights of ecstasy thus conserve a link with the
symbolic order, and this is why these great mystics can testify
to this, in richly descriptive metaphors. This is very different
from the psychotic’s position, whose jouissance is not disciplined
by the phallus, which can give rise to bodily sensations that
are otherwise terrifying, and which, moreover, are very often
tempered only after a long delusional labor. This is what President
Schreber did, mobilizing a heavy symbolic apparatus to construct
a delusion apt to raise the jouissance that was harassing him to
the level of the signifier (thereby absorbing it). Henceforth, we
must distinguish this modality of push-to-the-woman from the
modality that manifests itself in the transsexual clinic.
To begin, we will note that the jouissance Schreber
experienced doesn’t stem from a cutaneous jouissance, or a
jouissance of the envelope, as mentioned by Stéphane Thibierge.
The pivotal moments of his unmanning are inscribed in the same
way as the inaugural sensation of feminine jouissance, which
surprised him at the beginning of his illness: throughout his
book, Schreber testifies to these bodily sensations that gave him
a “definite foretaste of female sexual enjoyment in intercourse”
(Schreber, 1903, 239). He explains that all the barriers that
curb the ravishing and voluptuousness of men within certain
limits, for him “no longer exist, indeed in a certain sense
the reverse applies” (Schreber, 1903, 249). This ecstatic state
sustains his illusion that the beatitudes he has passed through
stem from a subjective position that was emancipated from the
humiliating phallic signification that usually bounds masculine
jouissance (and feminine jouissance too, albeit to a lesser extent).
This ecstatic state will also lead his delusion down the path
of what Lacan called “push-to-the-woman,” a feature of the
ordinary clinic of psychosis, namely the spontaneous slope, for
numerous “psychosed” subjects, to give body (through delusional
elaborations) to The All Woman, that is, to a version of woman
totally liberated from castration.
Likewise, the surface of his body, its superficial envelope, was
not touched by the miraculous paths, but rather the real of the
internal organs, the space inside the body, which is inaccessible
to the gaze. Schreber describes at length, “the miracles that
enacted against the organs of the thoracic and abdominal
cavities.” Likewise, his conviction of being transformed into
woman didn’t come from the image in the mirror, but from
organic sensations, namely that “there were marked indications
of an actual retraction of the male organ; frequently, however,
particularly when mainly impure rays were involved, they
manifested themselves in the form of a softening, approaching
almost complete dissolution” (Schreber, 1903, 142). It was also
the physical sensation of “a contraction of the vertebrae and
possibly of my thigh bones,” and not the (visually) perceived
image of the contours of his body, that convinced him of “a
change in my whole stature (diminution of my body size)”
(Schreber, 1903, 142). We can see that the critical period when
the conviction of unmanning was established unfolded against
the backdrop of the tenacious “impression” (again, physical, not
specular) that his “body had become smaller by about six or eight
centimeters.” (Schreber, 1903, 142).
Let us now try to discern, using Schreber’s testimony,
what distinguishes the paranoiac version of the push-to-the-
woman from the transsexual form it might take, even if not
all transsexualism derives from the push-to-the-woman. In this
article, we will limit ourselves to the clinic of psychosis. The
paranoid subject, meanwhile, treats, by means of (symbolic)
delusion, the invasive jouissance that perturbs the real of the
organism; the imaginary, notably the imaginary that concerns
their identity and bodily surface, does not play a minor role
here: Schreber didn’t see, strictly speaking, the modifications that
occurred in his body. He felt them, from the inside, and moreover
he was fully conscious that the mirror (the image) couldn’t flesh
out this real (which is why he disguised it: not in order to sustain
a failing identity, but in order to sustain his delusion). Despite
this, and contrary to transsexual psychotics, he did not change
his civil status to conjoin his identity to the jouissance he felt (at
no moment did he make a claim for obtaining a female identity,
except at the terminal point of his delusion when he imagined
himself eventually coupling with God in order to engender a new
lineage). However, the psychotic subject who chooses feminine
transsexualism spares himself the delirium via the modifications
brought to his name (symbolic) and his appearance (imaginary).
THE CLINIC OF FEMININE
TRANSSEXUALISM ACCORDING TO
LACAN
By looking at Schreber, Lacan (1955/1956) identified the push-
to-the-woman in its delusional version, without knowing that
20 years later, he would meet psychotic subjects in his practice
suffering from this phenomenon in the form of transsexualism.
Let us reinforce that in using Lacan’s theory, we are interested
in transsexualism as it appears in psychosis. In this article,
we address uniquely the many forms of expression in the
metamorphosis into woman, in psychosis. We can neither infer,
from our observations, the subjective outcomes of transsexualism
in a “normal” or neurotic condition, nor infer a biological or
social existing cause, from any possible example. We cannot
pathologise, on a psychological level, such a subjective choice.
Consequently, in the case of psychosis, it would be inappropriate
to stigmatize the transsexual phenomenon, especially when we
see (we will demonstrate this mostly in the fourth part of the
article) how it allows the subject to avoid the deployment of a
delirium.
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Let us go back to 1976, where, during his clinical presentations
at the Sainte-Anne clinic, Lacan interviewed a biological man,
whose psychosis left him in no doubt that he was a woman
and should become one physically by means of endocrinal
and surgical treatments. Even though Lacan then qualified
transsexualism as pathological, he was also reworking the
concepts of jouissance and identification, deepening the trench
separating the delusion of metamorphosing into woman from
transsexualism. Let’s turn now to the patient dubbed “Michel H.”
Michel H. was hospitalized at Sainte-Anne in 1976, after
having tried to hang himself. He recalls, in speaking to Lacan,
the taste he had developed in childhood for stroking and dressing
in women’s clothing, beginning with his sisters’ clothes, whose
femininity he envied. He would have liked to “be a girl” like them.
He initially wore women’s clothes hidden from the gaze of others,
saying they were “soft on his skin,” “warm on [his] body” and
gave him a feeling of well-being that would have otherwise been
inaccessible. He specifies that this had always given him intense
satisfaction “on a sentimental level” and he counts among his
qualities the fact of being “soft and gentle.” At the time of the
interview, Michel H. still cross-dressed and did what he could
so that his bodily appearance would convey his impression of
being a woman. He shaved closely, wore makeup, and altered
the texture of his skin to arouse a soft look. He modified his
appearance, striving to make it more feminine by obtaining looks
of approval from the Other.
But Michel H.’s insistence on living as a woman in the
relation to the Other does not explain what kind of jouissance
he experienced. Moreover, on the subject of his sexuality, he said
that he was considerably perplexed. At twenty-two years of age,
he had attempted relationships with men and women, to see
which would suit him best, and concluded that neither one nor
the other attracted him (Lacan, 1976, p. 314). With women, he
did not feel like a man; even if penetration did procure for him
a physiological pleasure that he qualifies as “masculine,” leading
him to go “through to the end,” he reported that something
stronger than him contradicted him, and justified him pushing
his partner away. Furthermore, he tried to have sexual relations
with two male childhood friends, but limited himself to timid
caresses because he couldn’t manage to feel like a woman in the
arms of a man. Shortly afterward, he attempted suicide.
Was the inability for him to feel that he was of the opposite sex
to another partner a result of repressed homosexuality, as Freud
first suggested with regard to Schreber (Freud, 1910), or did it
result from a latent push-to-the-woman that Michel H. had not
yet deciphered? In support of this second hypothesis, Michel H.
said he had to negotiate the femininity that imposed itself upon
him, just as much as he had to struggle against the sense of being
abused. He gives an example of a time when he started to cross
dress in public, and men shouted at him in the street and pushed
him around. He felt he was approached in a similarly humiliating
manner each time he met people who he knew; some of them
would speak amongst themselves, point at him, or else try to get
to know him better and go out with him. According to him, these
people laughed at having unmasked him and seen that he was a
man. So, he decided to stay shut at home and “disguise” himself
while taking small quantities of drugs “so as to feel [his] way into
the character a bit better.” By doing so, he managed to see himself
as a “woman dressed as a woman,” unified and coherent, until the
impression of being a transvestite man exhibiting a lie imposed
itself on him again (Czermak, 1996). In these circumstances, the
feeling of wanting to get rid of himself could surge up within him
just as quickly, and he deflected it by breaking the mirror in which
he was looking at himself. Another time, he had tried to “castrate
himself ” by cutting off his penis with a razor blade. He could only
touch the skin due to the pain, which was too intense.
Michel H. adds to the feeling of being a woman, the sense
of being objectified in relation to the Other, depersonalized and
compelled to get rid of what he feels as an excess of the drive
of jouissance. When he tried to castrate himself, he seemed
to be responding less to a demanding paternal Ego Ideal, and
more to the urge to create the lack that symbolic castration had
not inscribed in him. In order to understand this, we should
revisit with Lacan (Lacan, 1972–1973) the myth of Totem and
Taboo (Freud, 1913), according to which a whole only assumes
value if it is contradicted by an exception. For the neurotic,
the exception is the imaginary father he has killed and whose
guilt-ridden memory forces him to renounce incest, maternal
jouissance, in favor of phallic jouissance. In the opposite case,
in which the subject has foreclosed the symbolic father, he lacks
this exception in order to subscribe to the phallic universal and
to singularize himself there. He is thereby exposed to maternal
jouissance, to a sardonic push-to-the-woman and to an anxiety
of fragmentation, which can lead him to hope to remedy this
through self-mutilation in order to create a lack.
But why, in order to mutilate oneself, does one choose the
penis among all the other organs? At the start of life, there is
nothing phallic about the penis for the subject, who takes himself
rather as a whole for the Other’s phallus. Only under the threat
of castration and by inscribing the signifier of the Name-of-
the-Father at the heart of his subjectivity does he phallicize the
penis and turn it into the signifier of desire, the phallus. In other
words, the subject gives up his status as the Other’s phallus by
becoming phallic himself, and by granting the phallus, beyond
its status as a signified, with the status of a master signifier of
the discourse about sex. By endowing it with this added value,
he commits the “common error” (Lacan, 1971/1972a,b, 311) to
which all subscribe. Among other effects, this phallic masquerade
immunizes the subject against the perception of a sexual organ
that is a disgusting deformity to be denounced as an “error of
nature.” This is the case of the psychotic subject who has equally
refused, along with the paternal metaphor, phallic jouissance.
Such a subject experiences the penis as a part of the body
even more threatening than the others, one that targets sexual
jouissance and everything depersonalizing about it. To the extent
that the subject has not established their distinction, he rejects the
penis so as not to be taken for the phallus (of the Other) and, to
this effect, he may equally emasculate himself (Donnelly-Boylen,
2016) and take the surgeon for a castrating father.
Does the subject’s attempted ordering of the invading
jouissance imply a particular relation to identification? Freud
underscored that the anatomical difference between the sexes
had psychical consequences in the matter of sexed identification
(Freud, 1905). Lacan adopted this idea and identified three logical
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phases that allow the subject to opt for a sexed identification
(Lacan, 1973/1974). The first phase corresponds to the mythical
real of the anatomical difference between the sexes that, in
reality, only takes on its value in the second phase, where
the subject adheres to the sexual discourse and interprets
the given data with the aid of signifiers of phallic criteria.
During this second stage, nature succumbs under the weight of
symbolic castration and of the signifier of the phallus, allowing
the subject to subjectively differentiate the sexes. Only then
the third phase can take place, and the subject chooses to
identify himself sexually on either the masculine or feminine
side.
If the subject does not subscribe to the phallic function during
the second phase of sexualization, he will not be able to refer
to the phallus as the base for organizing his jouissance and
choosing a sexed identification. For example, without having
subjectively assented to phallic signification, Schreber (1903)
was passively inhabited by the phallic signifier. He showed this
through his virile protestation (Morel, 2000), which dwindled
in favor of the progressive feminization of his body and his
subjectivity. As for Michel H., he averted the painfulness of
a body that was incoherent with his feminine experience by
physically becoming a woman through gathering information
on the progress of medicine. Notably, he learned that one
is able to “get oneself castrated,” to “have breasts through
hormonal treatment,” and to truly manage to “metamorphose
into a woman.” Reinforced by these discoveries, he asked
plastic surgeons to modify his face and considered similar
steps in order to be castrated and to modify his secondary
sexual characteristics. The idea of “taking oneself for a woman”
gave him the hope of no longer experiencing the “anxieties of
being a man” and of “falling out of character.” Even though
Lacan said that psychoanalysis could not hope to modify
Michel H.’s projects, does this mean they are deleterious to
him?
The recent homologation of transsexualism in different
cultures allows the psychotic subject to envisage an
unprecedented way of establishing a link between jouissance
and identification. Michel H. hints to this by saying that nearly
all of his romantic relationships had failed except the one in
which he behaved as a woman. This was his most recent attempt
with a woman who also had the particularity of “admitting”
that he was a woman: “I was always dressed as a woman,” he
says, “even during penetration, and I felt that I was a woman
during sexual intercourse.” By way of consequence, he managed
to forget that he was a man and lived together with her “like
two dykes.” We will conclude from this that Michel H. was
suffering from a gender dysphoria that afflicted his relations
with men as well as his relations with women, except when the
nature of the relation allowed him to feel like a woman. Could
the jouissance that was being sought out be the jouissance of
the identification with the woman, and this alone? It seems
so, and this identification would be existential for Michel H.,
who affirms that since he was very young he has lived only to
be a woman. Furthermore, he says that he prefers to sacrifice
his life and not have children, to have nothing but to be a
woman.
When Michel H. chooses the signifier “woman” to describe his
sensorial jouissance, and wishes to take on the appearance of a
woman, he is different from Schreber, who elaborates a delusion
in order to justify the term of “unmanning” (Schreber, 1903). On
the contrary, he constructs a project of real metamorphosis and
asks for authorization from society, from medicine, demanding
that the insane source of the drive, his penile organ, be removed.
The psychotic subject who opts for transsexualism strives to
engage in the raison d’être of the other sex thanks to an
appearance and feminine social codes with which to stabilize
himself in the relation to the Other. All in all, for Schreber,
the signifier “woman” justified a devastating imbalance in the
drive, whereas for Michel H., it is destined to regulate and to
humanize jouissance. The psychotic transsexual subject privileges
the delusional imagining of the symbolic inscription of his body
in the relation to the Other, which is nothing less than the
definition that we give to supplementation.
Nevertheless, the primal mark of symbolic inscription in
psychosis continues to have its effects. Not having singularized
himself, the subject still feels himself to be the element of a
whole devoid of exteriority and experiences it in the form of
anxieties of fragmentation. In this way, he is able to tame his
tendency toward the “push-to-exception” (Morel, 2000) and to
invent singular solutions whose clothing is contingent upon an
era or upon a culture. One can be, like Schreber, the woman
that men are lacking, or, like the transsexual psychotic subject,
the one who denounces the order of nature as not being in
conformity with the being of exception that he embodies. This
second eventuality allows the subject to appropriate his push-to-
the-woman subjectively, and to make a claim for an exceptional
destiny by wanting to become even more of a woman. Freud
had identified and qualified psychotic feminization as asymptotic
(Freud, 1910), which Lacan (Lacan, 1958, 572) took into account
in the “push to” of the “push-to-the-woman” (Ménard, 2011).
The push-to-the-woman proceeds from a real dimension,
because jouissance is attested in the body, from an imaginary
dimension – which manifests itself through the subject’s
fascination with the image – and even from a symbolic
dimension, once one has mapped out the position of exception to
which the subject aspires as an avatar of the Ego Ideal. When this
clinical phenomenon is integrated into a paranoiac construction,
the subject creates a new world order around the law of his
being and seeks to rejoin the signifier of “woman” by means of
a delusion that is proportional in intensity to the jouissance that
he is seeking to absorb. Schreber exemplified this by delaying his
transformation into a woman under the pressure of the delusion’s
work-in-progress, until he endowed the woman that he would
embody with a character that was so exceptional that he could
couple with God and generate a new lineage.
As for Michel H., he explains (as other psychotic transsexuals
also do), the destiny of the singular exception that he covets.
After 2 weeks of hospitalization, he says he finds it hard to bear
only being allowed to wear his women’s clothes at night and
that this privation makes him nervous during the day, except
when he dreams of his project of metamorphosis. He specifies
that this consists of becoming a woman of exceptional beauty,
as has been promised him by numerous scientific articles that he
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has read on the subject, in which a man could be much more
slender, much more beautiful, and much gentler, than a true
woman. Michel H. turns the signifier “woman” into the point
of exception that he lacks in order to create a new order of
jouissance, and thus generates the conditions in which his sexual
jouissance is tamed. Lacan’s conceptualization of the knotting
between Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real clarifies this even though
the psychoanalyst himself was against exploiting it for the subject
of transsexualism.
FEMININE TRANSSEXUALISM
AS A SOLUTION
Very early in his teaching, Lacan turned his attention to the
dimensions of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic that
organize subjectivity. He spoke about them between the lines
of his thesis on the case of Aimée (Lacan, 1932) and then
reconsidered their dialectic again on the occasion of the three
significant periods that marked his approach to the psychoses.
In the first period, which occurred at the same time as the
Seminar that he dedicated to them (Lacan, 1958), Lacan maps
out how the conditions of the psychical structure and its points
of fracture are determined by a psychical, logical, and linguistic
causality. In psychosis, the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father
prevents the symbolic from absorbing the imaginary. During a
second period, he ventures into an analysis of Schreber’s Memoirs
(Lacan, 1958) and puts the emphasis on the jouissance of the
Other, namely the Real against which the psychotic subject can
sometimes defend himself by identifying a persecutor. Lastly, he
opens up a third and final period (Lacan, 1975/1976) in which
he turns his attention to the way in which the psychotic subject
can compensate the fragile articulation between the Real, the
Imaginary, and the Symbolic.
To understand this, we may recall that at birth, the child
begins by struggling against maternal jouissance, the Thing or
das Ding, and does no more than babble a subjective claim. By
turning to the father, the infant subsequently allows the Real,
the Imaginary, and the Symbolic to be organized (Bousseyroux,
2011). He consolidates his subjective structuration by taking the
name of his father, who names him, a step which produces a
symptom at the same time. In neurosis, the symptom is thus
correlative to the nomination relative to the sinthome (Lacan,
1975/1976). However, in psychosis, the subject does not have
the paternal reference to constitute for himself a symptom, thus
it is all the more necessary for him to fabricate a sinthome a
posteriori, a name, in such a way that that the equilibrium of
the structure will hold together. This step must circumscribe
jouissance (the Real), arrange the body in the relation to the
Other (the Symbolic), and exorcize the uncanny that is linked
to the Imaginary. When the Name-of-the-Father is lacking, the
sinthome does not replace it, but rather allows subjectivity to
become organized.
After having conceptualized the sinthome, Lacan did not
return to his work on transsexualism in psychosis, nor did
he have any occasion to, because medicine and law were far
less sympathetic to transsexuals than they have been in recent
years (Bonierbale et al., 2005). In 1976, transsexualism was
often considered morbid, whereas today, regardless of one’s
subjective structure, one can more easily solicit medicine to
modify his secondary sexual characteristics and proceed to “sex
reassignment.” That is to say, a transsexual can legitimately
request that the error of nature from which he suffers should be
the object of reparation. A legal system has been put in place in
numerous countries offering him the possibility of changing civil
status and of taking a first name of the new sex to which he asserts
to belong. Science and society taken as a whole have supported
the project of transsexuals’. But what does this specifically allow
the psychotic subject to do? In which conditions does it stabilize
him or not?
Contrary to the delusion of metamorphosing into woman,
feminine transsexualism (Stoller, 1968) in psychosis proceeds
from the subject’s election of the signifier “woman” in order to
attach the body to it. That is to say, he resolves his perplexity with
regard to his body and language by overinvesting the signifier
“woman” which gives the Real a meaning and offers a cartography
of the drive that is more sensible. For him, this signifier performs
at the same time as an advent of the body and an advent of
signification (Hubert, 2007). By knotting bodily jouissance to the
signifier, the subject obtains the sense of coherence that he was
lacking, turning the upsetting penile into the final obstacle before
reaching harmony. It is quite natural that he should thereafter
request that it be cut off (Chiland, 2011).
Michel H. mentions this when he recounts a childhood
nightmare in which he was terrified of a blond woman who cut
off legs and bodily members in a veritable bloodbath. In order to
protect himself against this woman, who “cut [also] the members
of the family,” he would sleep alongside his parents in their bed.
Michel H. thinks that he had discarded this nightmare by cross
dressing, and yet he underlines that he has since colored his hair
blond, and has also worn a blond wig. He makes a comparison
between the blond woman and his own blondness. Furthermore,
he remembers that this woman had aging facial features that
gave her a hollowed appearance, more like a man, and that she
was very unkind. He concludes that perhaps it related to the
pain he inflicted on his parents by cross dressing, because in his
dream, this woman always spared him by doing his parents harm.
For his part, he rejects the harm that he could do to them by
thinking of getting castrated far away from them, in a clinic in
Morocco.
The psychotic subject often has a body that persecutes him
at the level of the drive, except when he manages, as does
Michel H., to turn the image perceived from the outside into the
very thing that supports him. This step is uncertain, because if
the Other does not consent to it, for example when the Other
unmasks, mocks, or rejects the subject, the subject experiences
with fright the impression of being the wasted object of the Other
from which he struggles to detach himself (Czermak, 1996).
He feels again the impression of having been let go, of being
“fleetingly improvised” as Schreber put it (Schreber, 1903) and
of risking subjective death. But if the Other authorizes him to
identify himself with a woman, the subject annuls the mortifying
identification with the phallus and extracts himself from the
maternal jouissance. He succeeds by reaching a sensual and
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scopic jouissance of which he wants to be the exclusive agent.
Only when he was dressed as a woman did Michel H. say his
body experienced a satisfaction: “I truly find my personality, my
character, and my gentleness.”
In transsexualism, where metamorphosis into woman is not
delusional but requested, the subject aspires to give meaning
to the excess of jouissance by qualifying it as feminine and to
support himself to this effect in the eyes of the Other. The subject
strives to re-knot with his ideal Ego in a pacified manner by
looking at himself in the mirror that has never reflected unity.
When he dresses as a woman, Michel H. says that he regains
his gentleness. He completes this observation in the following
way: “You can see it. My gestures are different, and my behavior,
too.” Outside of him, the double being contemplates himself
from the outside and becomes the person that should have been
looking at him and recognizing him. Additionally, Michel H. says
he has written a poem entitled “L’éternelle-La femme blonde”
[“The Eternal One–The Blond Woman”] in which he describes
Corinne, the female character he has forged for himself, and to
whom he bears a singular veneration. He addresses her as though
it were not he, but an idealized version of himself. This pacified
way of living through the schism is possible at those moments
when he manages to “forget that he’s a man” and when he makes
any sense of discordance disappear behind an image that he
overinvests.
But this is not all. It is not only a matter of looking like a
woman (Serrano, 2007), but also a matter of being a beautiful
woman, with this highly particular relation to the exception.
Indeed, feminine transsexualism has the peculiarity, as opposed
to its male counterpart, of worshipping this appearance in a
singular fashion and of wanting to exhibit a remarkable beauty.
Alone in front of the mirror and dressed as a woman, he
sublimates what he perceives as a waste object, this phallus that
has not been detached. With a look that is subjugated by the
artifices that he models, he anticipates the body that was primarily
experienced as deformed (Czermak, 2001). If he obtains a look
of admiration from the Other, this represses his anxieties of
fragmentation. When speaking of the blond woman, Michel H.
says that he very quickly forgot that he had cross-dressed. For
him, the scopic pleasure represses the obscenity of the body and
allows whatever surrounds it to be invested in, in particular, the
clothing that is destined to give the Ego a consistency. With the
mask that he wears, the subject admires himself in the Other’s
look, which subtracts the jouissance of the organ and attenuates
the persecution of the look.
The scoptophilic aspect of the transsexual (Safouan, 1974)
is often associated with a tendency toward exhibitionism, even
to being a star. This comes from the desire to ward off the
annihilating look of the Other in order to be, instead, sustained
by the latter through a highlighting of the body. Etymologically,
“advent” refers back to the question of dignity (Castel, 2003),
which is to be underlined as central to the transsexual procedure.
First, alone in front of the mirror, and then in public, the
psychotic subject re-actualizes the specular experience lost to him
due to not having been named at the moment of appropriating
the image in the mirror. By harmonizing the body and jouissance
in the Other’s look and the look from his fellow peers, he asks
for their authorization so as to finally appropriate the image.
He lies in wait for the look and the words of the Other to function
as a unary trait, as a testimony that the egoic assumption can
take place. From this perspective, losing the organ would allow
everything to take shape around it. Furthermore, to be inscribed
subjectively in the collective is correlative with an assumption of
identity.
Ordinarily, during the specular stage, the subject not only
discovers his image, but also discovers that it will not be enough
to correspond with his being to the others. This is connected
to a symbolic hole that is traumatic for every single subject.
This pushes us to absorb the gap between these two images, and
this is what the first name (Ginestet-Delbreil, 2003) facilitates by
repressing the image of the body. But when the subject fails to
be named, he is unable to appropriate the scopic image capable
of repressing the bodily drives and must get by with a body that
has not been anchored to the signifying order. Could it be that
cultivating two other distinct images, whether an obscene image
or a feminine image, would allow him to re-actualize the process
and to provide the Other with a new opportunity to recognize
him subjectively? The subject who looks at himself for the first
time in the mirror has not benefitted from the assent of the Other,
but it gives him the opportunity to make up for it and to validate,
beyond the feminine seeming, the feminine being.
Wearing the feminine mask allows the psychotic subject to
knot in a different way the dimension of the drives, the image, and
the signifier “woman.” This signifier does not have the function
that the signifier of the phallus holds, that of sexualizing desire,
but rather the merit of differentiating the masculine and the
feminine without making any appeal to the father and facilitating
the subject’s subscription to a classifying identification (Morel,
2000). In this sense, a transsexual subject stripped of filiation and
of origin proceeds to an auto-engendering that he would like to
see validated, and chooses for himself an identification of sexed
appearance that holds the value of a primordial identification.
Let us underscore that this identification is the source of
subjectification because the transsexual, psychotic subject who
has not been able to say “my name is. . .” and “I’m a boy,” can
now say “I’m a woman” and proudly introduce his new first name
through the signifier “Mrs.” This is an experience of signifying
reassignment that has a performative scope, unlike the delusion
of metamorphosing into woman.
During subjective construction, the child frees himself from
the gaze thanks to the name he is given, which he accepts and
uses to mark out the imaginary by means of the symbolic. The
transsexual follows the same path, as Michel H. demonstrates in
choosing for his poem three first names in the guise of a signature:
“Michel,” “Michelle,” and “Corinne.” First, he feminized his first
name, then changed it for another that represented the woman he
wants to become. As for his choice of the name Corinne, Michel
H. explains that it refers to a childhood memory of a young girl
called Corinne: “it’s a first name that I’m fond of, so I gave it to
myself.” According to Ginestet-Delbreil (2003), the act of naming
oneself is symbolic, because, in this way, the subject replaces the
unconscious image of the body with the specular image to which
he gives a meaning. The transsexual psychotic subject requests an
inscription of his new first name in civil status, and re-launches
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the aborted process of articulating the Real and the Imaginary by
means of the Symbolic.
In summary, we must distinguish, in the realm of
psychosis, the delusion of metamorphosing into woman from
transsexualism, where the conviction of being a woman functions
for the subject as a project of inscription into the field of the
Other and fellow beings. While surgery is counterindicated for
the former (where the delusion needs to be contained), in the
latter, it allows the transsexual subject to refuse to be the Other’s
phallus by inscribing himself into the symbolic order. Indeed, the
transsexual wards off the effect of his foreclosure of the phallic
function with the aid of a new sexual discourse, with which he
replaces sexed identification. Moreover, he defends his image in
the Other’s look and supports it by means of an authentic claim
for subjectivity. He knots the Symbolic to the Imaginary and no
longer expects the Real of the body to confirm him by demanding
his anatomical sex be modified (Millot, 1983). In this sense, the
transsexual symptom functions as a supplementary device to the
Name-of-the-Father, in other words, as a sinthome (Cavanagh,
2016).
Before concluding our theoretical and clinical journey on the
function that feminine transsexualism takes in psychosis (for
instance, the exemption of a delirium), we wish to add that
we could have offered the reader a historical, anthropological,
or even sociological approach to the phenomenon. However,
this was not out intention, as it would have deviated from the
strictly clinical aspect of this article. Psychoanalysis, based on the
teachings of Lacan, must observe the choices of the subject and
the outcomes of the subject’s ethics, particularly, that of not giving
up his desire, obviously including when it is related to a choice of
gender and/or sexual object.
CONCLUSION
In the first part of this article, we proved that after the
subject has gone through the logical moment of the mirror
stage, he constitutes for himself an egoic identity. If, on the
other hand, he does not appropriate his image with the help
of an other that names him, his jouissance instrumentalizes
him and the body fragments. Our re-reading of Schreber
allowed us to observe that the excess of jouissance can in this
context take on a feminine sense for the subject and feed a
delusion of metamorphosing into woman. But, the structuralist
approach (Redmond, 2013) allows us to better understand the
classical delusions. This way of distinguishing the different
types of jouissance, in accordance with the identification that
is at stake for the subject, also sheds light on the way that
transsexualism in psychosis can be presented as a solution.
Indeed, not all transsexualism falls within the field of psychosis,
but when it imposes itself within this subjective structure, it
allows the subject who is not in the throes of the delusion
of metamorphosis, but who is grappling with the jouissance
of the Other, to subscribe in a different way, via the phallic
function, to classifications of gender. It thus facilitates the
subject’s inscription of his body and subjectivity in the collective,
if the surgeon and lawmaker consent to it. Henceforth, he can
sustain himself in a relation to the Other whose recognition
previously failed him.
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Current psychological research on contemporary medicine, and in particular genetics,
often targets the underpinnings of patients’ attitudes and behaviors with respect to
biomedical knowledge and healthcare practices. But few studies approach these
underpinnings as manifestations of the unconscious, while so doing could (in
particular) help understand patients’ apparent difficulties to understand information,
and to subsequently act accordingly (e.g., in making therapeutic decisions, etc.). We
hypothesize that Lacan’s (1966) remarks (“The place of psychoanalysis in medicine”) on
the transferential nature of the demand addressed by the patient (or his family) to the
doctor can help account for these issues: demand filters medical information received
from the practitioner, and thereby motivates subsequent decisions. In this paper, we try
and shed light on this thesis, and focus on pediatric genetics. We start by describing
the manifest doctor-patient-family relationship in the pediatric genetics consultation, in
order to show where unconscious determinants can come to play a role (1). We then
explain Lacan’s theory of demand: what the patient unknowingly demands is knowledge
(savoir), the object of which is the body of jouissance – the libidinal experience of
one’s body through the first libidinal exchanges with the Other of early infancy, whereby
the subject is assigned by the Other (subjectification) a specific fantasmatic status
organizing his desire. Patients’ understanding and attitudes thus vary so greatly because
of this pre-existing filter. Healing and cure are merely apparent objects of the medical
demand, which is an invocative drive seeking knowledge on the cause of one’s desire:
medical demand is an instance of transference. Doctors should thus enable patient
subjectivization, i.e., help them realize that their demand’s genuine object lies in their pre-
existing subjective coordinates (2). In pediatric genetics, apparently paradoxical family
attitudes heavily draw on what G. Raimbault, drawing on Lacan, called implicit demand,
the object of which is knowledge about the family fantasy giving shape to the guilt
of possibly transmitting the disease. We give a clinical example, then show how the
concept of demand helped us elaborate the core of a research project on the subjective
effects of a genetic deafblindness handicap (3).
Keywords: genetics, pediatrics, demand, subjectivization, medical knowledge, transference, desire, doctor-
patient relationship
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INTRODUCTION
One of the main axes of contemporary psychological research
on healthcare and biomedicine revolves around the impact
of personalized medicine. This is especially true with respect
to medical genetics and genomics, which are undergoing an
exponential development. This development gives rise to new
problems, such as the use of unsolicited or secondary findings,
supplemental information unrelated to the patient’s initial
request, and yet of potentially crucial medical importance (such
as BRCA 1 or 2 – see, e.g., Christenhusz et al., 2013).
In the 2000s, psychotherapists and family therapists were
already aware of the need to reflect upon the consequences of this
emerging state of affairs:
“When we go for a routine physical, rather than making blanket
pronouncements about increasing exercise, lowering cholesterol,
and other preventive health measures, our physicians and nurse
practitioners are likely to draw individualized blueprints of
personal risk factors based on our specific personal genotype”
(McDaniel, 2005, p. 27).
The question raised by this state of affairs is: what are
the personal, family and social effects of the possibility to
receive individualized medical recommendations based on
an unprecedented knowledge of one’s genetic and genomic
characteristics?
To answer this question, social science research has explored at
length the personal and family effects of contemporary medicine
(cf. e.g., James et al., 2006; Hens et al., 2016), including the
indirect constraints embedded in genetic healthcare pathways
(e.g., Vailly, 2013). Within psychology, this question has been
scrutinized by cognitive-behavioral psychology (e.g., McDaniel,
2005) or systemic approaches, but few studies have addressed it
through the lens of psychoanalysis, with the exception of e.g.,
Feissel-Lebovici (2001), Aubert-Godard (2005), Driben (2011),
Gargiulo et al. (2017). Yet, the originality of psychoanalysis
lies in that it can spell out the unconscious determinants at
play in the reception of medical information (see e.g. Balint,
1957; Debray, 1996; Gutton and Raimbault, 1975; Raimbault,
1975; Sausse, 1997), of which genetic information is a subset.
The specificity of a psychoanalytic approach to this question
lies in its grasp of how apparently remote autobiographical
elements and repressed childhood situations influence the very
thought processes of information understanding, by structuring
the individual’s personality up to the very way in which she
asks for help and assistance – and what she thereby genuinely
expects.
Therefore, psychoanalysis can shed an original light on
two pressing issues which, albeit encountered daily in clinical
practice, are rarely dealt with directly in research papers,
especially outside of French-speaking psychoanalytic literature:
(1) the unconscious determinants of patients’ difficulties to
understand genetic information; and
(2) the unconscious determinants of subsequent attitudes
or behavior disregarding (or even contradicting)
recommendations based on this information – e.g., in
taking therapeutic decisions, from short-term life-or-death
transplant to long-term therapeutic compliance.
While biomedical and genetic knowledge have developed
exponentially since Lacan’s (1966) lecture at the Salpêtrière
Hospital (entitled “The Place of Psychoanalysis in Medicine”), we
believe that the theory of the demand in the medical field laid
out in this lecture can be of help in spelling out the unconscious
determinant(s) at play in the reception of genetic information.
Some of the literature partly addresses such unconscious
determinants upon the reception of medical information in a
Lacanian fashion, e.g., in the French-speaking psychoanalytic
tradition (Del Volgo, 1997; Brun, 2005 gathers important
collective proceedings on this topic; Lebrun, 2017; Weber, 2017).
But we would like to approach them from an angle which, to
our knowledge, hasn’t been explored as such – especially in
genetics – that of the concept of demand1 (We leave aside non-
Lacanian approaches of demand in medicine; integrating them
would require a systematic review).
Thus, our goal will be to provide a presentation of the Lacanian
approach of demand, and to explore how it can be drawn upon
to understand the clinical stakes of pediatric genetics. As we
shall see, the interest of this specialty is that the unconscious
dynamics (aimed at by the notion of demand) implicitly at work
in the background of what is explicitly asked of the medical
practitioner, come more readily to the forefront: it is generally
parents who come for their child’s disease – this leads them
to express how they unconsciously represent their child. This
family context thus helps shed a strong light on the weight of the
unconscious fantasies at work in parental demand, which bear on
the psychical appropriation of the information and subsequent
decision-making.
In fact, the present paper presents a research trajectory, from
the experience of partaking in pediatric genetics consultations
within a renowned clinical genetics unit (Imagine Institute,
located at Necker Hospital in Paris), to the elaboration of a
funded research project on the psychosocial determinants of
the impact of genetic deafblindness (DéPsySurdi, see section
“Subjectivizing the Demand in Pediatric Genetics: Clinical
Practice and Research Perspectives”). The methodological
constitution of this project is the result of the present work on
demand, which represents its preliminary stage in many respects.
We first provide a description of the manifest doctor-patient
relationship in the pediatric genetics consultation, in order to
point where unconscious determinants can come to play a
role. We then develop Lacan’s understanding of the demand in
medicine – that is, in the patient–doctor relationship. We then
apply this understanding to pediatric genetics, by focusing on
what Raimbault, a pupil of Lacan’s, called “implicit demand”; and
we show how it this concept formed the starting point of the
aforementioned research project.
1While we stuck to the usual English translation, the meaning of the French
“demande” differs from that of the English “demand,” as will appear below in more
detail. While the English “demand” implies a positive requirement, and frequently
a dimension of command, the French “demande” (especially in its psychoanalytic
understanding) mostly refers to the expression of helplessness – so much so that it
often means to beg or to implore.
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Our central idea is that Lacan’s understanding of the demand,
the genuine object of which isn’t medical information and/or
healing but knowledge of one’s fantasies about what takes place in
one’s body, allows for what we propose to call subjectivization –
that is, an awareness that the core object of one’s demand lies
elsewhere than in healing or care. Subjectivization accounts
for the apparent discrepancy between the information explicitly
received to the patient and his family, and their understanding
and subsequent actions.
It is by taking into account this unconscious search for another
knowledge at work in the patient’s demand that the medical
practitioner will be in a position to both enable moments of
subjectivization, and deliver an adjusted medical response (both
in tone and in content) without being unknowingly caught in the
patient’s implicit demand.
THE MANIFEST
DOCTOR-PATIENT-FAMILY
RELATIONSHIP IN THE PEDIATRIC
GENETICS CONSULTATION
This description of the pediatric genetics consultation derives
from OP and RP’s participation to routine clinical consultations
in the pediatric genetics unit of Necker-Enfants Malades Hospital
(Paris), and subsequent exchanges with medical practitioners in
the context of these consultations. In other words, material in this
section is not derived from research projects or investigations, but
from routine practice.
In France, Necker Hospital has always been at the
forefront of an interdisciplinary dialog between medicine
and psychoanalysis – both in medical genetics and in child
psychiatry. At the time when Lacan examined “The Place
of Psychoanalysis in Medicine” (1966), one of his early
followers, Ginette Raimbault (M.D., Ph.D., psychoanalyst, who
introduced Balint groups in France along with her husband
Emile Raimbault) was head of an INSERM (French National
Institute for Mental Health) unit working on hereditary
child metabolic diseases. Since then, the interaction between
psychoanalysis and pediatric genetics at Necker has been
constant: many consultations are carried, on an ordinary basis,
by a pediatrician-geneticist and a psychoanalyst, who contributes
to the consultation as he sees fit (and can, if needed, meet with
patients afterward).
Classical medical genetics is mostly concerned with
Mendelian inheritance of pathogenic variants (along with
random spontaneous mutations, called de novo); as such,
it mostly focuses on monogenic diseases – accounted
for by the variation of a single gene – or, at broadest,
on a defined set of genes. Pediatric genetics is thus the
best setting for psychoanalytic work on the personal
impact of genetics: since it revolves around Mendelian
transmission, its effects can be best witnessed in clinical
contexts where families come to the Medical Genetics Unit
to sort out both the name and the cause of their child’s
disease.
This is typically a three-step process: first a clinical
examination (comprising the proposition to undergo genetic
sequencing and, in case of acceptance, the signature of an
informed consent form), followed by sequencing (genetic
analysis, on the basis of questions raised by the clinical
examination), and then – a couple weeks later – by the
announcement of the diagnosis (or lack thereof), along with
therapeutic advice (if possible).
A specific trait of pediatric genetics is that clinical examination
involves questions regarding potential antecedents in family
history: the geneticist, in addition to undertaking a clinical
examination of the child and questioning his parents, searches
for signs of the disease in previous generations and relatives
while drawing a family tree. This entails that the explicit
parental demand to the practitioner directly puts parents
themselves in a position to receive confirmation that they
have transmitted the disease – if the genetic character of the
disease hasn’t been established already. This context cannot
but trigger family guilt: whatever the results of the analysis,
the anxiety to have passed on the disease is in everyone’s
minds – to the point, not infrequently, of inducing momentary
psychical splittings, as when parents, e.g., leave out of the family
tree a deceased relative who happened to have signs of the
disease.
After sequencing (biological analysis), another consultation
is planned for the announcement of the diagnosis. It is often
extremely emotional, due to the guilt-laden anticipation –
conscious or not – of having in fact transmitted the disease:
learning that the child indeed has a genetic disease would be
synonymous with having passed it on to him, news which can
sometimes trigger deferred psychotic or psychotic-like onsets –
be they momentary or revealing a personality structure –
if parents are fragile. (In de novo cases, where the child
is the first to have the disease because of a spontaneous
mutation in the parents’ sexual cells, we often witness guilt
as well, but in a reversed form, so to speak: parents feel
guilty because their child is the only one affected with the
disease.)
A striking feature of such consultations is that, after the
practitioner has taken the time to announce the diagnosis,
and then given information about the transmission of the
disease (dominant vs. recessive, etc.) and the therapeutic and
lifecourse implications for the child, parents often have great
trouble making sense of the medical information they have
received – be it immediately or, more frequently, shortly
afterward. Often do the geneticists find themselves in a position
to have to explain again the mode of transmission and its
implications, up to a point where it clearly appears that the
real question isn’t “what is the disease and how has it been
transmitted?,” but “Why us ?” – in other terms, an attempt
to make sense of blind biological fatality. The geneticist is the
bearer of bad news, his speech is very often received as an
oracle-like prediction (Feissel-Lebovici, 2001; Munnich, 2014);
yet, even when he has successfully isolated the pathogenic
variant, parents are often perplexed and cannot make sense
of these traumatic news. This is often evidenced in their
spontaneous question about what can now be done to cure their
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child – while it has just been made perfectly clear to them
that only symptom-oriented care (at best) could hereafter be
implemented.
Geneticists experience the same type of perplexity during
follow-up consultations about medical decisions and care: often
do they see that the previously communicated (and repeated)
information concerning the stakes of proper therapeutic
decisions doesn’t seem to lead the parents to what would, from
the outside, appear as the most reasonable decision – such as
transplant, choice of medically adequate treatment, etc.
For example, in pediatric immunogenetics, it is not rare to
see parents refusing life-saving bone-marrow transplants for their
children, because of the residual 10% risk of lethal outcome –
while, by refusing, they could be seen as in fact becoming
responsible for their children’s future death, bound to happen if
the immune system keeps deteriorating for genetic reasons.
How can a Lacanian approach to the patient–doctor
relationship taking place in pediatric genetics account for this
often paradoxical gap between the objective, medical information
transmitted to parents and patients, and its subjective reception
and elaboration? We first need to lay out Lacan’s understanding
of the demand in contemporary medical consultations (2). We
will then use these elements to explore how they come to play in
pediatric genetics (3).
THE MEANING OF THE DEMAND IN THE
CONTEMPORARY MEDICAL
CONSULTATION
A Demand for Knowledge About
Jouissance of the Body
In his remarks on “The Place of Psychoanalysis in Medicine”
(Lacan, 1966), Lacan writes that psychoanalysis can help medical
practice – and is, in this perspective, part of it – since it can spell
out what is at stake in the “authentically medical position” (Lacan,
1966, p. 301): namely, the mode of response to what the patient
unconsciously expects from the doctor, through what Lacan calls
“the demand” (id., p. 302).
Paradoxical as it sounds, the patient’s doesn’t primarily expect
healing, which can be provided by therapeutic devices and agents
(surgery, drug, etc.). Aside from healing, “a certain something
remains constant, and every doctor knows what it is”: demand.
And “the significance of the [patient’s] demand, wherein the
medical function authentically comes to play” (id., p. 302), is
that it is a “demand of knowledge.” That is, the demand to the
medical practitioner is an instance of what psychoanalysis calls
transference (Lacan, 1966, p. 308), whereby the subject supposes
a knowledge in the addressee of his demand, thereby considered
as a “subject supposed to know” (Lacan, 1973, Chap. 18; various
texts in Brun, 2005 refer to this point).
The object of this type of knowledge is not the body
defined as what can be “photographed, X-rayed, calibrated,
diagrammatized” and so on (Lacan, 1966, p. 303), by the medical
devices which help establish the diagnosis and heal. In other
terms, the body is not to be understood, in the footsteps of the
“Cartesian dichotomy between thought and extension” (id.), as a
highly complex machine, in spite of the exponential development
of exploration and imaging devices which present a purified
version of it (cf. e.g., Potier, 2009). One should be aware that
this exponential development fostered an “epistemo-somatic rift”
(Lacan, 1966, p. 303) encouraging to (mis)understand the body
(soma, in greek) upon which medical knowledge (episteme)
should focus – and to miss that it is not to be understood as a
complex machine, but as a nexus of “jouissance” (id.). This rift is
typical of contemporary medicine: the diversity and complexity
of healing devices, machines and substances developed on the
basis of biomedical scientific progress tends to overshadow the
specific function of the practitioner, whose very authority and
personal prestige were deemed throughout the ages to be a central
part of his function (Lacan, 1966, p. 297).
What the patient demands from the doctor as subject
supposed to know is a knowledge about the jouissance taking
place in his body. “The rapport thanks to which the doctor is
what he is, is the patient’s demand. Inside this strong relationship
where so many things take place, this dimension is fully revealed
in its original meaning (. . .): the relation to the body’s jouissance”
(Lacan, 1966, p. 309).
We thus need to briefly account for the constitution of the
subject’s relationship to the body’s jouissance, in order to shed
light on the patient’s demand to the doctor.
The Subjectification of Jouissance:
Drive, Demand, and Desire
In this context, jouissance refers to the untamed, not-yet-
organized circulation of excitation which takes place in the
infant’s body during the primordial interactions with his human
environment, whereby the infant experiences his body as such
(Lacan, 2016, Chap. 13). It is a pure erotic experience of one’s
organic being, in all its intensity – a jouissance of being (cf.
also Dimitriadis, 2017) [It should be noted that while this
jouissance involves direct interactions with the Other as real,
since it corresponds to a “mythical” (Lacan, 2016, Chap. 13)
moment prior to the linguistic constitution of the subject qua
separated – more on this just below, the Other is correspondingly
not experienced as separated, but as part of a field of jouissance
comprising himself and the infant].
At this mythical (i.e., reconstructed) stage of the constitution
of the subject, in the infant’s state of absolute dependence upon
its environment (Freud’s Hilfslosigkeit), it is the Other’s response
to the bodily manifestations of anxiety to which jouissance gives
rise which retroactively converts these manifestations into an
appeal. This is the first step of the process of subjectification
(subjectivation, Lacan, 2016, Chap. 12): the infant’s alienation to
the Other’s response.
The paradigm case is the infant’s cry (cf. Lacan, 2016, Chap.
24): it is the “marks of [the Other’s] response that had the power
to turn his cry into a call” (Lacan, 2006, Remarks on Daniel
Lagache’s Presentation). While the infant’s cry doesn’t initially
express a specific need (since he wouldn’t know what he needs),
but instead manifests an unbearable excitation and is thus at the
level of jouissance, the Other (typically, the caregiver) interprets
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it as a call for a specific action on his side – which will, in turn,
be determined by how He unconsciously represents the infant.
This representation is constituted by signifiers, discrete elements
of speech considered as distinct sounds, independently of their
usual socially determined meaning; the specific signifiers which
constitute the Other’s representation of the infant will form the
latter’s ego-ideal, the very core of his subjectivity.
These marks, in which the all-powerfulness of the response
are inscribed, are thus circled in reality with the signifier’s
line. It is not without reason that these realities are
called “insignias.” The term is nominative here. It is the
constellation of these insignias that constitutes the subject’s
ego-ideal (Lacan, 2006, Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s
Presentation).
That is to say, the function of the Other’s response is to enable
a primary identification to bind the infant’s jouissance through
signifiers which represent him for the Other. Herein lies the “all-
powerfulness of the response.”
The function of the Other’s initial response is thus to turn the
bodily jouissance of the cry into what Lacan calls an “invocative
drive” addressed to the Other (Lacan, 1973): by understanding
the cry as a call, the Other leads the infant to experience what
takes place in his body as a drive (with its source in a specific
erogenous zone, the mouth), aimed at satisfaction and expressed
as a demand. The cry thus becomes “the radical knot where
demand and drive come to be bound” (Lacan, 1973, session of
May 27th, 1964 – modified translation).
At this level of primordial alienation, where the infant qua
subject of jouissance is bound to grasp what happens in his body
through the response of the Other, he undergoes an identification
to what Lacan calls object a (objet petit a) of the Other, wherein
he comes to wonder “what the Other wants from him” (Lacan,
2016) in so responding to his cry.
Therefore, he needs the Other to elucidate the signifiers of
primary identification (often written S1 by Lacan) by drawing
on a constellation of complementary signifiers (written S2) that
account for the Other’s choice of S1. Typically, S2 stands for the
Oedipal narrative which accounts for the unconscious choice of
S1 by the Other – most often the mother. [In most cases, the
maternal or mothering Other will be in a position to provide such
a constellation by drawing on the Name-of-the-Father, Lacan’s
formal re-writing of the Oedipal complex (Lacan, 1998); for a
more detailed recent presentation, cf. e.g., Razon et al., 2017, see
section “The Manifest Doctor-Patient-Family Relationship in the
Pediatric Genetics Consultation.”) In such a second step, whereby
the primordial Other is divided by the necessity to account for his
choice (most often by leaving room in the S2 for another figure
co-defining the infant’s identity through a paternal function, such
as the father), the object a to which the infant was identified
acquires a new meaning through S2 – and the infant can thus
know what he is for this Other, i.e., what the Other wants from
him (Lacan, 1973, 2016). From the perspective of the Other,
the infant becomes an object of desire since he is viewed as a
representative of another desired figure; he becomes, as Lacan
puts it, “phallicized” (Lacan, 1973). From the perspective of the
infant, the maternal Other thus appears as desiring, since she
also cathects someone else, who partly accounts for what the
infant represents for her. Lacan calls this second step “separation”
(Lacan, 1973).
Thus, at the end of this reconstructed two-step process of
unconscious subjectification by alienation/separation, the cry has
become a demand qua invocative drive. Correspondingly, its
object, i.e., what could genuinely satisfy it, isn’t merely the oral
partial object (breasts, etc.). Since the maternal Other, when
giving the breast to a crying infant, draws on the signifier-based
framework of Her representation of the infant qua object a of
desire, it is Her repressed representation of the infant qua object
a, which constitutes him as subject of the unconscious, which is the
object of his demand.
Thus, once the subject is constituted, everything that he comes
to voice will, from the perspective of the unconscious, have to be
understood as a demand, unknowingly articulating the signifiers
which constitute the coordinates of the particular object a that he
is for the Other.
Consequences on the Patient–Doctor
Relationship: Subjectivizing the Demand
It is for this reason that Lacan starts his conference on “The Place
of Psychoanalysis in Medicine” by stressing the “gap between
demand and desire” (Lacan, 1966, p. 302): while the manifest
demand addressed to the practitioner looks like a demand for
healing, the repressed signifiers of the desire of the Other to which
the demand can be related show the discrepancy between what he
demands and what he genuinely desires.
When he is sent to the doctor, or comes to meet him, the
patient does not simply expects to be healed. He puts the
doctor to test, to see whether he can bring him out of
his condition; this is altogether different from healing the
patient, since this demand can imply that the latter very
much wants to remain ill. Sometimes the patient wants us
to authenticate his status of illness; in many other cases, his
obvious wish is that we help him remain ill, treat him in the
way he wants, which will help him remain settled within his
illness. I just need recall a recent experience: a patient, who
recently came in a formidable state of permanent anxious
depression having lasted for more than 20 years, was in utter
terror at the idea that I could do something for him.
(. . .) As soon as we’ve pointed out [the gap between demand
and desire], it appears that it isn’t necessary to be a psychoanalyst,
nor even a doctor, to know that once anyone, be they our best
friend, male or female, demands something, it is in no way
identical to – and, sometimes, in full opposition with – what they
desire (Lacan, 1966, p. 302).
What the patient desires can thus, depending on the
structure of the signifiers which constitute him as subject of
the unconscious, amount to various types of relationship with
the Other – such as, e.g., remain dependent from Him (“help
him remain ill”) – which are then projected onto the person
of the medical practitioner. These types of relationship with
the Other refer to the type of object a to which the subject is
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reduced by the desire of the Other – this is the formula of the
fundamental fantasy (Lacan, 1973), which formalizes the role and
the organ (mouth, etc.) to which the subject identified at the step
of separation from the Other. It is this formula, to which the
subject identified in separation, which gives its shape to the desire
of the Other, and that the subject unknowingly seeks to uncover
by voicing his demand, which is at bottom transference, i.e., a
“demand of knowledge” (Lacan, 1966, p. 308).
Hence the importance of the medical response: strictly
understanding what the patient says as a demand for healing via
a cure, and thereby missing that the signifiers used or hinted at by
the patient are indirectly referring to something else (the object
a) will prevent the doctor from grasping that what he wishes is to
know the truth about the structure given to his jouissance by the
desire of the Other, i.e., about the fantasy at play.
Correspondingly, it is by taking into account this unconscious
search for another knowledge at work in the patient’s demand
that the medical practitioner will be in a position to deliver
an adjusted medical response (both in tone and in content).
In the medical consultation, especially in the context of heavy
medical examinations, leaving out this dimension will typically
lead the patient to persist in fulfilling his unconscious role in
the fantasy (e.g., request more and more examinations, or act
in opposition with what he is told). Reversely, the medical
consultation (as Del Volgo, 1997 has insisted) provides the
practitioner with a context propitious to help the patient gain
awareness, and question the consistency, of the knowledge of
his jouissance that he supposes that the Other holds – in a
movement analogous to the end of a psychoanalytic cure, where
transference is dissolved, i.e., the consistency of the subject
supposed to know collapses (Lacan, 1968(unpublished), Session
of January 10th, 1968). “On the one hand, [the doctor] deals
with an energetic cathexis, the potency of which he cannot
suspect if he isn’t told about it” – i.e., transference – and
“on the other, he needs to put this cathexis between brackets
precisely because of the power that he possesses, that he needs to
distribute [i.e., medicine, OP], and of the scientific plane within
which he is situated” (Lacan, 1966, p. 308). In so doing, he
puts his medical knowledge between brackets in order to gain
access to the patient’s representation of his knowledge about
jouissance, in order to be able to provide the right, adjusted medical
response.
This analysis of the medical function thus implies that it
depends on the doctor to hear the patient’s demand as the
manifestation of a desire to know something about his jouissance:
he can thereby help the patient become aware of his desire,
instead of responding to the demand solely by drawing on the
position granted to him by his knowledge and position. This is
certainly not to say that the medical practitioner has to explicitly
interpret the patient’s discourse: a medical consultation isn’t a
preliminary interview prior to the initiation of a psychoanalytic
cure. But being aware that the demand’s object is knowledge upon
the patient’s jouissance can help make the latter aware that the
truth of his demand (in the psychoanalytic sense of the term:
the subjective truth) doesn’t primarily lie in medical knowledge –
once again, a preliminary step to an adjusted medical response in
terms of cure and healing.
We propose to call the awareness that the medical practitioner
can help the patient experience a subjectivization of the latter’s
demand. Subjectification, the word aptly chosen by A. Price to
translate the French word “subjectivation” (Lacan, 2016, Chap.
12), refers to the constitution of the subject through alienation
to, and separation from, the Other; we view subjectivization as
referring to something different, namely the process of becoming
aware of the essentially subjective nature of the demand to the
practitioner concerning what happens in his body. Subjectivizing
means understanding, to some extent, that the meaning of
this demand derives from elements of one’s own subjective
coordinates; in Lacanian terms, this amounts to understanding
that the signifiers of one’s demand have to be referred to the
primary signifiers in the Other, which assign the subject to a
certain position qua object a of the desire of the Other. A medical
consultation carried by a practitioner aware of both medical
stakes and the subjective meaning of demand, can help the patient
partially grasp this subjective meaning, and question what it is he
wants from the practitioner.
Focused on producing in the subject an interrogation on the
genuine meaning of his demand (and open up the way for a
potential further inquiry on this desire itself), subjectivization in
a medical context is a the condition for adjusted medical action,
and a potential preliminary step with respect to a potential deeper
elucidation – such as the one carried in a psychoanalytic cure,
which ultimately aims at helping the subject move beyond his
assignation as object a of the Other’s desire.
An Instance of a Setting Enabling
Subjectivization: The Instant to Say
We can illustrate this concept by commenting an example
through which Del Volgo presents the original clinical setting
that she calls the “instant to say” (1997, p. 61), which we view
as a typical setting enabling subjectivization. Del Volgo, both a
hospital medical practitioner and a Lacanian psychoanalyst, gives
examples of how, within the context of a medical consultation,
she asks patients about their medical history in such a way as
to enable an “instant to say.” This refers to a logical moment
when patients, by recalling the important events of their life in
the course of recounting the history of their illness and its various
stages or occurrences, are presented with the opportunity to grasp
the signifiers with which they describe the illness in relation to
important prior life events. While this opportunity isn’t presented
explicitly, or as a goal of the consultation, this associative process
opens up a space aside the healing-oriented dimension of the
medical response, and gives them a chance to grasp and question
the meaning of their medical demand – that is, the structure given
to their jouissance by prior important life events. In so doing, she
doesn’t respond do the immediate demand but tries to help the
patient gradually become aware of the subjective significance of
his symptoms, i.e., of the fantasy which underlies them.
We will comment on a case that she presents in Del Volgo
(1997). An elderly asthmatic patient, Ange, experienced a severe
asthma crisis upon learning from the specialist that his wife,
after 3 weeks of nocturnal hallucinations which made him feel
“lost” much like an orphan, was in fact not suffering from
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a brain tumor, as initially suspected. Being asked to recall
important elements in his life, he indicates that he has been
repeatedly and unexpectedly been put in the position to be the
closest to his mother: his father died in the beginning of World
War II, when his older brothers had already left the house.
He experienced this as becoming the man in the house – an
important signifier for his personal history. His first respiratory
crisis occurred at age 30, “the age of adulthood” (where he could
go see a doctor, unlike childhood where he was once beat up for
doing so): he accidentally started spitting blood during physical
effort, which (he says) includes physical intimacy. It thus seems
that respiratory problems became associated with fantasies of
castration as a punishment for Oedipal desire, summoned (in
accordance with Freud’s bi-phasic trauma theory) in the context
of adulthood and conjugal life. It is as if the guilt of desire
(being put in the position of a phallicized object a vis-à-vis the
Other in the fantasy) could find a somatic expression – castration
symbolized as bleeding out during effort; and that, conversely,
the presence of the Other was experienced as the approach of
a forbidden oral object a, thus causing in his body a symbolic
equivalent of castration through hysterical conversion.
This interpretation was confirmed through transference
during the next consultation, when he mentioned that a cardiac
accident occurred while he was eating sweets on the anniversary
day of their first consultation: the reminiscence of the first
consultation during the second one, and the structure of the
Oedipal fantasy within which he is caught up, accounts for
the symbolic equivalence between the forbidden pleasure of
eating sweets and becoming intimately close with the mother of
childhood. The cardiac accident is thus a transferential replica
of his first respiratory problems at age 30, confirming that these
series of bodily events can be understood against the background
of the way in which his jouissance is structured – namely,
through an oral Oedipal fantasy. Those elements constitute the
background on which the patient’s associations, supported by
Del Volgo’s psychoanalytic listening, shed a partial light during
this sequence; it was then up to the patient to subjectivize the
connection between these past events and the actual occurrences
of respiratory problems.
We now draw on this conceptualization of the demand as
carrying a repressed desire open to subjectivization (and open to
further elucidation), and we turn to pediatric genetics.
SUBJECTIVIZING THE DEMAND IN
PEDIATRIC GENETICS: CLINICAL
PRACTICE AND RESEARCH
PERSPECTIVES
Explicit vs. Implicit Demand in Clinical
Practice
As mentioned above, pediatric genetics is particularly interesting
to study the demand at work in contemporary medical practice
since the structure of the fantasy which organizes the patient’s
desire (and thereby filters the reception of information) is often
more readily accessible during the consultation. The reason for
this is that the demand for diagnosis and cure is voiced for
the child by the parents – the unconscious of whom largely
contributed to structuring the child’s – who feel responsible for
his disease since it is viewed as hereditary (at least potentially: the
cause is sought for in previous generations).
As we mentioned above, the main proponent of applying
Lacan’s theory of the medical demand to pediatric genetics was
Ginette Raimbault, in charge of research on the unconscious
stakes of medical consultation at INSERM (French National
Institute for Mental Health), and whose clinical field was a
pediatrics unit working on hereditary child metabolic diseases –
the precise hereditary cause of which was largely unknown
at the time, for lack of adequate sequencing apparatus and
knowledge. In 1966, right after Lacan gave his lecture on
“The place of Psychoanalysis in Medicine,” she gave a didactic
presentation of her research – which consisted in assisting silently
to consultations and elaborating on the unconscious dynamics
at stake in the family’s demand. This is how she describes these
dynamics:
“As early as during the first interview with the medical
practitioner, the parents formulate the results of their own
research about the etiology of the disease, considered as a trouble.
(. . .) The parents’ formulation shifts from ‘this makes no sense’
to ‘this is the sense we give to this disease”’ (Raimbault in Lacan,
1966, p. 313).
While the subjective sense given by the family to the
disease partly depends on the medical antecedents, the lack of
information or the powerlessness of medical science (op. cit.), it
largely derives from “the elaboration of fantasies concerning the
agent of the disease” (Raimbault in Lacan, 1966, p. 313).
“the child’s disease thus seems to reveal the family’s problem and
its singular drama, which is actualized in the disease and feeds off
of it, but isn’t properly speaking caused by it. The difficulties faced
by doctors partly stem from the fact that they only hear the explicit
demand (‘Cure this crisis!’) and not the implicit one (‘This is our
drama’)” (Raimbault in Lacan, 1966, p. 313).
Any medical discourse concerning this hereditary agent will
thus be filtered by a pre-existing family fantasy organizing what
she calls implicit demand to the practitioner.
The specificity of the notion of implicit demand is that it
refers to the parents’ quest for help with respect to a guilt
which, albeit coming to the forefront at the occasion of the
child’s disease, predates it. Raimbault’s main clinical finding
is thus that the disease is filtered by the “window of the
fantasy”: to put it in the Lacanian framework which underlies
her work, the disease is experienced by the parents (especially the
mother) as a punishment for their normal anticipated fantasmatic
elaboration of the status of the child qua object a, prior to
any medical condition. Since this anticipated elaboration – way
before the birth of the child – cannot but include an element of
repressed guilt (even in neurotic contexts: a child is always partly
viewed by both parents as an Oedipal child), the subsequent
disease is experienced, through an unconscious displacement, as
punishment for the accomplishment of the Oedipal wish to have
a child with one’s parent.
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The notion of implicit demand thus directly echoes Lacan’s
characterization of transference on the doctor as a demand
for knowledge upon one’s jouissance, and narrows it down to
the context of hereditary diseases: what is implicitly demanded
is knowledge about the family fantasy giving shape to their
guilt. It is in this wake that Raimbault insists that what
matters most, on the side of medical practitioners, is to prevent
stereotyped attitudes and responses based on unquestioned
personal assumptions concerning what stands as appropriate
behavior in those medical situations: they are laden with
the practitioners’ personal subjective organization, and would
prevent him from grasping the family’s implicit demand
(Raimbault in Lacan, 1966, p. 314).
The core of the knowledge that he is unconsciously asked by
the family – the object a of the family’s demand, so to speak (and it
most often is the mother’s, in these circumstances) – concerns the
particular structure of the desire of having a child, of which they
(unavoidably) feel guilty. Responding to their implicit demand
would amount to help them subjectivize this family fantasy.
An Example of Implicit Demand: A
Consultation in Pediatric Genetics
The medical context in which hereditary child diseases nowadays
take place is pediatric genetics, wherein such implicit demand
unfolds. The following example illustrates elements present
within a host of consultations, and comes from OP’s practice
of pediatrician-genetician/psychoanalyst dual consultations in
pediatric genetics. Only de-identified data were used; therefore,
an ethics approval was not required for the use of this material
as per the Institution’s guidelines and national regulations. It
shows how the explicit demand carries an implicit one, which
filters both the reception of information and the subsequent
decision-making of patients.
In this context, that of the pediatrician-genetician and
psychoanalyst, the difference with both Del Volgo’s setting and
Raimbault’s research is that the psychoanalytic perspective is
embodied by a specific person (not the doctor), who also actively
partakes in the consultation, sometimes to an important extent –
when the weight of the implicit demand comes to the forefront.
It is not only listening, but also active interventions, which open
up a space of subjectivization, i.e., of relating the signifiers of
the demand (the explicit demand, in Raimbault’s quote) to those
of the underlying fantasy of the implicit demand of the family
singular drama. This is sometimes needed in order to shed light
on the extent to which this demand filters medical information
and subsequent behavior.
The following example is reduced to a few elements
for anonymity reasons. A young mother of two adolescents
was extremely reluctant to try a bone marrow transplant
which could save them both of a rapidly developing disease
enabled by a hereditary recessive immunodeficiency. Hearing
the unmentioned guilt present in her speech, OP told her
“in any case Madam, you are not responsible for your sons’
disease” – in order to stress that she couldn’t know, medically
speaking, that mothering them would lead to transmitting them
the disease, but that her apparent sorrow might be rooted
somewhere else. She replied (thereby illustrating the equivocation
enabled by the signifier “guilt”): “what do you mean? I am
by no means irresponsible! I’m doing my best here!” Her
mastery of French language was more than sufficient to rule
out a cognitive explanation for her apparent mistake. In so
responding, she showed us how guilty she does feel for their
disease, experienced transitively as a punishment for what (in
the rest of the consultation, in relation to biographical elements)
most likely appeared to be the structurally normal (see section
“The Subjectification of Jouissance: Drive, Demand, and Desire”),
predating Oedipal fantasy of receiving a child from her father –
the paradigm forbidden desire of which, at a certain level,
she unconsciously expected the consultation to relieve her, by
helping her formulate it. The singular drama was thus that she
unconsciously experienced this forbidden desire, upon which
becoming a mother largely relies, as directly punished by the
disease. It is this unconscious connection, qualifying her relation
to her children qua phallic objects a (because of the Oedipal
structure of the Other organizing her unconscious), that she
needed to subjectivize; for ultimately, the way to partly soothe
this guilt is to start by acknowledging it, which is the object of
her implicit demand to medical knowledge about what takes place
within her children’s bodies, and therefore filters how she heard
OP’s intervention.
Unfortunately, this subjectivization (realizing the relation
between her experience of the disease and a guilt of a
different origin) was made extremely difficult by the pressing
therapeutic context, where a decision had to be made in the
near future concerning the bone marrow transplant. In other
words, aside the response which she unconsciously sought
concerning the fantasmatic cause of what was taking place
within their children’s bodies, a healing-oriented response also
had to be given her concerning the stakes and urgency of the
transplant. Upon hearing about the necessity to soon make a
decision concerning this matter, she said she was extremely
reluctant to accept it, because of the residual 10% chance of
lethal outcome (in spite of the certainty of such an outcome
in the absence of transplant). One can wonder whether a
masochistic need to be punished for the Oedipal character of
her fantasy, which enabled her to represent her children as
phallicized objects a in the first place, could account for her
decision: wouldn’t a lethal amount (inexorable in the absence
of transplant) symbolically amount to a paradigm punishment
for her forbidden fantasy? In this case, what appeared to be the
structure of her fantasy could account for her fantasy, with its
masochistic components. Her behavior, seemingly paradoxical
with respect to the perspective of healing and cure, thus appears
in a new light (see section “Consequences on the Patient–Doctor
Relationship: Subjectivizing the Demand”).
Demand-Based Starting Point of a
Qualitative Research: The Subjective
Effects of Genetic Deafblindness
Finally, we would like to give a brief illustration of the demand-
based rationale of an ongoing qualitative research based on
this conception of the demand in pediatric genetics. This
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multidisciplinary research focuses on the subjective effects of
genetic deafblindness on autonomy in child, adolescent and adult
patients with Usher, Wolfram and Stickler syndromes (research
codename: DéPsySurdi). It is funded by the French Rare Disease
Foundation (“Fondation Maladies Rares”); RP is its principal
investigator, and it has been made possible by a close partnership
with the Reference Center for Genetic Deafness (INSERM –
U587, dir. Dr. S. Marlin).
What we briefly present here is the nucleus of the
psychoanalytic rationale of this research, jointly conceived by RP
and OP on the basis of a Lacanian approach to the demand in
the context of genetics (and in particular pediatric genetics). This
nucleus is both the result of a research on medical demand with
a focus on pediatric genetics, and the basis of the specifically
psychoanalytical contribution to the DéPsySurdi project; on this
basis, collaborators in psychology, medicine and social science
joined in order to turn this nucleus into an exploration of the
effects of genetic deafblindness at a psychosocial level. (Our
methodology, which we cannot fully unfold here, relies on semi-
structured interviews using sign language or tactile sign language,
in order to leave as much room as possible for association,
and more generally punctual emergences of formations of the
unconscious.)
The gene-based Usher, Wolfram and Stickler syndromes
gradually affect both hearing and sight up to partial or total
auditory and visual deficits, resulting in deafblindness (a specific
handicap, wherein large parts of audio-visual compensation is
impossible). The effects of this handicap on one’s autonomy
appear to vary greatly; it has important psychiatric comorbidities,
such as depression due to increased social isolation. We decided
to examine the effects of deafblindness on autonomy in child,
adolescent and adult subjects because autonomy is centrally
impacted by this handicap, and is thus the natural manifest
object of family and patient demand: the demand for medical
and social help and support greatly focuses on compensating this
handicap, especially in parents with children and teens affected
with these syndromes. Therefore, various strategies, devices (e.g.,
technological) and personalized supports (personal or family
assistants, etc.) are devoted to this compensation, and thereby
help young patients and their parents achieve social participation
and self-realization: the explicit objects of the families’ demands
are means to ease the burden of the handicap and facilitate
interaction.
This initial context raises specifically psychoanalytic
questions: doesn’t the variety of available supports sometimes
cloud the subjective significance of the syndromes? In other
words, behind the need for help and support, does the current
available medico-social leave room for subjectivization in the
families’ and patients discourse on the handicap? To what
extent can they question the signifiers which, at the manifest
level, they use to refer to the everyday impact of the handicap,
and ways to alleviate its burden? This would mean having the
opportunity to relate the gene-based loss of autonomy (along
with the parental guilt which accompanies it and is reinforced
by genetic sequencing) to what Raimbault called the predating
family fantasy which gives its particular sense to their child’s
handicap. In this respect, a particularly sensitive question is
the degree to which the child’s participation to the family
fantasy – and conversely, his degree of autonomy with respect
to it. What room do they leave for the gap between their child’s
autonomy in the expression of his demand, and their own
representation of him (laden with the guilt of his syndrome,
which clouds the structural predating guilt)? And in cases where
this gap is thin, is his demand devoid of singular desire, i.e.,
just a reflection of his main caregiver’s fantasy, in which he
would be caught up? Or does it present aspects of a singular
desire of separation qua phallicized object a, waiting to be
acknowledged as such? This stake is particularly crucial, since the
context of deafblindness leaves less room for separation, since
communicating often requires to use tactile sign language – and
thus to touch. What of the potential equivocity of the signifier in
these contexts?
These are the questions which led us to decide to focus on this
cluster of syndroms, in order to help doctors position themselves
with respect to the unconscious question concerning one’s body
at play in the demands for support that they receive.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we wanted to draw on Lacan’s take on the demand
to stress that the exponential development of personalized and
stratified medicine, which help provide previously unexpected
adjusted cure and healing, requires medical practitioners to
remain sensitive to the dimension of the demand for knowledge
about jouissance, in order to prevent their response (cure,
investigations, etc.) from reinforcing the underlying repressed
fantasies, with their masochistic basis.
It is even more important when the object of this knowledge
is what takes place in someone else’s body: these situations are
often quite projective, in the sense that it is difficult for caregivers
to acknowledge that their understanding of their child’s bodily
symptoms is heavily influenced by his role in their fantasy. This
is particularly true when the child represents the object of the
Mother’s (and not the couple’s) fantasy, as Lacan wrote in the first
“Note on the child” in 1969 (Lacan, 1986).
The unconscious guilt of having transmitted the disease, even
in cases where transmission cannot be established (which are
numerous, even as of today), contributes to these projections. It is
for this reason what we chose to focus on pediatric genetics, since
this clinical field is both saturated with such projections, but at
the same time open to potentially disalienating interventions –
especially if children themselves, as well as other members
of the family, actively partake in the medical exchanges, so
as to distinguish their own speech to their parent’s implicit
demand.
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